DIALOGUE ON DIALOGUE

A RESOURCE BOOK FOR THE DEVELOPING DIALOGUE THROUGH PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY COURSE FOR TEACHERS

Produced under the EU Socrates Scheme by the Menon group, consisting of educators from 11 European countries.

MENON: Developing Dialogue through Philosophical Inquiry
Comenius 2.1 Action 226597-CP-1-2005-1-MT-COMENIUS-C21
The MENON Partners
Dr. Joseph Giordmaina is a lecturer at the Faculty of Education, University of Malta. He lectures in Philosophy of Education, and is the coordinator of The Programme for Critical and Creative Thinking in Education within the same Faculty. Dr Giordmaina has been involved in the teaching and development of curricular material for the teaching of thinking in schools as well as with adults. He has participated in a number of conferences on this area and is an active member of SOPHIA, the European Foundation for the Advancement of Doing Philosophy with Children.

Roger Sutcliffe
Society for Advancing Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in Education, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM

Educational Consultant, President of SAPERE, the Philosophy for Children (P4C) network in UK, and of ICPIC, its international equivalent. He has taught at all levels, from Kindergarten to University, and now specialises in educating teachers in facilitating Philosophical Enquiry and Thinking Skills. He has adapted one philosophy text-book for use in UK middle school, and has co-written two other resource books for developing philosophical enquiry in upper primary and secondary schools. He is a former vice-Chair of the Values Education Council, UK, and is on the editorial board of Teaching Thinking, and of the Philosophy in Management journal. He has been advisor in a number of projects in UK involving
P4C, including Philosophy for Global Citizenship, and Philosophy for Emotional Literacy, and is currently leading the revision of the 3-level SAPERE training structure.

Rob Bartels

INHOLLAND University, THE NETHERLANDS

Rob is fellow worker of the Centre for Philosophy with Children in the Netherlands, he is a teacher of Philosophy with Children at INHOLLAND University in Alkmaar and Haarlem, and he is a teacher at a primary school in Boskoop, a village near Rotterdam. In the 1990’s he discovered Philosophy with Children and became a participant in the Centre for Philosophy with Children. From 2002 until 2006 he was coordinator of the Centre. He developed several projects on Philosophy and Creative thinking for the primary school and teacher education, in cooperation with the Centre for the Development of Creative Thinking in Antwerp (Belgium).

In 2004 he held a Delphi inquiry on the future of Philosophy with Children in education in the Netherlands and Flanders. As a result of this, he developed a research program with teachers and counselors on the practice of Philosophy with Children in primary schools. His book ‘Children Philosophize’ was published in 2007. It is a book on the methodology of Philosophy with children, based on the research program.

In 2006 he started the program and inquiry ‘Democracy and Philosophy’. The aim of the program, which is initiated by the Centre, is to give tools to teachers in primary schools to develop Philosophy with Children in their classrooms in the framework of democratic citizenship. The research program, facilitated by
INHOLLAND University, is there to evaluate the results of the program and to show that Philosophy with Children contributes to democratic Citizenship.

Zaza Carneiro de Moura
Portuguese Centre of Philosophy for Children, Lisbon, PORTUGAL

Zaza Carneiro de Moura has been the Director of the Portuguese Center of Philosophy for Children since its inception in 1988, in the scope of the Portuguese Society of Philosophy. She has a degree in Philosophy by the University of Lisbon, as well as a postgraduate degree in Contemporary Philosophy. She was Secretary of the Portuguese Society of Philosophy from 1986 to 1991 and treasurer from 1991-1996.

As part of her formation in P4C, she participated in several conferences at Mendham and IAPC, as well as in Spain and Australia, followed by her own training doing philosophy with children for about two years. Her main activity has been linked to the developing of teacher and teacher-trainers formation and school implementation of P4C, and translation and publishing of the IAPC curriculum. She has been working with several institutions in educational projects, giving courses and conferences all over the country. She participated in numerous International Conferences, namely of the ICPIC, in Brazil, Taiwan, Mexico, Australia, Spain, besides organizing International Conferences in Portugal.

In 1994 she was certified as an expert teacher–trainer in P4C under the specific conditions called by Portuguese law decree. She has published several articles on P4C and other topics focused on the work of Karl Popper and Rousseau. She is responsible for the content of the CPFC website and is currently coordinating a group of teachers engaged in the production of new materials as resource for
teachers who visit the site. At present she also coordinates a recent extension of the CPFC in Portalegre, Alentejo.

Felix García Moriyón
Autonomous University of Madrid, SPAIN

He has written several books about philosophical and educational topics, with a specific focus on practical philosophy; human rights, political philosophy, education and philosophy for children.

In 1981 he was a founding member of the Spanish Society of Philosophy Teachers and in 2001 of the Spanish Centre of Philosophy for Children; he was the president in 1991-1994 and 2003-2004. He was also founder member of Sophia, the European foundation for the dissemination of Philosophy for Children. He is member of the ICPIC and in 2005 he was elected vice-president. He is a board member of several journals of philosophy, education and philosophy for children. He is the coordinator of a stable research team on the implementation of philosophy in education and has published some research on this subject. He has conducted many workshops on different topics related to education and the teaching of philosophy, and has also participated in many national and international conferences and congress on philosophy and education.
Ieva Rocena
The Center of Philosophical Education (CPE), Riga, LATVIA

M.A. in Philosophy, M.Ed. in Philosophy for Children, Chair of the Center of Philosophical Education, Latvia.

Ieva Rocena is a lecturer, teacher educator, project manager, and author, with more than 10 year experience in the field of Philosophy with Children. She has studied Philosophy, Philosophy with Children and Management of Education in Latvia and the United States. Ieva is one of the pioneers in the field of PWC in Latvia and co-initiator of the Center of Philosophical Education (1998). Ieva has more than 10 year experience in working in higher educational institutions in Latvia (Teacher Training and Management Academy (1998-2001), University of Latvia 2002 -2008) and in The Netherlands (NHTV, since 2009) in the fields of Philosophy of Education, Values Education, Philosophical Thinking, and Management. She has been a national consultant for the UNDP and The World Bank Educational projects in Latvia. Ieva is a member of the ICPIC (International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children, 2001), ENIRDELM (European Network for Improving Research and Development in Educational Leadership and Management, 2005), and a Board member of SOPHIA (2004) – The European Foundation for the Advancement of Doing Philosophy with Children.

Leman Çetin
International Small Hands Academy, Istanbul, TURKEY

Leman Çetin, (Turkish) used to be an English as a Foreign Language teacher. She has worked in this field for 14 years (both in the state and private sector) and has attended programmes at
Cambridge UCLES. She has also organized three International Congresses about high quality early childhood and primary education, the third of which was in 2008.

Since the 21st century’s society is changing, children are changing too. To offer the best education available so far (including foreign language learning, philosophy for high level thinking skills, ICT-integrated learning, life skills and teacher in-service training) she is opening a primary school in September 2007. www.utopyaschools.com

### Daniela Camhy

Austrian Center of Philosophy with Children (ACPC), Graz, AUSTRIA

Study of Philosophy, German Language and Language Studies at the Universities of Vienna and Graz (Austria). Dissertation on “Karl Bühler’s Language Theory” in Graz/Austria Ph.D 1980. 1980-81 Research Associate at the Research Center for Language and Semiotic Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana USA (Prof. Dr. Thomas A. Sebeok). Studying at the Speech and Hearing Science Department at Indiana University, Completed a postgraduate study and specialist training as a teacher-educator and workshop director in Philosophy for Children at the “Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children” at Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey, USA in 1982. 1983 Teaching Associate at the Institute of Philosophy at University of Hamburg, Germany. 1984–1987 and (break because of three children) 1990-1992 Assistant Professor at the Education Department at the University of Graz, Austria. 1990 Honorary Doctorate of Montclair State University, Montclair New Jersey, USA. Lecturer at University of Innsbruck, at Trinity College at Dublin University, Ireland and at University of Hiroshima, Japan. Coordinator for elementary and secondary
school teachers in public schools for the school experiments “Philosophy for Children” in Austria. Teacher-trainer and lecturer in Australia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, USA. 1999 Master in German language studies and literature, psychology, pedagogy and philosophy at University of Graz, Austria. Completed a postgraduate study in “International Project Management” at the University of Graz in 2001. From 1995-2009 organizing and realization of EU-projects (European Netd@ys, Socrates Comenius Action 1, Socrates Comenius Action 2.1, Socrates Comenius Action 3.1, Daphne Programme, KoKoLeLe, Sokrates Grundtvig Action 2, Sokrates Lingua 1, Lifelonglearning: Leonardo da Vinci, Comenius ) with partners from Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK. From 1992 - 2009 Director of the Austrian Center of Philosophy for Children, the first research Center on Philosophy for Children in Europe.

Main research and project areas: language philosophy, philosophy for children, ethics, human rights, citizenship education, languages, linguistics, critical thinking, psychology, pedagogy.

**Erzsi Ercek**

Trade, Catering and Tourism Secondary and Vocational School,
Budapest, HUNGARY

Erzsi Ercek has been involved in Philosophy for Children for nine years, and has used the P4C method in two elementary schools in Tata with students from the ages of seven to twelve.
She was trained by Sapere, and has helped to train teachers to do Philosophy with Children in several courses organised by the Hungarian Pedagogical Centre of Budapest.

She has also taken part in two international Comenius projects for 5 years (Project 100 and Taxi). Both were European platform for schools doing Philosophy with Children. At the moment she is teaching History of Philosophy to eighteen to twenty-one year old students at a secondary school.

**Beate Børresen**

Oslo University College, NORWAY

Associated professor in Religious Education, Oslo University College. M.Phil. in History of Ideas, University of Oslo, 1975. She has written a book about religious festivals (1997), and is co-writer of two books about philosophy in school (1999 and 2003). All three books are used in the education of teachers in Norway. During the past few years, she has been working on developing training for teachers and teaching material in philosophy with children and religious education. Since 2000 she has been leading projects in philosophy in many schools in the Oslo-area.

In August 2004 Børresen started, together with her colleague Bo Malmhester, an experiment in philosophy at one primary school in Oslo. The children from stage 1 to 4 have one hour of philosophy a week. They are making the material, doing the teaching and training the other teachers at the school so that they can take over after a while.
In Norway philosophy is a part of religious education. In 2004 the government proposed that philosophy might be a new subject in primary schools from 2006. Before that there shall be experiments with philosophy and development of curriculum in philosophy. This work starts in January 2005. The emphasis will be on doing philosophy more than learning about. Børresen and Malmhester were in September 2005 appointed leaders of the experiment with philosophy by the Directorate of Education. The project will go on until August 2007.

Hannu Juuso
University of Oulu, FINLAND

Hannu Juuso is currently a lecturer at the Oulu Teacher Training School, University of Oulu. His expertise and areas of research include teacher education, philosophical inquiry in education, dialogue and education and pedagogical action. He is a board member of SOPHIA, the European Foundation for the Advancement of Doing Philosophy with Children, a referee for the journal Childhood and Philosophy: A journal of the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children, chair of the Research committee of Oulu Teaching School and member of the advisory board of Complex Thinking - ICPIC conference in Padova, Italy 2.-4.7.2009. He has also published a number of publications on the subject of Philosophy for Children.
| INDEX |
|------------------|--------|
| **Introduction** | 16     |
| 01 Reasons and Supporting Evidence for the Benefits of Practising Dialogue in the Classroom – Roger Sutcliffe | 26     |
| 02 Why Dialogue Is Not Always a Good Idea in Education – Felix García Moriyón & Roger Sutcliffe | 56     |
| 03 Communities of Conversation – Joseph Giordmaina | 70     |
| 04 Community of Inquiry and Dialogue – Zaza Carneiro de Moura | 84     |
| 05 Developing Dialogue through Philosophical Inquiry – Daniela G. Camhy | 116    |
| 06 Promoting Citizenship Education by means of Dialogue in the Classroom – Lucianne Zammit | 136    |
| 07 A wiser approach to PLTS, SEAL, PSHE, Citizenship and Cross-curricular Dimensions – Roger Sutcliffe | 158    |
| 08 Dialogue, Self and Education – Hannu Juuso, Timo Laine & Ieva Rocena | 166    |
| 09 Postmodern Insights into Dialogue – Joseph Giordmaina | 192    |
INTRODUCTION

Fundamental points

It is surely incontestable that human education - indeed human progress as a whole - would have been far behind what it is now without the invention and use of words, in one form or another. One can hardly imagine a classroom in which the enterprise of education itself is not framed and forwarded by words.

Moreover, despite the recent and healthy emphasis on improving the visual cues for learning, including displays of key words on classroom walls, the predominant use of words has been spoken, rather than written. For all the investment of education systems in textbooks and in developing the skills of reading and writing, it is still widely considered that the skill of the teacher in using the spoken word is fundamental to good learning.

The Menon group does not at all dispute the value of good spoken, or indeed visual, communication by teachers.

On the other hand, it shares the belief of a growing number of educators worldwide that more emphasis should be placed on how learners can best learn, rather than how teachers can best teach, in sense of ‘instruct and transmit’.

There are various reasons for supporting this shift of emphasis, and this book will play its part in elaborating them. They include:

- Evidence that recitation – asking students to recite or recall what they have been told, which is not quite the same as ‘learning by heart’, is not a very efficient way of building learning
Evidence that talking about what one is supposed to be learning is a quite efficient way of building learning.

Evidence that a questioning, or enquiry-led, approach to teaching and learning raises motivation and standards across the curriculum.

Evidence that learners can improve their questioning and reasoning skills through regular practice, especially when it contains elements of philosophical enquiry.

Evidence that teachers need to improve their own questioning, if not reasoning, skills if they are to deepen their students’ learning.

Finally, concern that, growing up in a world where ‘knowledge’ is expanding rapidly, but also where ‘know-how’ is changing constantly, young people need to be taught the elements of good thinking as well as the elements of subject-knowledge. (This might be increasingly important as those young people turn more and more to the internet as a possible source of information, but may lack the skills of research and critical questioning that would enable them to access the information efficiently and process it effectively.)

In short, the proper role of the teacher in the 21st century looks more and more likely to be that of a dialogical ‘guide on the side’ than a didactic ‘sage on the stage’. This book is designed to help teachers on their own journey from one role to the other – from being the dominant talker to being the instigator of more and better talking, thinking and learning in the classroom.

The book as a resource

The metaphor of ‘journey’ is important in the context of the whole Menon / Developing Dialogue project. Those who have worked on it see themselves as
continuing journeys of their own towards better appreciation of the **complexities** involved in the role change just referred to.

To make this point more vivid, let it be noted that most teachers will have been habituated to a **culture** of instruction and transmission from when they were children themselves. They will, for the most part, have been deemed successful within that culture of ‘teacher knows best’, and may even maintain their self-esteem, if not the esteem of others, by stepping smoothly across the line from ‘taught’ to ‘teacher’. And yet they will regularly be faced with students who are not as good as themselves in processing information – indeed, who are not nearly as motivated as themselves to do so. It is precisely to learn how to enter into a healthier and more productive **relationship** with such reluctant or different learners that teachers need to reflect on their own role and practice: to find out what puzzles, provokes or pleases young people in their educational experience. Developing a healthy dialogue in the classroom is surely a good, if not the best, way of doing this.

But taking this path is not like taking a pill that will transform the teacher overnight. The Developing Dialogue course is not a ‘quick fix’. It is, in fact, the start of a process whereby the teacher may steadily **transform** herself, firstly into a more reflective practitioner, and then increasingly into a more responsive and effective practitioner.

To that end, this booklet, like the DVD, “Towards Dialogue”, that also accompanies the course, is offered as a series of signposts, as it were, on the journey. Tutors on the course will certainly refer to it, and may recommend or even require particular pages to be read, but it is rather hoped that participants on the course will decide for themselves when, and to what degree, they study particular chapters.
General direction of the booklet

Roughly speaking, each chapter goes into increasing depth in regard to the practice and concept of dialogue. The first chapter, for example, is a plain outline of the evidence and argument for practising dialogue as a means to better thinking and learning in the classroom; whereas, the eighth chapter – (8) Dialogue, Self and Education (How dialogue relates to the development of self and others) - examines in depth and with subtlety the way in which the pedagogical relationship is different when it is also deliberately dialogical. It suggests that striving for dialogue in the classroom should be regarded not merely or mainly as a means to the end of better learning – admirable though that is – but, more importantly, as an end in itself: a way of living, as well as learning, that enriches both personal identity and social relations.

The argument for developing dialogue in teaching, then, becomes more than an educational one in the sense that it promotes effective learning. It becomes an argument about how to promote the good life for the individual and for society. That may, of course, be already part of one’s concept of ‘educational’; but if it is not – or if education for life in its fullest sense is too easily forgotten in the narrow search for grades and ‘qualifications’ – then the journey to, or back to, such ends could be well worth taking.

Development of booklet in more detail

After the first chapter, laying out the case for developing dialogue, there is, appropriately, a chapter – (2) Why dialogue is not always a good idea in education - in which another, challenging, voice or argument is presented.

Felix Garcia Moriyon, who presents it, is not only a teacher of Philosophy in a high school in Spain, but also the secretary of one of the teacher unions in that country. He has, therefore, first-hand experience of practical politics, but also a shrewd
sense of what makes educational systems ‘tick’. His **challenge** to an uncritical – one might even say, idealistic - promotion of dialogue in the classroom is responded to by Roger Sutcliffe. His teaching experience is wide – English, Maths, and Philosophy at secondary level, and general subjects at elementary level – and in his roles as Chair or President of UK and international organisations he has seen, equally, the practical and social value of dialogue.

It is hoped that the dialogue between the two voices achieves something of a balance in the argument, but also provokes further, **inner dialogue** in every reader.

The next chapter – (3) **Communities of Understanding** is written by Joseph Giordmaina, from the Faculty of Education, University of Malta. Long interested in ways to develop thinking, and combining theoretical perspectives with observations of practice, Dr. Giordmaina argues for classrooms to be transformed into sites where multiple forms of dialogue as conversation can take place. The main argument of this chapter is that classrooms are like little cities in which one does not find one but many communities, and that dialogue among such communities is paramount for the understanding of one another. Differences in the classroom should not to be eradicated, but celebrated. By means of dialogue as conversation with the ‘other’, children can become more aware of both ‘themselves’ and the unfamiliar other, resulting in newer, richer understandings and meanings.

Chapter 4 – **Community of enquiry and dialogue** – draws on over 20 years of experience by Zaza Carneiro de Moura of facilitating such communities in Portugal and of training teachers in how to do so. It should be noted that the phrase, ‘**community of enquiry**’, long pre-dates those of ‘community of learners’ or ‘learning communities’, and was coined by the American Philosopher-Scientist, Charles Peirce (1839 – 1914). He had in mind particularly what we would call the scientific community and its developing standards of research and peer scrutiny. That model still provides something of a touchstone for the concept as it could be
used in education today – if, that is, education were generally conceived as discovery. But, of course, part of the thinking behind the Menon project is that education has become too much led by teacher instruction and not enough by teacher and student enquiry. The very title of the project draws on Plato’s account of Socrates’s dialogue with the boy Menon. In this, the boy is enabled, through Socrates’s questioning, to ‘discover’ Pythagoras’s theorem for himself.

Lest mathematicians themselves, or non-mathematicians, cast doubt on whether such questioning and dialogue can apply more generally to the learning of maths, or to other learning, the view of a teacher of Mathematics, Colin Hannaford, retired now from a distinguished career in the European school, Abingdon, UK is worth noting:

“When mathematics is taught almost entirely through a teacher’s instruction, its success being measured by testing individuals privately, the outcome will be a small number who may already know or learn to understand the language of instruction and who are most likely to find this approach entirely satisfactory; usually a considerably larger number who find that their obedience to this instruction, even without their understanding, is almost equally rewarded; and the rest who can neither understand, nor obey, nor reproduce results sufficiently well to be allowed to continue.

The social consequences of this destruction of innocence, dignity, and value are all around us. This method of education by instruction will very largely preserve the stratification of society that it finds: stratification in mutually uncomprehending classes, each with a different morality, social structure, language, all inimical to each other.

There is, however, an alternative. This alternative was first developed by the first Greek democracies over two thousand years ago. The alternative to learning from instruction is learning through discussion. It has been the basis of mathematical and scientific inquiry ever since. I have used it as a successful and most enjoyable
pedagogy in my own classroom for over ten years. Increasingly it is being used elsewhere in Europe. In Hungary, entirely independently, it is has been shown by research conducted by the Department of Mathematical Didactics of Eötvös Lorand University to be markedly more effective in teaching mathematical understanding in all schools at every level.

This alternative can (also) promote a kinder, more compassionate, cohesive society. It can encourage young people to work and to think together with common goals, to share a common morality, structure, and language, and to accept each other's natural differences with patience, understanding and compassion.”

What Hannaford describes here could equally well be called a ‘community of enquiry’. But, since the early 1970’s, when Matthew Lipman, a professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, New York, introduced philosophical enquiry to groups of schoolchildren in an attempt to improve their readiness to reason together, the prime application of the phrase has been in such a ‘philosophical’ context. The associated dialogical pedagogy, along with stories written by Lipman and others over the years, has become known as ‘P4C’ (Philosophy for Children / Communities), and explaining what this is, how it works, and why it has significance for teaching – pedagogy – across the curriculum is the task that Zaza fulfils.

Education, if not almost every educationalist, segments the process of learning into ‘subjects’, often with rigid conceptual lines drawn between them, most notably between ‘the sciences’ and ‘the arts’. So, all but the most flexible thinkers reading the above paragraph may well assume that, however grand or general the phrase ‘dialogical pedagogy’ may sound, if it is associated with something called ‘philosophy’, then it has to be very specialist - and almost certainly has no application in other ‘subjects’.

This is precisely the sort of thinking that the Menon project, and P4C itself, aims to alter. The contention is that the learning and teaching of every ‘subject’ is
enhanced if it is approached in a more philosophical and dialogical way. This is not quite to contend that philosophy and dialogue are more or less the same activity (though close analysis of both concepts/activities will surely find considerable overlap).

Rather, it is to note (a) that philosophical enquiry, although it can be pursued by an individual, is essentially a dialogical process – one, that is, in which alternative viewpoints are deliberately sought in order to test and develop one’s original theses, and (b) that enlarging one’s learning in any field – what the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky would have called moving into the ‘zone of proximal development’ – benefits from a similar process, of participating in a dialogue in which one’s existing worldview is tested and developed.

In plainer terms, philosophical enquiry is the questioning of meanings/concepts, of facts/arguments, and of values/judgements. And it is precisely when any of these things is questioned – whether by teacher or learner – and developed through dialogue that learning moves forward.

That is the basic argument behind Chapter 5 - *Developing dialogue through philosophical enquiry*. This chapter is mainly authored by Daniela Camhy, who also has taught and trained teachers in communities of enquiry for over 20 years, in Austria. She has been involved in a large number of European projects and initiatives, and has steadily tested the value of philosophical enquiry in a range of subjects and situations. These include projects for teaching languages, environmentalism, citizenship and human rights. A strong theme emerging from this chapter is the extent to which opening up dialogue in the classroom helps to develop democratic dispositions, which in turn enable students to respect each other more and to grow as individuals and as lifelong learners.

Chapter 6 – *Promoting Citizenship Education by Means of Dialogue in the Classroom* by Lucianne Zammit, a research assistant at the University of Malta, looks at how the philosophy for children methodology can serve as a tool to promote citizenship
education. It suggests a way of using texts like newspaper articles and photos in order to discuss issues like immigration in the classroom.

Chapter 7 - *A wiser approach to PLTS, SEAL, PSHE, Citizenship and Cross-curricular Dimensions* argues for the introduction of PSP – Personal and Social Philosophy, which would serve as a bridge from Personal Education (knowing thyself) to thinking philosophically about oneself, taking into account the social dimension. This would provide a perfect platform for addressing learning and thinking skills, because no other discipline focuses on thinking as much as philosophy does – it is sometimes characterised as thinking about thinking.

Chapter 8 – *Dialogue, Self and Education* – takes further this theme of personal and social growth, looking at how their roots are strengthened by a deeper understanding of what it is to engage in dialogue. Just as, in a famous BBC documentary about P4C and communities of enquiry, a 14 year old unexpectedly identifies loyalty as an aspect of what it is to be a good listener, so the authors of this chapter connect the art of being a dialogical teacher with the rare quality of pedagogical tact, a dialogical phenomenon in the heart of education. That quality itself is, one might say, quite intangible, but Hannu Juuso, a teacher-educator in Finland, Timo Laine, a philosopher in the same country, and Ieva Rocena, a teacher-educator in Latvia, accept the challenge of making it real and relevant. The article is equally challenging to read as to write, but well repays the study in enlarging one's concept of oneself as a person as well as teacher.

Finally, the last chapter (chapter 9) entitled *Postmodern insights into Dialogue* by Joseph Giordmaina (University of Malta) uses some postmodern writings in order to discuss the role of dialogue, within the tradition of the subject of Philosophy in the development of the self. Philosophy here is perceived as a conversation and as concept creator. Dialogue in Philosophy is presented as a tool by means of which children come to realise that we and knowledge are socially constructed, and on realising this, children can be empowered to take command of their lives and improve their state of being.
CHAPTER 1

REASONS AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE BENEFITS OF PRACTISING DIALOGUE IN THE CLASSROOM

Roger Sutcliffe

United Kingdom
As indicated in the introduction, there is generally no shortage of talk in a typical classroom. But this is not to say dialogue is a common feature. In a book commissioned by the Open University, ‘Using Discussion in Classrooms’, James Dillon estimates that ‘typically, the teacher speaks about two-thirds or more of the time’ (p. 16). He reports that, ‘extensive observations of 1000 elementary and secondary classrooms across the United States have revealed that discussions could probably be seen only 4 – 7 percent of the time (Goodlad 1984).’

Moreover, says Dillon, teachers may consistently over-estimate the extent to which they engage pupils in discussion or dialogue. He quotes the example of a High School English teacher who claimed discussion to be her preferred method of teaching, used at least three or four times a week. But observation revealed that she used discussion just five per cent of the time and recitation 45 per cent (Conner and Chalmers-Neubauer 1989). And in another study two dozen middle school teachers of various subjects reported using discussion, but only seven could be observed doing so; the others used recitation and lecture with question-answer (Alvermann et al 1990).

But before we consider the limitations of such classrooms - and the benefits that could arise from changes in pedagogy or teaching strategies - we need to spend a little time clarifying our terms. What is the difference, for example, between discussion and recitation? For that matter, is there any significant difference between discussion and dialogue in the classroom? And, since this booklet and the course for which it is designed give special emphasis to ‘philosophical’ dialogue, what is meant by ‘philosophical’ in this context?

**Recitation and Discussion**

Close analysis of transcripts by Dillon leads him to notice several differences between these two forms of talk or communication (ibid, p. 16) but essentially
recitation takes the form of one person (in this case, the teacher) doing most of the talking – making statements, occasionally expressing opinions, sometimes giving instructions – and one or more listeners (in this case, students, whose quality of listening of course will vary) being encouraged to speak only occasionally. Moreover, the encouragement is specifically to answer questions designed by the main speaker to test recollection of what she has said. In short, the teacher is reciting (Latin, re + citare = to summon back) her own knowledge and view of the world, and then expecting the students to recite/summon it back to her.

It is this sort of learning that tends towards what we call ‘rote-learning’, and it is this sort of teaching that we call straightforwardly ‘didactic’ teaching.

Let us just emphasise the point, though, that we are not saying such teaching and learning is never appropriate. It may, in fact, be the most effective way of gaining some very important knowledge, such as multiplication tables, vocabulary lists, lines for a part in a play, etc.

What can be said without much doubt, however, is that the more learning depends on accommodating new information or points of view that complicate one’s existing knowledge and understanding, the less appropriate is anything that tends towards rote-learning - and the more appropriate a discursive or dialogical approach becomes. But this is, again, jumping the gun. We have yet to clarify the concept of discussion, let alone dialogue.

**Discussion**, for Dillon, is characterised by multiple participation, more or less equally divided between teachers on the one hand and students on the other. Teachers actually ask fewer questions, and students offer different (multiple) proposals – some of which may, themselves, be questions. Often the questions express puzzlement or invite other opinion, rather than aim to elicit simple ‘facts’.

All of this is broadly consistent with the root meaning of ‘discussion’, from the Latin dis + cutere = to shake apart. A discussion tends to open up more questions,
and to look at each question or concept from different angles. There is often, in a common phrase, 'no one (or no simple) right answer'.

It is this open-ended nature of discussion that fits it well for those situations mentioned above where students are expected to expand or modify their existing knowledge or understanding. For such changes often require the appreciation of different opinions and value judgements; and even when they do not (perhaps, say, in some science lessons) they certainly require the development of students’ conceptual frameworks. As we shall see when we look at evidence from a ‘thinking skills’ approach to Science, presenting students with ‘cognitive challenges’ (i.e. challenges to their conceptual framework), and then encouraging them to talk and think through their ideas, is a most effective way of enabling them to develop their scientific knowledge and understanding.

**Discussion and Dialogue (and Enquiry and Debate)**

A little more, first, on the concept of dialogue (though you might consider pausing for a short while to discuss the last paragraph with a colleague, or even to hold an ‘internal dialogue’ with yourself. If the theory is valid, you should end up with a greater confidence that you understand why discussion becomes increasingly valuable in learning as the subject or topic – such as *What is the difference between recitation and discussion?*! - becomes increasingly complex. Or, just carry on and do something similar in regard to the difference between discussion and dialogue.)

This whole booklet, of course, explores and elaborates the concept of dialogue, so it might seem a little premature to try and wrap it up in a paragraph or two early on. However, the more general definition of discussion that Dillon gives (ibid, p. 7) is not a bad basis for a useful ‘compare and contrast’ exercise.
There is a danger of over-complicating such matters. It needs to be said that some people are rather attached to the idea that dialogue is a very special form of communication – something over and above ordinary conversation or even discussion. They might emphasise, and rightly so, the **interpersonal** dimensions of dialogue, which are captured in Burbules’ notions of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘respect’, and which may be lacking in Dillon’s account, where the focus is on ‘the matter at issue’.

This emphasis on the interpersonal relationship involved in teaching and learning is, actually, dear to Burbules’s heart – he regards it as an essential element in
dialogue – and echoes the beliefs of one of the great educators of the 20th century, Paulo Freire (1921 – 1997), who said:

‘Dialogue is the sealing together of the teacher and students in the joint act of knowing and re-knowing the object of study... Instead of transferring the knowledge statically as a fixed possession of the teacher, dialogue demands a dynamic approximation towards the object.’ (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 14)

Not everybody will be convinced by this formulation of the changed relationship between teacher, knowledge and learner. They might agree that learning is not, for the most part, like a simple transfer of physical goods or money (the so-called ‘banking’ model of learning). They might even agree that the process whereby each of us comes to ‘own’ knowledge and understanding is still something of a wonder and a mystery, despite modern advances in psychology and neurophysiology: that ‘aha!’ moment – when it all ‘makes sense’, when one ‘gets it’ – is possibly different in every learner, each of whom comes round to understanding in their own way and in their own time.

However, Freire’s concept of ‘a dynamic approximation towards the object’ might seem more mystical than mysterious, and perhaps the claim should be rather more mundane: that teaching and learning are generally the better, morally as well as practically, when teachers and learners enter into the process in a spirit of collaboration: exploring and interrogating each others’ minds as well as the ‘object of study’. Or even more simply, one might observe that the effort learners put into their learning will generally be the greater for being in the context of a warm personal relationship between teacher and learners.

That spirit of collaboration is equally present in Dillon’s account of discussion as it is in Burbules’s account of dialogue. And, we dare say, for practical purposes, there may be no great difference between the two accounts.
(We might signal, however, that while both of these accounts are consistent with another, equally powerful, approach to teaching and learning, namely, enquiry, neither of them sits very comfortably with debate as a classroom exercise. Again, debate has its own rationale, which we do not wish to belittle. But we do wish to clarify that debate, at least of the formal kind, rarely has the ‘exploratory and interrogative’ tone that Burbules seeks in dialogue. It is more about trying to persuade others of one’s own point of view than being genuinely open to theirs.)

Dialogue and Philosophy

Our final clarification concerns the relationship of dialogue with philosophy, or more precisely with philosophical enquiry. As philosophers are, or at any rate should be, among the first to point out, the noun ‘philosophy’ means different things to different people or in different contexts. Some, for example, like to see it as a practice rooted in the original Greek sense of ‘love of wisdom’; others interpret it more narrowly (but somewhat circularly) as the study of what ‘philosophers’ have thought down the ages in response to a range of questions more or less defined by the ‘great’ philosophers of ancient Greece (and, a little more broadly, of other ancient civilisations, such as China and India).

There can, of course, be much common ground between these interpretations and the practices that they encourage, but there can equally be a big divide between ‘professional’ or ‘academic’ philosophers and the practice of ‘amateur’ or ‘everyday’ philosophy. It is not the purpose of this booklet and course to represent one side of this divide more than the other. Rather the focus is on the common ground that might reasonably be agreed to be the practice of philosophical enquiry.

So, can this be defined or summarised in a few words agreeable to both sides? And, if so, can it be shown how this practice relates to dialogue, and to teaching and learning?
Laurence Splitter and Ann Margaret Sharp, in their book ‘Teaching for Better Thinking’, pointed a way towards answering the first question by suggesting criteria whereby a concept could be counted as philosophical: it should be ‘central, common and contestable’. By this they meant it should be of central importance to the way that humans conceive of the world; it should be part of common or everyday thought, if not conversation; and it should be contestable in the sense that different people conceived it in different ways.

Obvious examples of such concepts would be ‘beautiful’, ‘fair’, ‘good’, ‘important’, ‘freedom’, ‘duty’, ‘right’, ‘mind’, ‘real’, etc. – concepts, indeed, that have recurred in the writings of philosophers, but which also form part of everyday discourse.

Less obvious examples, but ones which certainly feature regularly in philosophical enquiries with children, are: ‘friend(ship)’, ‘normal(ity)’, ‘afraid’, ‘love’, ‘pet’, ‘anger’, ‘punishment’, ‘dream’, etc. Each of these is clearly central and common to children’s experience, but each is also contestable. It is not simply that different people choose different friends: they also have different expectations, and therefore concepts, of what it is to be a friend. Or one might note that people, however different, may all recognise a punishment as such; but they might nevertheless have very different views as to whether a particular punishment is appropriate.

You may be surprised, indeed, at how far the 3C criteria can stretch, once you begin to think along these lines. Long-established concepts or practices can be ‘problematised’ in such reflection, though in some cases society has already recognised their problematical nature. Marriage would be a clear example. Does it have to be a relationship between people of opposite sex, or not? There is no undisputed earthly authority in this matter.
And it is not only ‘moral’ practices that can be controversial in this way. To take a more trivial example, darts is a practice – shall we say, like miniature archery. Now, archery is generally acknowledged to be a sport, indeed an ‘olympic’ sport. But darts is not, even though darts players think it should be. Again, not even the Olympic committee is an undisputed authority in deciding what counts as a sport.

**Short exercise:** Firstly as an individual, and then in conversation/discussion/dialogue with a partner, see how long a list you can make of concepts that could be said to be pretty ‘common’ and ‘central’ and yet which are ‘contestable’. Then compare your list with those of other pairs, and as a whole group.

N.B. The concepts do not have to relate to social practices. Some surprisingly ‘concrete’ concepts are contestable. For example, consider whether a tree is a place or not. There is often disagreement about this, because some people think of ‘place’ in two dimensions, and others in three. For that matter, is there an agreed authority deciding when a shrub is a bush, or a bush is a tree? (Such distinctions might matter, e.g. in buying and selling, and presumably that is when institutions such as the EU Trades Commission come to the rescue!)

Now, of course, there will be those who say that discussing and deciding on such contestable matters as whether darts is a sport, or whether a bush is a tree, may be all very well for bureaucrats, or even lawyers, but is beneath the dignity of philosophers.

We, however, are not so concerned about dignity in drafting a definition of philosophical enquiry. We simply note that the practice of enquiring into – and trying to clarify, if not agree upon, the meaning of - contestable concepts is the same whether we are talking about trees and darts or freedoms and duties. One might very well begin, as Socrates was wont, by seeking examples of ‘places’ or of ‘sports’; and one might proceed to draw out criteria for applying such concepts; and then one might return to the particular example to see if it fits those criteria.

Of course, enquiry turns out to involve more in practice than just drawing out criteria. Criteria cannot generally be taken for granted: they have to be argued for. Further questions have to be asked, in order to draw distinctions or analogies;
reasons have to be brought forward and shown to be strong and relevant; consequences of particular views have to be explored and evaluated; and so on.

And all this is happening not in an abstract world where words simply attach to or rebound off each other. Conceptual analysis, which is how the process of philosophical enquiry is sometimes also labelled, cannot be done without continual reference to the actual usage of concepts in the ‘real’ world. Indeed, the world as we ‘perceive’ it is largely ‘conceived’: that is, once we are ordinary language users, we tend to see objects as just examples of general concepts with which we are familiar – tables, houses, cows, etc. And we naturally get rather confused and even uncomfortable when we cannot put objects – including people, of course - into clear categories or concepts. We even feel the need, then, to do some conceptual enquiry as well as some closer observation: ‘Is it a bird? Is it a man?’ – Well, could it be a giant bird, or a superman?

Time to get back down to earth/business! How does this account of philosophical enquiry related to dialogue and to teaching and learning?

In regard to dialogue, the echoes from Burbules’s account are surely clear. Whilst it is possible to pursue a philosophical enquiry as a lone individual, it is much more natural to do so in dialogue with others - as part of a ‘community’ of enquiry. Then one can hope for ‘a series of alternating statements of variable duration ... guided by a spirit of discovery’, with a tone that is typically ‘exploratory and interrogative’. The aim would be ‘to see things through to some meaningful understandings or agreements among the participants’. And whilst it might not always be the case that a philosophical enquiry ‘manifests an attitude of reciprocity among the participants: an interest, respect, and concern that they share for one another, even in the face of disagreements’, generally those qualities seem to go with the development of reflection and reflectiveness within the group.
It might be possible, indeed, to condense Burbules’s definition of dialogue and the above account of philosophical enquiry into a single, simple definition of ‘philosophical dialogue’, namely: **reflective talk, driven by the desire to create better understanding of the world and of each other.**

As to teaching and learning, philosophical enquiry can be seen as essential to the entire enterprise (of education) especially once these two points have been appreciated:

(a) that many more concepts in everyday use - even within classrooms where the attempt is to present the world as neat and simple - are complex and contestable (Were the Romans/Christians civilised, and the Barbarians/Vikings not? Was Othello jealous, or rather vain? Is Global Warming due to humans, and if so what should we do about it? and so on...)

(b) that even when concepts can be well explained, exemplified, elaborated and evaluated by (generally, graduate) teachers, the real challenge is how to enable (generally, struggling) students to explain the concepts satisfactorily to themselves.

A very good answer to the challenge appears to be to encourage students to begin exploring, and then explaining, the concepts with others, i.e. in dialogue.

And now here is some of the evidence supporting that claim.

**Channels of Learning**

(1) Colin Hannaford, the Maths teacher quoted in the booklet introduction, draws his confidence in discussion/dialogue from research which he details in an article for the National Literacy Trust of UK.
The amount of knowledge children retain depends on the teaching method by which it is delivered to them. The three most common classroom activities in 'traditional' teaching fare poorly:

- by listening, children on average retain 5% of the information delivered;
- reading, 10%;
- and audio-visual techniques, 20%.

By contrast,
- discussion (50%),
- practice by doing (75%)
- and explaining to others (90%)

show significant improvements in the amount of knowledge retained.

For those teachers who are especially focussed on children retaining information/knowledge for tests, these are particularly significant figures.

(2) They echo the findings of Cazden (2001, Classroom Discourse: the language of teaching and learning, Portsmouth NH: Heinemann) and of Nystrand et al (1997) in their large-scale pretest-posttest study in America, ‘Opening Dialogue: understanding the dynamics of language and learning in the English classroom’, New York: Teachers College Press. The latter study showed that ‘authentic’ (or open) questions, as opposed to what Nystrand calls ‘test’ (or closed) questions with only one possible answer, were much more likely to lead to successful learning and genuine understanding.

(3) Again, in a study published in the Journal of Educational Psychology (1998), Marc Aulls, Professor of Psychology at McGill University, Quebec, showed that the recall of units about ancient Egyptian society by 12 year olds was greater when
students were engaged in classroom discussion about topics in the text, and were allowed to initiate questions of their own.

(4) Robin Alexander, in his seminal booklet 'Dialogical Teaching', cites Jerome Bruner, formerly professor of psychology at Harvard and then Oxford, as arguing that: 'several lines of research – on intersubjectivity, on the nature of the human mind, on metacognition and on collaborative learning – all converge on the principle that children must think for themselves before they truly know and understand, and that teaching must provide them with those linguistic opportunities and encounters that will enable them to do so.

(5) Finally, in this section, we quote Robert Sternberg, President of the American Psychological Association and originator of the 'triarchic' theory of intelligence (i.e. with 3 main elements, critical, creative and practical), who said straightforwardly that, 'The teacher’s goal is to teach students to be better thinkers, and to do so by engaging students in dialogue’. He goes on to say, 'No programme I am aware of is more likely to teach durable and transferable thinking skills than Philosophy for Children’.

The next section, then, looks at the mounting evidence from P4C practice that the ‘community of enquiry’ approach to thinking and learning yields enormous benefits to both learner and teacher.

**P4C / Community of Enquiry Results**

(6) One of the most striking findings of recent years was in a study of 18 primary schools in Clackmannanshire, a small county in Scotland, where P4C was practised for 1 hour a week over 1 year. Professor Keith Topping of the University of Dundee’s Faculty of Education and Social Work reports: "Some educators argue that improvement in thinking is impossible to measure. However, this review identified 10 rigorous controlled experimental studies of P4C. These studies measured
Outcomes by norm-referenced tests of reading, reasoning, cognitive ability and other curriculum-related abilities, by measures of self-esteem and child behaviour, and by child and teacher questionnaires. All studies showed some positive outcomes and a consistent moderate positive effect size (0.43) for P4C on a wide range of outcome measures. This suggests a gain in IQ of 6.5 points for an average child.

Better still, the children who moved on to secondary school, where they did not practise P4C, were tested again a year later using standard Cognitive Attainment Tests, and their attainment levels remained steady. Children who had not practised P4C in their primary schools, however, showed a significant drop in attainment levels after their first year at secondary school (a worrying, but not unusual feature).

But P4C has been steadily showing such results since it was first monitored in the late 70’s and early 80’s in the USA.

Here are samples from 14 controlled studies published by the IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children) at Montclair University, New Jersey.

(E = Experimental Group, and C = Control Group).

(a) Karras (1979)

Groups: 5th and 6th grade students in Lexington (E = 150, C = 150)
P4C implementation: 2 hours per week for 1 year
Measures: Reasoning ability (NJ - New Jersey - Educational Testing Service, formal and informal logic test)
Result: E significantly better than C on post-test (p < .05)

(b) Cinquino (1981)
Groups: 5th and 6th grade gifted & talented students in NJ (E = 47, C = 0)
P4C implementation: 7 months
Measures: Formal reasoning (NJ ETS-developed test)
Inferential reasoning (CTMM)
Ideational productivity (HMR., WCU, WCB)
Results: Highly significant (p<.01) gains on each measure.

(c) Shipman (1982)

Groups: 6th grade students in Pennsylvania (E = 750, C – matched demographically with NJ students)
P4C implementation: 2.5 hours per week for 1 year
Measures: Formal and informal reasoning (NJ ETS-developed test)
Ideational fluency and flexibility (WCU)
Result: Reasoning: E consistently greater than C on post-test.
Ideational fluency: 14 out of 16 E classes showed significant gain.

(d) Iorio, Weinstein & Martin (1984)

Groups: 3rd, 4th & 5th grade students in New York City, with diverse ethnic backgrounds and varying commands of English (E = 380, C = 344)
P4C implementation: 1 year
Measures: Formal and informal reasoning (NJ ETS-developed test)
Teacher’s perception of student’s ability to function rationally (CDC)
Result: Reasoning: E showed significant improvement compared to C (p<.001).
Teacher’s perception: E teachers show significant increase compared to C.
Overall, 11 of the 14 studies had reasoning as a dependent variable, and in each case improved performances on that ability were found to be significant.

In the 3 studies that examined the effect of the intervention on reading comprehension, significant gains in performance were evidenced.

A significant improvement was recorded in studies of ideational productivity, fluency and flexibility, as well as in each of the 3 studies that examined behavioural dimensions of student performance.

The Cinquino study also reviewed parental attitudes to P4C and found that of the 35 parents she interviewed, 33 said that they wanted their children to participate in the program if it continued.

(e) In one study, the New Jersey Educational Testing Service (ETS) found that experimental subjects made a 36% larger gain in mathematics than did control students, and the gain in reading was 66% larger.

(f) A further study by the ETS in 1980-, involving over 2000 middle school students, using a highly sensitive test of formal and informal reasoning, showed that the experimental group’s gain was 80% greater than the gain of the control group over a one year period. And a similar experiment in 1981 involving 32 6th grade classrooms, resulted in 29 classrooms improving at the .05 level, and 19 showing highly significant improvement at the .005 level or better.

This significance of gains in reasoning, especially in the New Jersey ETS test, is especially worth drawing out. That test – generally taken in one’s early teens - has been shown to correlate particularly well with achievement at degree level. Whether it is the capacity to reason well from one’s early teens that steadily accelerates one’s learning through the formal stages of education, or whether it is just a plain fact that degree level success depends on having that capacity in place,
the argument for an approach that develops such capacity from an early age (P4C can be practised from age 6 or even earlier) is very strong.

But now we should address a couple of other arguments: (i) that timetables are so full (of other important ‘subjects’) that there is no time to fit in special lessons in either philosophical enquiry or ‘plain’ dialogue; (ii) that, even if timetable space could be found, teachers do not have the knowledge and skills to teach such lessons.

Briefly, of course, headteachers and curriculum designers have to prioritise. But, in the face of the above evidence, particularly that from Clackmannanshire, one is surely entitled to wonder what could be a better investment of time than a single hour that can so dramatically improve capacity, and indeed attainment, across the curriculum.

Besides, this booklet and course are not aimed particularly at developing teachers’ skills in conducting a full, hour-long, philosophical enquiry session. Rather they are designed to develop teachers’ skills in encouraging and managing dialogue in their usual lessons, and our argument is simply that learning about philosophical enquiry (particularly how to develop conceptual analysis, or what P4C practitioners tend to call ‘concept-formation’) will assist them greatly in that process.

This point has already been hinted when we noted the wide range of everyday concepts that were more problematical (or, putting it more positively, richer) than people generally recognised. It will be made more explicit during course sessions when key concepts in different subject areas are proposed for analysis. These will include generic concepts that cross the curriculum, such as ‘cause’, ‘conditions’, ‘necessary’, ‘sufficient’, ‘importance’, ‘relevance’, ‘fact’, ‘opinion’, ‘compare’, ‘contrast’, etc. But they will also include subject-specific concepts such as ‘emotion’ or ‘character’ (literature), ‘number’ or ‘proportion’ (maths), ‘substance’ or ‘compound’ (science), ‘function’ or ‘efficiency’ (design), ‘form’ or ‘beauty’ (art), ‘empire’ or
‘government’ (history/politics), ‘environment’ or ‘sustainability’ (geography), ‘culture’ or ‘tense’ (languages), ‘fitness’ or ‘competition’ (physical education), etc.

As to the question of knowledge and skills, well, it is precisely to develop these that this course is designed! If the end (of better teaching of learners) is willed, then the means (better learning by teachers) must also be willed.

All that said, we now move to a third section of evidence which we trust will show that traditional subject teachers not only have important skills deficiencies, but, more encouragingly, are well capable of making up those deficiencies.

Better Teaching for Better Thinking and Learning

(9) Nystrand, whose study was quoted in (2) above, wrote more recently: ‘Our earlier research revealed that dialogic discourse is rare — taking up only about 15% of instruction in the more than 100 middle and high school classes in the study. Our current study is investigating how beneficial dialogic patterns are set up, with our main purpose being to discover how teachers initiate such shifts in talk, why and how they end, and what classroom contexts promote them. This study confirms that dialogic shifts are rare, occurring in less than 7% of all instructional episodes observed. The most striking finding is the virtual absence of dialogic shifts among low track classes: Only 2 dialogic shifts in the 197 instructional episodes we observed, no doubt a result of emphasis on skill development and test questions about prior reading. Quite simply, lower track students have little opportunity for engaged discussions.’

(http://cela.albany.edu/newslet/spring99/spring99.pdf)

(10) Quite how teachers initiate ‘such shifts in talk’ is still not clearly established, then. Some place a great deal of faith in the power of questions to open up dialogue – questions, that is, of an open, inviting nature. Certainly these are more
likely to evoke elaborated and diverse responses than what Nystrand calls ‘test’ questions. So, what is the evidence about teacher use of open questions?

The following is gleaned from a review by Steven Hastings, published in the Times Educational Supplement, 04/07/2003:

- ‘the average’ teacher asks c. 400 questions a day, allowing less than a second for an answer, before throwing the question to someone else, or answering it themselves

- but! - the optimum ‘wait-time’ for answers (what Robin Alexander prefers to call ‘thinking time’) is around 3 seconds for ‘lower-order’ (recall) questions (Budd Rowe, 1974, and Ken Tobin, 1997)

- studies in 1912, 1935, and 1970 all showed at least 60% of teacher questions were ‘lower order’, and at least 30% of teacher questions are reckoned to be ‘procedural’

- a 1989 Lincoln University study found only 4% of secondary teacher questions were ‘higher order’, whilst Ted Wragg’s more extensive research in primary schools came up with a figure of 8%

- a review of 37 projects in 1988 suggested that increasing the proportion of higher-order questions to 50% brought significant improvement in student attitude and performance

The references to ‘higher-order’ and ‘lower-order’ are based on the long-established taxonomy of Bloom, in which the lower-order thinking skills are, in ascending order, knowledge (= recall), comprehension, and application (= use of
knowledge), and the higher-order skills are, continuing: analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.

It is clear, especially from the last two bullet-points, that most teachers – across the curriculum - have a lot of catching up to do. This is the almost depressing view of Robin Alexander, when he summarises the state of affairs in classrooms in England in ‘Dialogical Teaching’ (2004) as follows:

“Among the features on the debit side which seem particularly resistant to change are:

- the relative scarcity of talk which really challenges children to think for themselves, and especially the low level of cognitive demand in many classroom questions

- the continuing prevalence of questions which remain closed despite our claims to be interested in fostering more open forms of enquiry

- the habitual and perhaps unthinking use of bland, all-purpose praise rather than feedback of a kind which diagnoses and informs

- the seeming paradox of children working everywhere in groups but rarely as groups

- the rarity of autonomous pupil-led discussion and problem-solving

He also notes: ‘the striking finding that well-structured oral and collaborative activities maintain children’s time on task more consistently than do solitary written
and text-based tasks, yet in many classrooms the latter predominate.’ (His own research, 1995, Versions of Primary Education, London: Routledge, pp 157-8.)

(11) As well as the power of good questioning to stimulate dialogue, it is worth singling out the importance of ‘wait time’ or ‘thinking time’. Budd Rowe (ibid, referred to in Dillon, 1994) found that an increase in teacher wait-time from 1 to 3 seconds resulted in an increase in student response from 7 to 28 words, and of unsolicited responses from 3 to 37. And this effect is seen at Higher Education level, too. The following is a report of a study of use of the ‘pause procedure’ in lectures.

‘In this study an instructor paused for two minutes or three occasions during each of five lectures: the intervals ranged from 12 to 18 minutes. During the pauses, while students worked in pairs to discuss and rework their notes, no interaction occurred between instructor and students. At the end of each lecture, students were given three minutes to write down everything they could remember from the lecture (free recall); 12 days after the last lecture, the students were also given a 65 item multiple-choice test to measure long-term retention. A control group received the same lectures (using the same anecdotes and visual aids) and was similarly tested.

In two separate courses repeated over two semesters, the results were striking and consistent: Students hearing the lectures while the instructor paused did significantly better on the free recall and the comprehensive test. In fact, the magnitude of the difference in mean scores between the two groups was large enough to make a difference of two letter grades depending upon cutoff points!'


(12) What the Ruhl study shows, paradoxically, is that teachers or lecturers can stimulate dialogue and better learning by simply saying nothing, as well as occasionally saying something helpful! This reinforces findings and suggestions by
Dillon in ‘Using Discussion in the Classroom’, where he specifically discourages teachers from putting questions to students during a discussion. Alternatives he suggests, apart from deliberate silences, are: statements, signals (such as exclamations or gestures) and student questions (pp 80 – 91).

In particular, he notes, students’ responses to questions from other students are longer and more complex than to teacher questions. Mishler (1978) found that in first-grade classrooms, most responses to teacher questions consisted of one or two words, compared to six and more words in response to other children’s questions. (This is especially encouraging to the practice of P4C, in which it is a basic principle to elicit and develop children’s own questions.)

(13) A more recent study of the impact of the UK government’s national literacy and numeracy strategies, again quoted in Alexander (2004), concluded that: ‘Far from encouraging and extending pupil contributions to promote high levels of interaction and cognitive engagement, most of the questions asked were of a low cognitive level designed to funnel pupils’ response towards a required answer. Open questions made up 15% of the questioning exchanges... Probing by the teacher, where the teacher stayed with the same child to ask further questions to encourage sustained and extended dialogue, occurred in just over 11% of the questioning exchanges... Most of the pupils’ exchanges were very short, with answers lasting on average 5 seconds, and were limited to 3 words or fewer for 70% of the time.’ (Smith, Hardman et al, 2004, 408)

(14) By contrast, there is encouraging news from UK in regard to what were originally referred to as ‘thinking skills programmes’, but which might better be termed ‘cognitive development approaches’, or even ‘strategies for developing habits of mind’. P4C is one such approach, already referenced. The most successful of the other approaches is CASE, or Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education, developed at King’s College, London. In studies throughout the 1990’s this intervention in Science lesson regularly improved results in public

From our point of view, what is particularly relevant about these results is that an important emphasis in the programme is placed on discussion, which is regarded both as a stimulus to *metacognition* and as an encouragement to bridge or *transfer* learning beyond the science classroom. Here is how the CASE website itself (http://www.case-network.org/case_info.html) expresses the value of discussion:

- **Discussion amongst students provides an essential opportunity for extending and reinforcing the range of performance related strategies used by them.**

- **Discussion provides the chance to realise many alternative ways of proceeding with any one task and to think about the nature of the outcomes.**

- **Discussion allows for social interaction and the development and honing of concepts, events and ideas.**

- **Discussion allows for reflection and gives the opportunity for the student to 'think about their thinking' and share this with one another.**

- **Discussion allows the student to appreciate that mistakes can be overcome.**

- **Discussion may highlight that different interpretations can be placed on events/ideas/happenings/outcomes depending upon ones' perceptions and prior experiences.**

(15) Finally, two other significant studies in the UK pointed the value of discussion, provided that it was well-managed. One project involved 230 10 year-old children, and was designed to see if teaching students to work and talk together raised...
achievement in science (N. Mercer et al, 2004, *Reasoning as a scientist* – see also http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/research/); the other involved 6 classes of 7 year-olds, and was designed to improve student’s access to educational opportunities through teaching them how to interact and reason together (R. Wegerif et al, 2004, *Widening access to educational opportunities*).

Both used strategies from a general thinking skills intervention called *Thinking Together*, and both achieved their objectives. Dialogue played a central role in this approach, from the learning of ground rules to the negotiation of challenges and objectives.

So, not all teachers/classrooms in UK lack the will and the opportunity to fit their methods to the 21st century. And Robin Alexander, whose study, *Culture and Pedagogy: international comparisons in primary education* (2001, Oxford: Blackwell), alerted him even more to the rarity of dialogical teaching across the world, did note that there were stronger traditions of such teaching elsewhere in Europe and in Japan and Singapore.

But in his most recent publication, *Education as Dialogue: Moral and pedagogical choices for a runaway world* (2006, Hong Kong Institute of Education) he suggests that the stakes – and the need for dialogue in education as well as about education - are rising all the time:

‘Ecological catastrophe and the concomitant social collapse, if or when they happen, will be a consequence not just of capitalistic greed, but more fundamentally of a simple failure of the collective imagination, a failure to relate cause and consequence, to make connections, to enter into the necessary dialogues between past, present and future, between the hard-won experience of one generation and the casual aspirations of the next, between humankind and the natural world, and between the expectation of infinite material gratification and the fact of finite resource.'
All this ‘the world well knows and yet none knows well’ (Shakespeare, Sonnet 129).
And to such a condition of knowledge without understanding or connecting, dare I suggest, dialogue offers a promising antidote.’ (pp 14 – 15)

Better Talking for Better Living

Alexander plainly believes that dialogue is a powerful, and necessary, educational tool – and that is ‘educational’ in the broadest sense that would John Dewey, the American philosopher/educator would have approved, seeing, as he did, a vital link between the (educational) process of enquiry and the (political) process of democracy. There is also a clear echo in Alexander’s plea of the sort of global political thinking that, surely, lies behind one of Socrates’s famous remarks: when asked of which country he was a citizen, he replied not ‘I am an Athenian' but ‘I am a citizen of the world/universe’.

Teachers of any subject whose concerns lie beyond those of merely helping their students to get good grades (creditable though those may be) and, rather, embrace those of accompanying their students on their personal journey seeking ‘the good life’, and on their social journey seeking ‘the good society’, may very well wish occasionally to raise the sights of those students from the paper-chase; and they would then, very likely, find philosophical dialogue an invaluable 'tool' for doing so.

But, as well as thinking instrumentally in this way, they might also recall that dialogue has a value in itself. It is when teachers and students lose themselves in a genuine and amicable dialogue that they are most truly themselves. One is reminded, after all, of Freire’s ‘sealing together’ of teacher and student in a common enterprise. Teachers who have not had such an experience, or do not open themselves and their students to it, are truly missing an ingredient in the good life itself.
Postscript: the following is an outline curriculum suggested by David Perkins, in collaboration with his Harvard University colleagues, Howard Gardner and Vito Perrone. Its relevance to the Menon project is its emphasis on a smaller amount of content, and on the generation of ‘bigger’ questions, stimulating a deeper search for understanding. The major concepts (shown in italics) within these questions and topics are precisely the sort of concepts that would benefit from analysis and dialogue.

Examples of topics for Essential Questions

From David Perkins, ‘Smart Schools: From Training Memories to Educating Minds’ (New York; Free Press, 1992)

Natural Sciences

Evolution focusing on the mechanism of natural selection in biology and on its wide applicability to other settings like pop music, fashion, the evolution of ideas.

The origin and fate of the universe focusing qualitatively on cosmic questions as in Stephen Hawking’s ‘A Brief History of Time.’

The periodic table focusing on the dismaying number of elements identified by early investigators and the challenge of making order out of chaos.
The question what is real in science, pointing up how scientists are forever inventing entities (quarks, atoms, black holes) that we can never straightforwardly see but as evidence accumulates, come to think of as real.

**Social Studies**

Nationalism and internationalism focusing on the causal role of nationalistic sentiment; often cultivation by leaders for their own purposes as in Hitler’s Germany, in world history and in the prevailing foreign policy attitudes in America today.

Revolution and evolution asking whether cataclysmic revolutions are necessary or evolutionary mechanisms will serve.

Origins of government asking where, when and why different forms of government have emerged.

The question what is real in history, pointing up how events can look very different to different participants and interpretations.

**Mathematics**

Zero, focusing on the problems of practical arithmetic that this great invention resolved.

Proof, focusing on different ways of establishing something as true and their advantages and disadvantages.

Probability and prediction, highlighting the ubiquitous need for simple probabilistic reasoning in every day life; the question what is real in mathematics, emphasizing
that mathematics is an invention and that many mathematical things initially were not considered real (for instance, *negative* numbers, zero, and even the number one).

**Literature**

*Allegory* and *fable*, juxtaposing *classic* and *modern* examples and asking whether the form has changed or remains essentially the same.

*Biography* and autobiography contrasting how these forms *reveal* and *conceal* the true person; form and the *liberation* from form examining what *authors* have apparently *gained* from sometimes *embracing* and sometimes *rejecting* certain forms (the *dramatic* unities, the sonnet)

The question what is real in *literature* exploring the many *senses of realism* and how we can learn about *real life from fiction*. 
CHAPTER 2

WHY DIALOGUE IS NOT ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA IN EDUCATION

Felix García Moriyón & Roger Sutcliff

Spain & United Kingdom
Félix: From the very beginning, formal education has two different goals: reproduction of the society as it is and helping new generations to develop those cognitive and affective skills, those behaviours that will help them to cope with the problems of living together in a shared world.

Roger: These may well be two of the goals of formal education, but at least in the UK there are others. For example, education is seen as “a route to the spiritual, moral, social, cultural, physical and mental development, and thus the well-being, of the individual.” (National Curriculum) I dare say other countries might have similar goals written into their curricula. And surely a case can be made that for any individuals to develop in such ways it is necessary for them to be actively engaged in dialogue of all sorts, but especially philosophical.

However, I shall proceed to deal with the more limited argument put here, which is that the goals of reproducing society as it is and helping new generations to develop skills to cope with the problems of living can best be achieved with a minimal amount of dialogue, especially philosophical.

Félix: As might be expected, there are all those other goals, but eventually the two I mentioned in the previous paragraph are the basic ones. You can consider the situation focusing on the educational goals from a social and political point of view. From this point of view, formal education has also two different goals, although they can be mutually contradictory. The first one is offering people the education they need to get a job and climb up social positions; formal education assesses your achievements, and certificates that you can apply for specific jobs. The second one aims at fostering the skills and knowledge people need to become full citizens – those who are able to participate in social and political life as free persons.

Although both goals are important, the first one deserves more attention from educational institutions and authorities. As a White paper on education, published by
the European Commission, emphasizes: “This investment in knowledge plays an essential role in employment, competitiveness and social cohesion”

Roger: Do you mean ‘deserves’? That is a value judgement that certainly needs some justification. Climbing up social positions does not sound like a worthy goal in itself – unless it not only improves the lot of the person climbing, but also makes a net positive contribution to society. Getting a job is perhaps more laudable, since it generally improves the wealth of the person whilst also contributing to the common good. But there are more things to a life of well-being than just having a job – for example, enjoyment of good social relations – and many such things could well be the result of learning how to take part in dialogue..

Félix: Of course it is a value judgment, but at the same time is just an empirical verification of what actually happens in society. I mentioned official documents published by the European institutions, and there is a lot of empirical educational research that backs my point. The needs of the economical institutions, such as they are defined by the entrepreneurs, that is, by the “boss”, are given more importance by educational system. And be sure that the social and cognitive skills that employers are demanding from their employers are much more related with obedience, punctuality, due respect to authority and so on. As Manuel Castells shows in his well done book, The Age of Information, most of the jobs required for the present economy do not need at all a sophisticated or high order education. Think, for example, on the people who are working in McDonalds and other similar shops and stores.

Roger: One might tease out a conceptual and practical contradiction here between competitiveness and social cohesion, but again I do not think that is at the heart of this argument. What surely counts for more is that in each of these particular goals – employment, competitiveness and social cohesion – dialogue itself has a part to play.
Effective employment relies, in both the short and long term, on good communication between employers and employees (not to mention, in many cases, with clients). Developing such communication is more than a matter of having a few workshops on ‘communication skills’. These are of little value unless they are imbued with dialogical dispositions, such as cooperative listening.

Even competitiveness is unlikely to be maximally effective in most cases unless it is conceived and developed in a dialogical relationship. (For example, for a company to be competitive in the market, it needs to have people who not only know the market through talking with people, especially existing or potential clients, but also people who elicit good feedback and can translate that, through dialogue, into advantageous change. Again, the case for more practice of dialogue in schools emerges strongly.)

As to how one develops social cohesion without placing a high priority on dialogue, one is left wondering. One could even ask what social cohesion could be if it is not, largely, good dialogue in itself. But such dialogue does not just emerge ‘naturally’ – it has to be cultivated in citizens from an early age.

\[\text{Félix: Once again, you are right: dialogue is needed all the time, but this is true only if you use dialogue in a very wide sense of the word. For example, every time a teacher asks a question to a student, looking for verification of the student’s homework and of their knowledge, there is a dialogue. But in this case, and in many others, basically in the working settings in which employers tell workers what to do at the workplace, it is an-symmetrical dialogue, without effective freedom of speech on the side of the worker. That is also the case in educational settings. Teachers and students have to talk all the time, but it is up to the teacher to control the bulk of the dialogue. Students only have to receive what teachers tell them, asking some questions in order to clarify their understanding of the topic and answering the teachers’ questions aimed to verify the students’ assimilation of the knowledge explained by the teacher. So, most of the time in schools has to be devoted to handing down all that knowledge}\]
required to become efficient and able workers and to internalize those basic facts. Remember, for example, Plato’s dialogues: it is Socrates who talks nearly all the time. His speeches are much longer than those of their interlocutors.

Roger: So we come to the main argument of those who see education more as a ‘filling up’ process rather than a ‘drawing out’ process: that schools have a duty to pass on essential knowledge and facts, without which future citizens would not be as efficient or able as they should be. May I ask, then, what are these essential facts, and why exactly are they essential? N.B. These do need to be sufficiently clear and agreeable to somehow meet the common recognition that ‘most of what I learnt at school I have forgotten or do not use in my adult life’!

Oh, and we are not, apparently, talking here about basic skills, such as how to read, write and do elementary calculations. That might be a separate argument, but even that is weak, since there is evidence that standards of reading and writing, at least, are higher when they are learnt in a dialogical environment (i.e. one rich in interactive speech) than in a didactic one.

Felix. Well, we can come back to my previous comment about basic facts. I am taking for granted that in any society there are some basic facts that have to be passed on children if they have to become active members of that society. I am thinking, for example, about basic facts about the social environment in which you are brought up; or basic facts about your body and health, and food; there are also basic facts in the field of science, mathematics and physics. And the most important facts, those what are related with values that guarantee the social glue. Those values are fundamental values that come out of our national history or great literature. Society has to make a decision about which are those basic values, and that changes from time to time. And that decision is made, in democratic societies, by representatives in the parliament, of by specific lobbies. I would like to remind you of the ideas of Noam Chomsky about the making of consensus in modern democracies, a booklet inspired by Walter Lippmann’s political analysis.
Roger: This is a part of the argument that is tricky for both sides. If, by ‘values that guarantee the social glue’ one means (in an authoritarian way) values such as ‘obedience to those in higher social positions’, then one is on very dubious ground. If, on the other hand, one interprets this in a broadly democratic as meaning, for example, respect for others beyond one’s immediate culture, then there is certainly a challenge to explain how such respect is cultivated in many societies that comprise of many different cultures. Is there a better answer to this challenge, though, than that of cultivating dialogue, especially philosophical dialogue, in schools?

Felix: I am not saying that dialogue is not a value in itself, nor I am suggesting that we should not be fostering dialogue. My point here is that it is a very secondary value in our society and, so, it should not require a lot of attention in compulsory schooling. Even if is a political correct goal to facilitate the citizens’ ability to participate in democratic institutions, the hidden (I dare to say, that it is not hidden at all) curriculum in society is being obedient to law and authorities. No less, of course; but no more. On the other hand, there are many jobs, probably most jobs, in which people do not need any specialized training or higher-order skills to do a good job.

Roger: This seems to take the ground from under the feet of those who argue for non-dialogical education, since if no specialized skills are needed for the job, then surely anyone could do the job without spending enormous amounts of time learning knowledge/facts that are irrelevant? Wouldn’t they be better off spending most of their school-time in learning how to enter into inherently rewarding dialogue (as well as basic skills, and perhaps a number of other life-enhancing skills, such as how to cook, etc.)?

Felix: You are probably right, but that is not the point. Any student or teacher can spend a lot of time in rewarding dialogue, but compulsory schooling has different goals, and those goals are assumed by those who attend the school, irrespectively of whether there are students or teachers. With these official goals in mind, and taking
into account the actual possibilities of teachers and students during the school time, there are strong limiting constraints which influence your work. I suggest some of the most important difficulties, and focus on those that have the stronger impact on the possibility of using philosophical dialogue. That is the main reason why introducing dialogical procedures in educational settings is a very lost of time, and time management is always a serious problem in education.

Roger: One could agree on the second proposition without agreeing on the first. Time management is indeed a problem in education, but perhaps largely because schools are teaching (or trying to teach, rather unsuccessfully in many cases) lots of knowledge/facts that most children/future citizens do not need to know. As to the question of whether introducing dialogical procedures into educational settings is a waste of time, there is growing evidence, included elsewhere in this booklet, that teaching thinking skills, especially through a dialogical process, is time well invested. Children not only develop essential, general skills that will stand them in good stead throughout life, such as problem-finding, problem-solving, working in a team, speaking their mind, etc. They also are better motivated to learn in general, and – the icing on the cake – they even learn what they have to learn more efficiently.

Felix: Your approach sounds very nice. But remember, time is not like gum that you can stretch as much as you like. You have to use it as well as possible, and children and parents, and most of all, educational authorities, expect from you that at the end of the compulsory schooling period, children master the basic skills the will need to integrate themselves into this present hierarchical society. So, all you can do is to explain children the basic stuff they have to learn, to organize some activities in the class period to facilitate they get a meaningful learning of that knowledge.

Roger: I repeat the challenge to clarify what this basic stuff is. On the other hand, you introduce a fundamental concept: Meaningful learning! Precisely the point is that most learning is pretty meaningless without being linked to prior knowledge and understanding. The process of linking and thereby extending one's
understanding is not one, by and large, of the rote learning of new isolated facts. It is one in which, through dialogue with others, and through thinking to oneself (which itself is internalised dialogue) one is reshaping one’s brain to be more in tune with the shape of the world.

Felix: However, you are jumping very fast to conclusions, based upon very arguable definitions. You assume that meaningful learning involves (if it is not the same that) dialogical learning, even philosophical dialogue. But I am not so sure. I remember when I was a teenager and attended philosophy classes in high school; I had to learn the basic philosophical ideas of great classical philosophers, like Aristotle, Tomas of Aquino or Descartes, and I did learn, and my learning was meaningful, and I liked philosophy, but I never, never, “enjoyed” any philosophical dialogue during my school time in the philosophy classes.

I also want to move to a fundamental part of the learning process in compulsory school. I am referring to evaluation. The last step of this learning process is to evaluate how much students have learnt, using tests and other evaluation tools that require from children an intellectual effort to show what they know and how well they are able to apply that knowledge to specific problems.

Roger: Well, setting aside (again) the doubt as to whether all children really need to know all that they are taught in schools, and setting aside (again) the doubt as to how long they remember most of what they learnt at school, one is still left with a serious question as to whether the standard tests that are used to evaluate all this learning do effectively measure the application of that knowledge either to specific practical problems, or to problems in general. Most tests are not to do with problem-solving (except, notably, maths and some of the sciences) but with rehearsing approved perspectives that bear little relation to most children’s or indeed human problems in general.
Felix: I know that there is a strong relationship between testing and learning, and the influences go both ways. That is, if you introduce some specific tests to evaluate what children learn at school, then teacher will adapt their teaching to the tests, and the consequence is that they will learn to solve the tests. And we also can design a test that evaluates just what they are teaching. So, it would be possible to put more emphasis on the learning skills than in the content, if it is possible to separate the content from the process or skills. The problem is that at present, most of the official curriculum is centred on content.

The second problem is a consequence of the need of becoming familiar with specific knowledge. The bulk of education consists in handing down knowledge to children minds by those who have the mastering and control of this knowledge.

Roger: Mm... This remark seems to fall right into the hands of the respectable wing of post-modernism, which seriously questions the conscious or unconscious control of ‘modern’ curricula by people who generally come from a narrow class of people whose own education and sense of values is very different from that of many, perhaps most, other members of society.

Felix: And, as you know, in order to do that, children do not need any specific critical and creative high order skill.

Roger: Mm... A highly questionable proposition, which probably deserves fuller treatment than we can manage here.

Felix: Take your time, if you need. My point is that, at school, children’s only intellectual activity is: a) understanding the subject matter teachers are conveying to them; b) memorizing that information; c) applying their knowledge to specific problems or in tests or examinations. To guarantee a good proficiency in a) dialogue can help, but is not very useful.
Roger: Ah! Understanding is such an easy thing, isn’t it? Actually, no, it often is not. I would argue the case (again in more detail later) that subject teachers consistently underestimate the challenge posed to learners in mastering the essential concepts/understandings of their subjects. Philosophical enquiry/dialogue is not the only process that supports learners in facing this challenge, but it certainly is one of them. Part of the skill/art of the good philosopher is to wrestle with difficult concepts and to make better sense of them, through both outer and inner dialogue. That is a skill/art that is applicable in any subject, and indeed an argument could be put that there can be no advance in understanding in any subject at any level without the application of this basic philosophical skill. Philosophy, in other words, is inherent in every subject under the sun. (And philosophy advances, generally, through dialogue.) On the contrary, it is the best guarantee of proficient and long-term learning.

Felix: On the other hand, in compulsory education, children have to learn other things, most of them related to their behaviour, to attitudes and social values, such as discipline, work routines, obedience, punctuality, co-operation... Once again, dialogue can be useful in training children in all those attitudes, but is not the right/best procedure. Learning means a stable modification of people’s behaviour, and that also involves a change in the theories and knowledge their behaviour is based on. Therefore, they have to realize that the new behaviour, theories and knowledge really work, that is, have a positive consequence in their everyday life. As behaviourist psychologists used to say, education is impossible without the positive and negative reinforcements that allow all of us to discover which behaviour and theories are beneficial and useful and which are injurious for our own personal “survival”.

As long as the whole personal growth of students is a central goal in formal education, sometimes we have to face hard situations where children do not do their social and school duties. Their behaviour is disruptive, even dangerous for their classmates. In those situations, dialogue is needed, but is not enough and it might be also inefficient, if not counterproductive. Some children in some cases need a
punishment aimed at controlling and modifying their negative behaviour. After talking with those disruptive children, teachers have to adopt more severe measures and to take all the necessary steps to see that that the disruptive behaviour does not happen again. That is the moment when we have to stop talking and move to do some other things.

Roger: Most of this may be agreeable, but it is marginal to the question of whether dialogue should play a greater part in general, formal education. Of course dialogue does not solve every problem. But of course, also, not every moment of education is filled with problems that dialogue cannot solve. Most of the time available in schools, teachers are actually teaching. The question is whether they are teaching the right curriculum and to best effect. The main thrust of my argument is that they are not teaching the right curriculum, but even if we agreed they were, there would still be a big question as to whether the prevalent mode of didactic/transmission teaching is so effective. A study by the National Literacy Trust in UK indicated that learners retained only 5% of what they heard, compared with 50% of what they learnt in discussions. That is only one indicator of the power/value of dialogue in education. Other reasons for believing that it is an underestimated and underused approach to teaching and learning include the changes it can lead to in good attitudes and behaviours in respect of learning.

Felix: Schools are social institutions where people live together according to specific social rules that regulate their activities. As in any other social institutions, people need to know which deeds are allowed and which one are forbidden, that is, they need a clear list of do’s and don’ts to adjust their behaviour to the social and school requirements. Social conflicts are an intrinsic facet of social life: people disagree and some times their interests are opposite, even contradictory. People fight for recognition, a hard task above all for children and teenagers, who are struggling for building up their own identity. In order to cope with that kind of problems, dialogue is, without any doubt, a necessary tool, but it is also a non-sufficient tool.
Again, all largely agreeable. But nobody who argues for developing dialogue more in schools is arguing that it alone (i.e. sufficiently) is how teaching and learning should proceed. It remains a necessary, and still arguably undervalued, approach. N.B. One might as well belittle the need for children to listen to their teachers on the grounds that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition for learning.

Felix: And last, but not least, school are very hierarchical institutions where there are people in a position of power and responsibility (teachers) and other people in a subordinate position (students). Teachers need to have authority and practise it in their classes and in their teaching, they have to make decisions and they have the duty of grading children as a way of evaluating their academic achievements. They have specific professional responsibilities that need something more than just dialogue. Perhaps. Probably, even. But to say that they need to do more than dialogue is, of course, to say very clearly that they do need to dialogue! On the other hand, students on their part have to respect and obey their teachers, and recognise that they occupy a different position in the school activities.

Roger: Mm... Yes, of course. But dialogue need not undermine the relationship and respect between teachers and students. On the contrary, it can often enhance it, leading to improved learning and well-being.

Felix: So, teachers-students’ relationships are not symmetrical relations, and this is much clearer as long as knowledge is involved. Teachers are paid because they have knowledge their students don’t have, and they are suppose to succeed in get their students to learn what they are supposed to learn. In this asymmetrical bond, overestimating the power of dialogue is probably a mistake if not a skilful stratagem to offer an appearance of equality and hide the actual inequality that characterize those relationships.

Roger: No. There is here a misconception of the relation of equality inherent in dialogue. No two humans are ever precisely equal in any significant sense. There
will always be differences of age, knowledge, ability, social status/respect, etc. None of those differences need affect the particular relationship of equality that dialogue supposes. This is a relationship in which each person is paying equal respect to the other as a person. When such respect is clear, not only is the dialogue able to proceed in a healthy way, but also the learning (both ways, i.e. from each other) is likely to be maximised.

*Felix: Probably there is not a more blatant piece of trickery that Plato’s dialogues. We only have to take a quick look to those dialogue to realize that Socrates’ speeches are always much longer than those of their opponents, who most of the times reduce their participation to a very concise “yes”, “no” or “of course”. And this apparent open dialogue is no more that a clever procedure to ensure that people reach the conclusions Socrates expects from them.*

Roger: Yes, indeed, and to that extent the ‘dialogues’, whether reconstructed by Plato or accurate representations of Socrates’ conversations, are not dialogues in the sense we are positing in this project. They have, superficially, the form of dialogues, but – pace Plato and Coca Cola – they are not the ‘real thing’!
CHAPTER 3

COMMUNITIES OF CONVERSATION

Joseph Giordmaina

Malta
Dialogue, Philosophy, Thinking and Children

The *Teaching Thinking in Europe: Inventory of European Programmes* (Hamers & Overtoon, (eds.) 1997) lists 42 different programmes whose main goal is the teaching of thinking to children in schools. One identified approach is *Philosophy for Children*, a ‘subject’ developed mainly by Prof Matthew Lipman at Montclair State University. Prof Lipman has also set up The Institute of Advancement for Philosophy for Children (IAPC), which has published a curriculum in Philosophy for Children, one which is currently being implemented in more than 60 countries. Other writers in different parts of the world have taken different approaches from the one taken at IAPC; reflecting the educational traditions they are working in.

The common goal of all Philosophy for Children programmes is the development of children into better thinkers, into more reasonable beings. All writers within the Philosophy for Children tradition believe that thinking can be taught and improved, and that it takes place within a subject: one thinks about something, one does not just ‘think’. They also believe that the ideal subject to promote better thinking is Philosophy. The goals of Philosophy for Children programmes are to encourage children to think, to reason and to make judgements about issues that are of interest to them, most of which are judgements about values as well as better understanding of concepts. It is through such a process of thinking that children create meaning of their worlds, constructing their values, knowledge, dispositions and making informed and well thought out judgements. Through Philosophy for Children teachers try to develop the social, ethical, aesthetical, affective and political domains of children’s lives. The underlying notion is that thinking develops through a conversation within a community of inquiry: my thinking develops because I have a language by means of which I can express my thoughts. I also have the capability of listening to others, assessing/judging their positions, and changing my beliefs accordingly.
Methodology

The Philosophy for Children approach does not involve the uncontextualised drilling one finds in a number of thinking skills programmes; it can be taught both as a subject in itself as well as through the curriculum, and is a ‘subject’ which is directly related to the child’s experience, that experience which goes beyond the classroom walls. Although one cannot divorce methodology from content, for the purposes of this paper I shall focus more on the former, that is, the methodology employed, particularly the part referred to in the literature as the community of inquiry, in which dialogue plays a central role.

In the initial part of a Philosophy for Children lesson, children are introduced to a text. A text can be a novel specifically written for a Philosophy for Children lesson, or any other children’s literature. A text can be a happening in the school or classroom, an autobiographical writing or a video. Anything in fact is a text, as long as it has enough content to stimulate the children’s interest. The text is introduced to children in a number of ways, normally through reading aloud the passage/story, through dramatisation, using puppet theatres, etc. Children are given enough time to reflect and problematise the text, and are encouraged to note on their ‘Thinking Notebook’ what they would like to discuss. After ‘Thinking Time’, the facilitator of the discussion, who initially is the teacher, but eventually can be any child, asks the children to identify what they would like to talk about. These points are written down on a large sheet of paper; the name of the contributing children written next to the sentence. One of the themes identified by the children is chosen for discussion either through general agreement, or by taking vote or some other way. Following this, a discussion or ‘inquiry’ takes place. For this to be possible, the classroom is turned into a community of inquiry, where dialogue is encouraged in order to inquire into the selected theme, through a process of questioning and sharing of ideas. Children are encouraged to move in their discussion from the specific, the point of departure of the discussion, to more general terms, and to correct and change their positions as the inquiry moves.
along. Following the discussion, children are encouraged to act on their ‘new’ positions, for example, by simply taking note of their ideas and how these changed, in their ‘Thinking Notebooks’, by expressing their ‘new’ ideas using different media, for example putting up a poster exhibition, drawings, writing a play etc., or to try to bring about a change in the way things are done. If the topic of inquiry is ‘fairness’, and a classroom procedure is identified as being unfair, children are encouraged to act so as to bring about a change in class: a fairer procedure. The idea is not to stop at the thinking process, but to help children to pass to action, that is, from spectators to actors.

Although the methodology described in a Philosophy for Children lesson seems to be a rather simple one, it involves great skills on the facilitator’s part so as to have a meaningful dialogue going on in the classroom. Teachers are prepared for Philosophy for Children through training courses. The teacher’s manuals help in developing that necessary ‘philosophical ear’ in order that certain issues that might escape the untrained philosopher be identified and thought about and maybe even discussed with other teachers prior to the lesson.

**Thinking in a Community**

For the purpose of this chapter I shall be mainly dealing with the notion of ‘community of inquiry’ as developed through the Philosophy for Children literature and, drawing on a number of philosophers’ writings, I shall try to add different perspectives to how the idea of the community of inquiry and dialogue can be further developed.

In engaging in the community of inquiry the main tasks are two: the first being to inquire, the second to inquire with others. Tinder (1993) distinguishes between different kinds of inquiry: scientific, historical, transcendental, and philosophical, arguing that the latter is the most comprehensive of all inquiries, ‘of unifying all
modes of consciousness in a single interpretation of being’ (p.359). For Splitter and Sharp (1995) community evokes a ‘spirit of co-operation, care, trust, safety and a sense of common purpose’, while inquiry evokes a form of ‘self-correcting practice driven by the need to transform that which is intriguing, problematic, confused, ambiguous, or fragmentary into some kind of unifying whole which is satisfying to those involved, and which culminates, albeit tentatively, in judgement’ (p.18).

Lipman (1991 p.229-243<sup>iv</sup>) argues that in a community of inquiry

1. the process is not merely conversation or discussion, it is dialogical;
2. this activity has a direction: it goes where the argument takes it;
3. it always has an aim: that of producing a product, a settlement or a judgement. This can be tentative, but it is always a product of the activity.

Lipman also argues that the community of inquiry is a necessary means for attaining a democratic society (Lipman 1991 p.244). Lipman’s vision is that the community of inquiry in the class should both ‘represent and anticipate a society composed of participatory communities - a society that is a community of such communities’ (p.247). This is possible if education becomes ‘education as inquiry and education for inquiry’.

**The Dialogical Process**

The Philosophy for Children movement promotes the use of dialogue in the classroom rather than conversation, debate or argumentation. For example, Splitter and Sharp (1995) argue that dialogue is a form of conversation, in which the following conditions are present:

1. The conversation is structured by being focused on a topic or question which is problematic or contestable.
2. The conversation is self-regulating or self-correcting. Its participants are prepared both to question the views and reasons put forward by others, and to restate their own position in response to questions or counter-examples that come from the group.
3. The conversation has what we call an egalitarian structure. By what they say, participants show that they value themselves and one another equally for the purpose of the dialogue, irrespective of where they stand in relation to a particular viewpoint.
4. The conversation is guided by the mutual interests of its members. In a community of inquiry, it is the participants (of whom the teacher is but one) who set the agenda and determine the procedures for dealing with the issues at hand (p.34-35).

In the process of dialogue children have the opportunity to articulate what they believe in, to decentre from their own point of view in order to understand the position of others, to listen, to take turns, and to build on the ideas of the rest of the community. Dialogue in the classroom gives children the opportunity to modify and improve their thinking.

For Burbles (1993) dialogue involves two or more interlocutors. It is marked by a climate of open participation by any of its partners, who put forth a series of alternating statements of variable duration (including questioning, responses, redirections, and building statements...), constituting a sequence that is continuous and developmental. Dialogue is guided by a spirit of discovery, so that the typical tone of a dialogue is exploratory and interrogative. It involves a commitment to the process of communication interchange itself, a willingness to 'see things through' to some meaningful understandings or agreements among the participants. Furthermore, it manifests an attitude of reciprocity among the participants: an interest respect, and concern that they share for one another, even in the face of disagreement (pp.8-9).

He distinguishes between 'teleological' dialogue, which is a dialogue in search of the Truth through a process of dialectic (convergent dialogue), and nonteleological dialogue, which is critical and constructive dialogue (divergent dialogue). There are four types of dialogues:

a) dialogue as conversation: where through co-operation one arrives at mutual understanding, but not necessarily towards an agreement or a reconciliation of differences,

b) dialogue as inquiry: where the main goal is the answering of a specific question, and an outcome that is agreeable to all is produced,

c) dialogue as debate: defending and articulating positions; agreements or reconciliation of differences is not on the agenda

d) dialogue as instruction: through the use of questions the discussion is moved towards a definite conclusion.

These four positions can be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Dialogue</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive - Divergent</td>
<td>Dialogue as conversation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive - Convergent</td>
<td>Dialogue as inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical - Divergent</td>
<td>Dialogue as debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical-Convergent</td>
<td>Dialogue as instruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although most writers within the Philosophy for Children tradition argue for type (b) dialogue, that is, dialogue as inquiry, conceiving of dialogue as conversation is more appropriate to the achievement of the goals of a community of inquiry.

**Dialogue as Conversation**

In a dialogue as inquiry methodology, characterised by Burbules (1993) as inclusive -convergent, the main aim is to move towards the answering of a specific question, the resolution of a specific problem, or the reconciliation of a specific dispute; it is convergent in its aims to produce an outcome agreeable to all (p.116).

Rorty (1980) believes that this has been the main goal of what he terms constructive systematic philosophy. The main goal of such philosophy has always been to find foundations, to find common grounds to which we all agree. Rorty calls this ‘epistemology’, a set of rules to which we can turn in order to settle an agreement once there is an issue.

The dominant notion of epistemology is that to be rational, to be fully human, to do what we ought, we need to be able to find agreement with other human beings. To construct an epistemology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with others. The assumption that an epistemology can be constructed is the assumption that common ground exists (p.316).

Rorty claims that not all discourse is commensurable, that such a foundation, such common ground is not always possible. Rorty believes that

There is no such thing as human nature...There is only the shaping of an animal into a human being by a process of socialisation, followed (with luck) by the self-individualisation and self-creation of that human being through his or her later revolt against that very process (Rorty, R. 1990b p.44)

This clearly identifies the role of education as one primarily of socialisation to be followed by ‘self-individualisation’ and ‘self-creation’. For Rorty the former takes place in primary and secondary schools while the latter takes place in colleges and universities.

Education seems to me two quite distinct enterprises: lower education is mostly a matter of socialisation, of trying to inculcate a sense of citizenship, and higher education is mostly a matter of individuation, of trying to awaken the individual’s imagination in the hope that she will become able to re-create herself. I am not sure that philosophy can do much for any of these enterprises.
Rorty here is mistaken on two grounds.

The first is his division of the roles of education into consecutive rather than parallel processes. Self-individualisation and self-creation should be encouraged in all students and not only those who manage to make it to university or college. What Rorty calls ‘edification discourse’, which is discourse which is meant to ‘take us out of our old selves by the powers of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’(p.360) should be present in all classrooms, irrespective of whether they are in primary or secondary schools.

The second mistake Rorty makes is that philosophy cannot do much to reach such goals. It is precisely this kind of discourse that teachers within the Philosophy for Children movement are trying to achieve using philosophy: encouraging discourse that helps children to make the familiar strange, encouraging them to react to what is presented as systematic, as unproblematic.

Rorty distinguishes between two kinds of people, the commonsensicalist and the ironists. The commonsensicalists are those who are merely socialised, people who accept the given vocabulary of the day. ‘Ironists’ are those who fulfill the following three conditions:

1. She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered.
2. She realises that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts.
3. Insofar as she philosophises about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself. Ironists who are inclined to philosophise see the choice between vocabularies as made neither within a neutral and universal metavocabulary nor by an attempt to fight one's way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off against the old.

This rather than inquiry should be the main goal of Philosophy for Children in schools. It is a process of hermeneutics which is only possible through the process of conversation; it is by keeping the conversation going that one can understand...
the other's position, his/her point of view. Inquiry leads to transformation of 'that which is intriguing, problematic, confused, ambiguous, or fragmentary into some kind of unifying whole which is satisfying to those involved, and which culminates, albeit tentatively, in judgement' (Splitter and Sharp p.18). Conversation is much more than that. Inquiry leads to a closure, even if tentatively, of the conversation. The aim of a community of inquiry should not be inquiry at all, 'of producing a product, a settlement or a judgement', but a conversation without the 'direction' of where the 'argument takes it' (as suggested by Lipman 1991 p.229). Teachers should aim at attaining communities of conversations in the classroom. Depending on the social background of children, on their 'contingent historical circumstances' conversations in a classroom can be incommensurable. At this point understanding is only possible through Rorty's hermeneutical process.

Reed in Sharp and Reed (eds.) (1992 pp.158-164) points out that conversations are 'in a sense, freely chosen'. In a conversation one chooses whom to talk to and about what to talk. It is open-ended and on-going, 'listening to what is truly, genuinely other' (Caputo 1985 p.201). One always has the possibility of refusing to participate. Conversation, of its very nature comes prior to all other forms of communication, including dialogue, which is more focused, more investigative, more of an inquiry. For Caputo (1985) the final goal of hermeneutics and edifying philosophy is to put man back in touch with himself, rather than turning to the 'speculative constructions of metaphysics' (p.265). It is a process of recognition of ourselves, the ability to find ourselves in conversation with others possibly but not solely through philosophy (Bernstein 1985 p.76).

Walzer (1989-90) distinguishes between real conversation and constructed conversation. The aim of constructed conversation like that proposed by Rawls and Habermas is to 'produce conversational endings, finished arguments, agreed-upon propositions - conclusions, in short, whose truth value or moral rightness the rest of us will be obliged to acknowledge' (p.182). On the other hand, real conversation is always inconclusive; it has no authoritative moments.

Real talk is the conscious and critical part of that process that generates our received and reigning theories - reflection becomes articulate. Arguing with one another, we
interpret, revise, elaborate, and also call into question the paradigms that shape our thinking... There is no design. Real talk is unstable and restless, hence it is ultimately more radical than ideal speech. It reaches to reasons and arguments that none of its participants can anticipate, hence to reasons and arguments undreamt of (for better and for worse) by our philosophers (Walzer, 1989-90, p.195).

Both Rawls (1971) and Habermas (1990) have designed hypothetical theories by means of which one can ensure the freedom and equality of all speakers involved in a conversation. Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ sets a number of conditions for people in ‘the original position’, to ensure that agreement is reached in a fair manner. People in the original position do not know

- their place in society (social position, class status, generation),
- their natural assets (intelligence, strength, health),
- their own conception of the good (personal goals, plans, values),
- their particular psychological attributes (attitudes toward risk, pessimism, optimism),
- anything particular about their own society (its political structure, economic system, history, cultural values, class divisions, etc.).

Habermas on the other hand has designed rules for reason. These are:

1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever.
2. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever in the discourse.
3. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.
4. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2).

He also suggests four validity claims by means of which we can better understand what is going on in a conversation. Habermas claims that these four validity claims are universal assumptions we make during everyday communicative action. The assumptions are that:

1. What we are saying or hearing is intelligible, i.e., it is coded according to the usual rules, etc.
2. What we are saying or hearing is true in so far as it implies the existence of states of affairs, etc.
3. The persons speaking are being truthful and sincere
4. The things said are normatively appropriate considering the relationship among the people and between them and the situation they are in (Young, R.1989 pp.75-76).
Both Rawls and Habermas’s theories are only useful in a Philosophy for Children lesson in order to unmask the degree of asymmetry that might be taking place in a conversation. There is always asymmetry of power and knowledge. Deceptions, ulterior purposes, force, authority, intellectual status and other distortions coming from both teachers and pupils may be identified and criticized using the ideal speech situation as a guide. Rawls’ and Habermas’ ideal situations only help us in being aware of what might be going on in a dialogue, in a conversation.

Conclusion: Confrontational Discourse

In Philosophy for Children the attempt is made to turn the classroom into a community of inquiry. In actual fact a classroom is not necessarily a community where children have the same interests and goals, united by reciprocal trust; these being characteristics of a community. Children in a classroom are simply put together by chance or by design. They have no option to leave, or to move from one community to the other. In the classroom one has to respect the diverse communities that exist, the differences of race, of culture, of religion, of gender. It is through conversation that children can be encouraged to examine the ‘historically inherited and unreflectively held prejudices, and [to] free [themselves] of those which hinder our efforts to understand others’ (Kimball and Garrison 1996 p.53). It is only when one person confronts the beliefs and values of others that he or she can recognize, question and value his or her own position. The community of inquiry in an lesson should be the site of confrontation of ideas, of a conversation about what is important to children in order to help them interpret and reinterpret both their ‘selves’ and their culture. Such discourse encourages them to acknowledge that every participant in the conversation in the classroom and beyond is conditioned by different historical circumstances: gender, age, class, education level, vocabularies, etc. These differences are not to be eradicated, but celebrated. It is only through such a space in the school curriculum, only through dialogue as conversation with the ‘other’ that children can become more aware of both ‘themselves’ and the unfamiliar other, resulting in newer, richer understandings and meanings.
Bibliography


Rorty, Richard. 1990b *Education Without Dogma* Dialogue No.2 pp.44-47


CHAPTER 4
COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY AND DIALOGUE

Zaza Carneiro de Moura
Portugal

DE PAIS PARA FILHOS...
Indeed? Is this what we want our children to inherit? Is this really happening? Can we stop it? Where does our responsibility as inhabitants of a world turned unequivocally global in less than a century lie?

No doubt, there has been an alteration of our experience of time and space, undergoing a process of compression, among other reasons by the rapid growth of new information technologies and means of transportation. For better and for worse our perception of other people, cultures, societies become virtually familiar in real time. Familiar, but not intimate, nor necessarily understood or even grasped in its complexity and diversity.

The beginning of the process and its naming were not coincidental. The word “globalization” only became of common usage in the eighties of the last century. Thought and language achieving by that time a classification and identification of a multi-faced phenomenon which we all experience, whether we acknowledge it or not, which affects our lives and deep inner selves.

Assuming that the tossing about, from parents to children, of an increasingly diseased Earth - polluted, and impoverished in its finite natural resources, as it is mordantly portrayed above - reflects a dramatic reality. Is there anything we can do? What’s in our power, whatever the society or regime we happen to be born into in this diverse vast world? What kind of world do we want to live in and pass on to future generations? More, does it still make sense a call for a better world?

Yes, one can answer, because it has to do with our drive to survive as happens with all animal beings. Notwithstanding the fact of being part of the problem, humans, as such, are able to formulate problems and search for their solution in a

---

reasonable and arguable way. This is of course a simplification – even well-reasoned hypothesis or theories arriving at practical solutions can lead to unforeseen consequences, creating new problems to solve, in a chain that is sometimes a demonstration of scientific progress. Worse, it seems there is no paralleling with ethical progress and political and social fairness, nor individual or collective interest, in following this path.

No doubt, the significance of our environment is pressing for urgent, creative and sustainable solutions shared by individuals *per se* and those in power. It doesn’t follow, of course, that it is all that counts for the building of a better world.

Paying attention to this open question may be connected to the underlying assumption of the idea of *hope*, as positive grounding for action: hope, the concept and the feeling of it, acting as a background for the search of a more equitable relationship amongst people, pointing to a worldly inclusion of tolerance, awareness, freedom and peace, operating by means of relating ourselves to each other in many different engaged ways. Another assumption is the idea that it is possible to contribute to the building, not faking, of reality.

Refuting being called a positivist - a strong belief in the results and methods of science that favours scientific knowledge against metaphysics - the philosopher Karl Popper tells us:

*I am not a positivist, in so far as I regard it as morally wrong not to believe the enormous importance and reality of human and animal suffering and the reality and importance of human hope and goodness*².

The idea of a *better world*, having a long tradition enfolding an ideological, religious, political, anthropological, or psychological as well as a philosophic

---

dimension, makes it necessary to circumscribe, briefly, its scope to our main topic - that is, community of inquiry and dialogue, related to the field of education.

Of Minds in Different Voices

We are immersed in dialogue ever since we are born. When we come into the world with no hearing injury and - with the exception of a few known cases - raised in society, we are immediately exposed to natural language. Language and thought being intermingled, chances are that very soon in our lives we enter by imitation on a process of asking questions and giving answers. Surely, a less than three year old child can ask many questions, while not knowing what a question is - “where is daddy?” could be one of many. Or even earlier giving answers by pointing her finger when asked: “where is the dog?”, for instance. The ability to make distinctions between questions and answers, as such, will come later, and is one skill that can be improved.

There are many types and degrees of dialogue. However, when there is a sequence of questions and responses, an exchange of ideas, by definition, in strictu sensu - then there happens to be a dialogue.

Probably, out of this original model of talking, different types of dialogue evolve according to context, from mere chatter to sound argumentation. This last type is of importance in all aspects of our daily life, especially in the case when “every argument is conceived along the lines of a challenge-response model of interactive dialogue, in which two people reason together,”3 and not as a verbal conflict or quarrel, or a non-intended monologue, when one of them just doesn't listen to the other.

---

A purposeful ambiguous use of the meaning of “argument” shows up in the next excerpt from the Monty Python’s Flying Circus “Argument Clinic” sketch, here partly quoted from the book, Invitation to Critical Thinking⁴:

Customer: Is this the right room for an argument?
Attendant: I told you once.
Customer: No you haven’t.
Attendant: Yes I have.
Customer: When?
Attendant: Just now.
Customer: No you didn’t.
Attendant: I did.
Customer: Didn’t.
Attendant: Did.
Customer: Didn’t!
Attendant: I am telling you I did.
Customer: You did not!
Attendant: Oh, I am sorry, just one moment. Is this the five-minute argument or the full half hour?
Customer: Oh, just the five minutes.
Attendant: Ah, thank you. Anyway, I did.
Customer: You most certainly did not.
Attendant: Look that’s get this thing clear. I quite definitely told you.
Customer: No you did not.
Attendant: Yes I did.
Customer: No you didn’t.
Attendant: Yes I did!
Customer: No you didn’t!
Attendant: Yes I did!
Customer: No you didn’t!

⁴ See, Vincent E. Barry and Joel Rudinow, Invitation to Critical Thinking, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1989
Attendant: Yes I DID.
Customer: No you DIDN’T!
Attendant: DID!
Customer: Oh now look. This isn’t an argument!
Attendant: Yes it is.
Customer: No it isn’t. It is just contradiction.
Attendant: No it isn’t.
Customer: It IS!
Attendant: It is NOT!
Customer: Look you just contradicted me.
Attendant: I did not.
Customer: Oh, you did.
Attendant: No, No, No.
Customer: You did just then!
Attendant: Nonsense.

Assuredly dialogue, “a sequence of exchanges of messages or speech acts”\(^5\), is not restricted to two participants. Argumentative dialogue is no exception. It happens in different contexts; when its participants engage their minds, expressing and listening to different voices. In the case that concerns us here, hopefully, they will turn into a community of investigation or enquiry. Being silent, like a pause in any musical piece, is also accounted as part of communal investigation process.

Inner dialogue, which can also be characterized as an exchange of ideas, is also an important aspect of development of our thought about ourselves, the others and the world around us. Plato, for instance, in the Sophist, defines thought as dialogue with oneself.\(^6\) The other is not excluded from inner dialogue. On the contrary, individual thought and feeling is apt to increase with an open and critical mind concerning others’ perspectives and insights, expressing either different or similar views.

---

\(^5\) “Ibid”
\(^6\) Plato, Sophist, …
Others point to a permanent conversation that incorporates thoughtfully the voices from past ages\textsuperscript{7}, the voice of the text, or as a sharing of minds that transcends space\textsuperscript{8}.

In the above humorous example, the goal of that exchange seems obliterated since the two opponents are unable to cooperate to accomplish mutual understanding. Doesn't it happen in so many, not so innocuous situations?

How can we improve dialogue, as a means for the fulfilment of our hopes of a “best” or “good life” for all?

If we accept that education is at the core of all social transformation then another question arises:

Is there a language of education which suits best our goal of a common good? to better our world? How can we as individuals, performing so many different roles, be a responsible part of this process?

\textbf{Stone circles in the water}

Our world seems spinning faster and faster, the media virtually giving the same news information, over and over again, to everybody at the same time, notwithstanding that facts can be presented along with different evidence or subtle bias. On the other side, there are innumerable examples of the positive impact of the media exposure, mainly through television and the web, calling worldly attention for dramatic situations in some distant part of the world where real

\textsuperscript{7} See for this idea, Richard Rorty, \textit{Philosophy as the Mirror of Nature}, Princeton U. Press, 1980

people are living, awakening public opinion and institutions, of a public/political or private nature, to their responsibilities and/or solidarity.

Nevertheless, children and adults of the twentieth-first century, as never before, are enthralled in a vertigo of the present tense. Time for reflection and the building of knowledge, where memory, and then history, are also crucial, for developing oneself with others, and one’s identity, may be somehow curtailed.

When Matthew Lipman, the innovator\textsuperscript{9} of Philosophy for Children, pointed, back in the sixties of the last century, to the fact that education should no longer hold on a “tribal education model”, he endorsed as a substitute one, the “reflexive model of education,” while introducing his own imprint which proved to open avenues to the developing of creativity, and reasonableness as outcomes: an education in the scope of, and towards, democratic societies.

Briefly, singling out for the time being only a few of his proposed model features - the active acquisition of knowledge through discovery and research, the presupposition of fallibility and the power of self-correction - one could say, by its seminal acceptance, that Lipman’s vision of education proved itself to account for the needs of an “education of the future”, as a movement sprang out, giving rise to more or less orthodox appropriations and developments.

Another convergent perspective, stated before the rise of the intensive sophistication and availability of electronic means of communication, the one of Jerome S. Bruner, calls our attention to a “language of education”\textsuperscript{10}, paraphrased here as four related ideas: activity - the child acquiring the control of his own mind’s activity; reflectivity - the child engaged in learning in depth, not just superficially; sharing - joining the individual resources of those collaborating in the learning/teaching process; culture as a forum – as a way of living and thinking that we build, negotiate and eventually name reality.

\textsuperscript{9} Thinking in Education, Cambridge U. Press, 1991
\textsuperscript{10} “The Language of Education”, in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Harvard University Press, 1986
In his own words, “a culture is as much a forum for negotiating and renegotiating meaning and for explicating action as it is a set of rules or specifications for action”.

A few more lines ahead he says “it follows from this view of culture as a forum that induction into culture through education, if it is to prepare the young for life as lived, should also partake of the spirit of forum, of negotiation, of the recreating of meaning”.

As with Lipman's rejection of the view of transmission of knowledge inherent in the so-called “tribal model of education”, so Bruner goes on, “But this conclusion runs counter to traditions of pedagogy that derive from another time, another interpretation of culture, another interpretation of authority – one that looked at the process of education as a transmission of knowledge and values by those who knew more to those who knew less and knew it less expertly.”

The fact that both thinkers see the child as an agent, nor as mere recipient of knowledge, but as part of its own education and growth, accords also in the role both give to the individual in a group. For in Bruner's forum we may grasp a practical correspondence with the classroom setting, with its transformation into a community of enquiry, the methodological approach of philosophy for/with children to dialogue and learning.

The community of enquiry involves a crucial relationship with a value of its own, as being conducive to the production of meaning in a peculiar way: at an interpersonal and intrapersonal levels - the one and other - and by the same token as a creative and motivating context for learning in any discipline.

It doesn’t happen by chance. It implies volition and determination in the teacher and the development with children of a bunch of skills, dispositions and attitudes that is likely to transcend the classroom setting to everyday life. It implies a growth in wisdom too, through what Lipman called self-correction, a feature of critical thinking developed through dialogue in a community of enquiry.
One and the same image\textsuperscript{11} can give rise to many metaphors from the above idea of vortex to the more serene one of circles in the water as a symbol for the spreading of communal inquiry to society as a whole, or more likely, from a classroom to a school, a school to network of schools, and so on.

However the intention is to single out Lipman's stone-effect metaphor when he writes:

\textit{If we initiate the practice of transforming the classroom into a community of reflective thinking, where one thinks in every discipline about the world and about his own thinking about the world, we are prone rapidly to recognize that those communities may happen to be placed inside bigger ones, and these ones in the interior of others even bigger, all of them obeying the same principles. There is the outwards undulation effect, like the one of a stone thrown into a puddle: more and more far away, more and more communities being formed concentrically, each community composed by individuals committed to a self-correcting search and to creativity.}\textsuperscript{12}

That is the case for any discipline, assuming we recognize the worthiness of this operative educational model which implies the “persistence of self-correcting searching of issues regarded simultaneously of significance and puzzling.”\textsuperscript{13} Then we may ask ourselves how to accomplish and/or develop it?

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} See powerpoint for image - reproduction of a painting by Jorge Martins, untitled, 1991. From an exhibition at Galeria Valemtim de Carvalho (invitation postcard).
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid, page 193.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
A Joint task – Building a Community of Inquiry\textsuperscript{14}

The community of inquiry builds questioning dialogue, intermingled with attitudes and dispositions of some sort. Before telling of those specifically, and of the of variety of supports and props for dialogue in any discipline, it may be useful to note that this concept applies to any classroom setting, be it formal, from kindergarten to university, or non-formal, like clubs of philosophy, of reading, or after-school hours institutions, for instance, as well to lifelong learning.

In short, it is linked to the role played by the teacher, educator, facilitator - a demanding one, though, by and large, rewarding. He or she models how to go about the process of the discovery of knowledge, while motivating, or enhancing, the will of the students to learn independently, without neglecting the need for quality results related to the contents of his or her discipline.

That is, the personal engagement that the creation and consolidation of such community requires from its members steps further than the mere acquisition of knowledge; it has a parallel impact over attitudes and dispositions, such as mutual respect, responsibility, intellectual humility and the wish of inquiry of one's worth, and discovery of a meaning for one's life.

Both teacher and students\textsuperscript{15} have to learn the "patience of the concept": it takes time to turn into a community of inquiry. Sometimes the group progresses easily, at other times by qualitative leaps towards the joint creation of a secure learning environment, an atmosphere of trust that favours and motivates for learning in any discipline, building on one another's ideas. This is a kind of pedagogical approach that is conducive of autonomous thinking and favours cognitive and emotional and ethical development. It requires courage to expose oneself, and understanding of the power of self-correcting and self-transcending oneself. Moreover it is an

\textsuperscript{14} See for image, PowerPoint image – Ana Vigidal, “No coração da 111”, 1992
\textsuperscript{15} For sake of simplicity the term teacher refers to all the settings mentioned so far.
experience that helps to build self-esteem in those who lack it, and to make more cooperative those who want to be undisputed leaders.

To build a community of inquiry implies attention to a series of interrelated guiding ideas translated into the pedagogical relationship, which can be summed up, for instance, as: autonomy, motivation and creativity, good thinking and caring thinking. Open-mindedness, sensitivity to ideas and to find the puzzling in what it is taken for granted, and a desire to pursue issues are also required. Some of these issues are a necessary subject of each specific discipline and others embody ideas that relate to topics and open avenues for further interests and studies: for instance, exploring the concept of time, of number, of narrative, of thinking, of nature, of responsibility, of good, of valid, of right, of correct truth, of ugly.

The process implies exposure to and practice of different thinking styles, too. It implies the mutual acquisition of an awareness of what is implied in “good thinking” – namely the use of the tools of formal and informal logic, that are needed in any discipline in order to make good, reasonable judgements, criteria-based and valid, and to solve problems.

Whether one wants it or not, we are all models, meaning that we are visible to the others in ways that sometimes we don’t even suspect and that may affect the person or persons unexpectedly in positive or negative fashion. It is not meant as an equivalent term for exemplariness, or as some personal conception of righteousness.

Then why emphasise it? Because modelling as a conscious performance by the teacher in the classroom with a view to create a community of inquiry leads to the internalization by the students of crucial, complex and diverse thought processes, like making hypothesis, deductive, inductive and analogical inferences, as well as attitudes and dispositions, of tolerance and mutual respect and love for learning and for getting near the truth, about oneself and the world around. In this context
there is an intention to allow for the development of an autonomous thinker/student/children/adult.

Is this not contradictory? No. Inquiry dialogue is an open one, with open questions. As such, the role of the teacher it is not to give all the answers as the final authority on the topic in discussion, or to be reduced to exposing the subjects to the students for them to memorize for the tests, but to facilitate discovery and research. However, by no means does it allow for a dismissal of teacher proficiency, nor a neglect of his responsibility as educator; and there is an acknowledgement of the challenges of all sorts he or she meets.

**Good Thinking and Caring Thinking**

The classroom being the proposed locus for the building of a successful community of learners, is an ideal setting for the acquisition of basic information in any discipline. In addition, it is motivating, since it stimulates individual and collective creativity of its members – teacher and students - to engage on their own, or at least grasp what their own inclinations are, for further pursuit of knowledge and hopefully cooperative dispositions, unfolded into their present, and future, active lives, with a concern for the “common good” - in other words, a caring attitude.

Often the use of some very comprehensive words must be made explicit, contextualized - mostly if one has in mind the pedagogical relationship – in order to avoid hasty generalizations. To exemplify: to be a member of the class of students does not obliterate the fact that teachers don’t face an idealized group of children, whose natural goodness would be unspoiled: by age, sex, genetics, family, society, the country where which one happens to belong, either by birth or by migration, etc. Those are features that somehow have to do with each own identity, with one’s life-story, sometimes of abuse, suffering and violence, and sometimes, whether poor or rich, affective instability. Not an easy task for the teacher.
Put in other words, a group of students is formed of many diverse individuals, who may happen to belong, or not, to the same social-economic background, the same rural or urban school environment. They may range from an easily motivated group to the one where violent behaviour may be the main pattern to be faced.

The arguable presupposition here is that using inquiry dialogue as part of teaching in any discipline, with any students, has a double outcome: the contents are acquired, and hopefully there is, by the same token, a transformation a) concerning the way of thinking - in mathematics, biology, physics and so on - but also as children learn to listen to each other, to ask questions, give examples and counter-examples, to build with another’s ideas, give reasons, use criteria and make decisions (to name just a few skills), and using the critical and creative dimension of thought as well; b) a behavioural transformation provoked by the creation of a space for thinking and making one’s voice heard - with care - by teacher and peers.

This caring dimension is something that emerges with the practice of dialogue in a community of inquiry – it is a two way process: you give and take. Exactly what?

The approach to caring as component of higher order thinking, along with its critical and creative dimension¹⁶ is likely to have an impact in each inner self. Initial modelling by the teacher is absolutely crucial. In practice what does it mean?

When nine to ten years old children at the end of a dialogue which took about an hour give their answer to the question: “To conclude, how did doing philosophy affect you?” one says, “It helps to deal with (understand) other people”; another, [philosophy helped] “Changing our feelings, the way we speak with other people and to be truthful”. They are summing up the ethical dimension of caring thought they were introduced to by their teacher modelling, not by indoctrination. And when others pointed that philosophy helped them to use their heads, and learn more, they were mirroring the cognitive dimension, not to be dissociated from the

¹⁶ See for a developed treatment of Higher Order Thinking, Matthew Lipman, opus cited, 2nd edition.
critical and creative domains of thought of which imagination is a part - “Now I’ve got it, earlier I didn’t have much imagination, now I’ve got it”.\textsuperscript{17}

The above quotations refer to doing philosophy. However as another child pointed out in the same dialogue\textsuperscript{18}, philosophy appears connected to other disciplines in the instance, mathematics:

Guest – You said that it helps you to think in mathematics?
Ricardo – It is the discipline I love most.
Several - Me too.
Guest – Can you say how philosophy helps you to think in mathematics?
Ricardo – Because philosophy helps a lot to use our head and mathematics does the same.

This child doesn’t know about the underpinning of the methodology of the community of inquiry. However, it seems to fit in the following quotation, from Matthew Lipman’s book, Thinking in Education\textsuperscript{19}, and the general aim of the Menon Project: “Philosophy encourages thinking in the disciplines because it assumes the burden of teaching the generic aspects of thinking that goes on in any discipline and because it is a model of what it means for a discipline to reflect on and be critical on its own methodology.”

**Guiding an Inquiry Dialogue**

One of the reasons for the inclusion of sessions’ video excerpts in the companion DVD, taken from different groups engaged in dialogue, is to provide for hints for a critical observation by the prospective users of the methodology of the community of inquiry in correlation with the materials – stimuli and exercises - designed to provide a basis for “developing dialogue through philosophical inquiry”. Different

\textsuperscript{17} Video take “Excuses and Reasons”, 2006
\textsuperscript{18} Final words of the same dialogue, not included in the final video for technical reasons.
\textsuperscript{19} See opus cited.
stages of the formation of a community of inquiry are exhibited. Likewise, the “Teacher Course” aims to provide for an initiation in the skills of guiding an inquiry dialogue, awakening or enhancing a sensibility to the underlying philosophical aspect. It is a kind of preview, where all the individuals, with one another, are engaged in the art of listening in deepness through immersion in a live, exciting experience that they will later develop creatively with their students.

The stimuli for inquiry dialogue, or its starting point, are very diverse. One can use different kinds of written texts literature, poetry, philosophy and, concomitantly, specific texts of any discipline, as well as various forms of expression: visual arts, music, dance, theatre and so forth.

The exercises provide a choice of materials to motivate and to enliven dialogue about the issues brought up. It must be noted, that in this kind of dialogue, the teacher in order to be consistent with the goal of modelling the procedures conducive to discovery learning and to autonomous thinking, must listen to the children’s ideas. She must be prepared to guide the conversation in a way that allows for the possibility of several threads to be pursued by the group, without trying to enforce his or her personal convictions. Nevertheless, it is expected that this openness makes sense with the starting point which was chosen by the teacher in accordance with the topics to develop in the session. There lies the art of guiding a dialogue.

Although it is not mandatory to join both stimuli and exercises, it is a way of inviting a creative approach to dialogue in the scope of any discipline. One can select all sorts of stimuli – photographs, postcards, comics, poetry, music, film, magazine news, objects and so forth - whatever one feels will add a dash of surprise, and capture the attention of the group.
For instance, in the field of Geography, those stimuli could be selected to originate a brief debate, opening to a broader understanding from different perspectives, say, of the greenhouse effect.

The shared reading of a related text - each one reading a sentence or a paragraph - is one way to proceed. Another suggestion, within the discipline of Mathematics, is the use of some riddle or problem to start discussion on some topic, followed by discovering together what happened in their minds while trying to solve it.

In any case, children are asked to put questions about what puzzled them, interested them or which ideas they find controversial or don’t understand. Their questions are written on the board, or any other suitable material, with the name of the child who put it. Of course, the teacher can add a question of her own.

With the initial agenda in view, it is the moment to open the discussion: maybe by asking all the group which one of them they wish to begin with, or by asking a shy child to choose one of them, or simply by the teacher selecting one question that she feels to be a good thread towards a rich discussion. Note that all questions are to be taken into account. Sometimes there is enough time, or they can be easily inserted in the stream of the dialogue. Other times one will have to put them in some kind of “question box” for further discussion in a following session.

At its closure, the discussion may provide the teacher with useful links to the contents of the discipline to be mastered by the students. This kind of connection can be very rewarding because it permits self-correction and enhances the drive to know more. What could be taken just as something boring to memorize, or unimportant, becomes something the students consciously integrate because it springs out of their joint effort of discovery and search for meaning in the subject; it may also help them to relate those topics to other disciplines and lead them, in other learning or everyday situations, to think about their own role in life and society.
Questioning

The very simple procedure of giving back to the students the usual role played by the teacher as the one who asks all the questions and is supposed to know all the answers can be very stimulating. In fact, the teacher is signifying that she or he has a real interest to work with their ideas, and children feel encouraged to make an effort to verbalize them. Moreover, the act of making questions is a thinking skill that can be very much improved in that way.

It happens just as well with philosophy teachers of the secondary level, who, just as with other disciplines, have a program to follow and tests to pass on to the class. Those who give a try to this simple move are often agreeably surprised by the dramatic change in the degree of attention and involvement it gives rise among their students.

What kind of questions are we talking about? Mainly three, with a common feature – they are open. They give rise to answers which in turn embody other questions or give rise to new problems and investigations.

- Questions asked by the students, roused by the puzzling features of a theory or the fuzzy domain of the concepts that are central to the grasping of those theories, or to find problem solutions.

  An example: to ask “What time is it?” has a straight answer, provided one has a watch; but to ask “What is time?” or more restrictively “What is time in the theory of relativity?” requires the efforts of inquisitive minds open to dialogue.

- Follow-up “critical” questions put by the teacher to encourage communal inquiry and the development of thinking skills. These will be, step by step,
internalized by students as procedures and are crucial for the building of the community of inquiry.

An example: at a certain point of a discussion over a question roused by the reading of an episode of a philosophical novel\(^\text{20}\) - “Why does Pimpa says that she never stops talking?” Amandio gives a reason: “She is saying that because she is the one who is telling the story”. After listening for a while to the conversation, another child, Artur, follows up questioning him asking for clarification while taking in consideration his colleague’s perspective: “I agree with you enough, but do you think this can happen just by telling the story?”

- Questions available from discussion plans belonging to specific curricular material available in order to help exploring concepts, or problematic issues, in depth.

An example: Suppose the discussion follows on the notion of story. One can enlarge the perspectives of the concept by putting questions to the group like these few: “Does every story have a beginning?” “Does every story have an end?” “...and a middle?” “A story may have a middle and an end, but not a beginning?” “A story may have a beginning and an end, but not a middle” “Every story is true, or are there stories which are true and others which are make-believe?” “How do you tell true stories from made-up ones?”\(^\text{21}\)

If you are working in the discipline of history, why not ask, for instance, “Is there a difference between a series of stories and History?” “Can historical facts be false?” “What is a fact?” and so forth.

\(^{21}\) Looking for Meaning, Instructional Manual for Pixie, Matthew Lipman and others.
Talking about the fruitfulness of doing philosophy in the field of art education, namely aesthetics, Parsons and Blocher\textsuperscript{22} say “...handled well, the study of aesthetics does not compete with the study of art but it is a natural part of it.”

Are they referring to university studies? No.

“With practice one can develop the ability to spot fruitful philosophical questions that permeate everyday classroom situations. They lie behind many ordinary encounters with artworks. But they do not lie on the surface and they are not apparent to most people because philosophy is just about what we take for granted”\textsuperscript{23}.

Furthermore, what is at stake in philosophy it is not the simple attainment of conclusions but the prosecution of a certain path of inquiry - in the words of Martha Nussbaum, “Real philosophy,... as Socrates saw it, is each person’s committed search for wisdom, where what matters is not just the acceptance of certain conclusions, but also the following out of a certain path to them; not just correct content, but content achieved as the result of real understanding and self-understanding”\textsuperscript{24}.

Does this uncertainty about finding conclusive answers raise a conflict between inquiry in philosophy and science, or are both faces of the same coin? Truly not, if we accept, or at least are willing to discuss with Karl Popper, his thesis that science progresses by an approach to truth, not by gaining in certainty.

“Since we can never know with certitude, we should not look for certain things, but for truths, something we do, mostly when we look for mistakes to correct them.

\textsuperscript{22} Michel J. Parsons and H. Gene Bloker, \textit{AESTHETICS AND EDUCATION – Disciplines in Art Education: Contexts of Understanding}, University of Illinois Press, 1993
Scientific knowledge, scientific understanding is, accordingly, always hypothetical - it is learning by conjectures\textsuperscript{25}.

Besides open-mindedness and a non-dogmatic attitude, guidance profits from the use of a balanced interaction of tasks performed in small groups and open afterwards to the whole group discussion, or prepared by students previously, whether in an emerging or fully developed community of inquiry.

Briefly, as examples: in the video on “Reason and Excuses” the teacher asked the children to bring that day, written on a sheet, cases illustrating “excuses” for their discussion. And it is how it started.

In a discussion where the exploration of the concept of silence came about, two groups were formed having to organize by degree of loudness, a series of postcards of works of art, and give the criteria for their grading. Questions put by one group to another dynamized the discussion. This kind of approach plays a role in feeling you are improving yourself with others.

Glimpses

What sorts of things happen in a dialogue?

To illustrate some of the facets of inquiry dialogue, we can take a glimpse into a classroom dialogue - an excerpt of a transcript translated from Hungarian by Erzsi Dawson. As she explains, this dialogue took place in Budapest, facilitated by Scullerné Deák Mária. The group is called View Circle, formed by children aged from 12-17, who met once a week after school, in 2005.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} opus cited, page 18.
\textsuperscript{26} For all transcript see Appendix.
The narrative support for this dialogue is a novel by Gabriel García Marquez famous book, “One Hundred Years of Solitude”. The teacher realized that they were comfortable with the idea of ‘unreal’, a topic they draw out of the book, but had difficulties with the idea or concept of ‘reality’. On a former session, they used the board to register their ideas in three columns: the first one on “reality”, the second, about “what they were not sure”, and the third “what is not reality”.

Zsófi: I have a question top of my head. But I am not sure how to write it down...
Teacher: What’s the question?
Zsófi: Does space really exist? Is it real or unreal?
Patrik: The Space, the Nothing? As a concept it is real.
Peti: The concept exists.
Kriszti: The space is real, it isn’t concept.
Patrik: Space as an abstract?
Teacher: Please explain why it is real or unreal? I’m very pleased that Zsófi asked this question. Explain to her, please.
Teacher: Very good question Zsófi.
Choir: Zsófi!
Patrik: Are you thinking of The Space or space simply? Something, or when something is lacking.
Zsófi: Space
Patrik: Oh, nothing?
Teacher: The space - it’s arising in people? Lack/ absence?
(noise and voices – students are trying to understand )
Kriszta: It can mean both.
Dorka: But what’s its shape like?
(noise, voices)
Teacher: Listen to me, please. Zsófi is frightened by the question and she ran away.
She asked a very clever question, so you should give her a normal answer...
Partik: Yes...
Teacher challenges him: Have you guessed what she meant, Patrik? We should give her a sensible answer when she returns. It is very interesting, not only Zsófi disappeared but Gyuszi did.

Choir: It is normal/ typical

Teacher: Space has arisen because no Zsófi, no Guszi. She asked a good question and left.

(noise, the students are still working on their paper)

Teacher: She is frightened. Then let’s move on. Let’s go back as Zsófi interrupted your speech.

Patrik: Fiction is falsehood. Freedom, alternativity.

Teacher: Patrik is challenging, that is very good.

Patrik: I have alternative ideas.

Teacher. So you have alternative ideas and then...Just one by one and where did you write illusion? ...Anyway the illusion is really good.........

Patrik: The world that exists, it is a big system. It works in a clever way, so it exists. It works according to its logical calculation. And what you see it is the reality. You sense as much as you come to terms from it. This is how the human system joins the system of reality.

Teacher: But this is only a part of the reality.

Patrik: But you can’t see everything. Ultraviolet, infra-red and lots of other colours can’t be seen by people and lots of noise can’t be heard, and what is not perceived, it is not reality.

Dorka: No, it is exist, what you don’t see.

Patrik: That is the World.

Teacher: Please let her finish

Dorka. It is not up to people that something exists. It is not you who decide if something you don’t see or hear exists or not.

Teacher: It is very good you have just said.

Patrik: And then the World and what people see, it is the reality.

Teacher: In your opinion what you can’t see....

Patrik: It is also the World but not reality.

Peti: Listen Patrik, if you don’t see the Space, as far as you think, it is not real?
Dorka: But what do you mean?
Peti: Do you mean it isn’t part of the reality? Let’s say, you don’t see the other solar systems - we say they don’t exist?
Patrik: I know they are there but I still can’t see the different yellow colours, so they are not part of the reality and I can’t estimate. I can’t estimate, they are not part of my reality. Especially for myself.

It seems obvious that these children are already well engaged in the dealings of a community of inquiry, albeit from time to time they need their teacher’s guidance to help them to go on track and listen to each other. A special kind of atmosphere is surfacing in this dialogue, as we understand that Zsófi’s shyness, or maybe lack of self-esteem, is an occasion from which her teacher profits, both to encourage the child and to ask for respect from her peers.

As well as this “question’s overture” (there is also rhythm in this dialogue, even if there is a “fugue”), and all that ensued, there are other apparent reasoning skills like giving examples and counter-examples, making valid inferences, trying to find underlying suppositions, giving reasons, to name a few. Out of the large taxonomy of inquiry skills we find out explanation, raising of problems, the making of hypothesis to try one answer to problematic issues. In the process they explore concepts such as space, reality. They also make comparisons and distinctions. A tentative descriptive definition of reality raising some controversy between the notions of reality and existence brought up arguments trying to find out inconsistency. They use their translations skills when they capture the meaning of what the other is saying. As mental acts one can single out, for instance, believing, inferring, making suppositions, judging, suggesting. To sum up, on the whole these children show critical dispositions like questioning, being puzzled, asking for criteria and having the aptitude to build with one another’s ideas. The fact that the dialogue is not conclusive, or reaching an agreement, for instance over the issue of, reality vs my reality, is a proof not of an insufficiency but of their capacity to
examine what is taken for granted, and that is due to its complexity, requiring further search.

**Ways of Self-Assessment**

Roses postcards lined on a table - how does it relate to our topic – self evaluation or assessment?27

In this case, it is an example of the use of criteria for the group’s evaluation of its own progression - it concerns the appropriation of what a dialogue is and how the group is evolving.

This sequence arrangement is a metaphor for a movement starting with voices speaking in the singular to minds thinking together, relating more and more in dialogue to each other and acquiring new meanings about themselves and about the world around them.

This kind of creative resource doesn’t intrude into the observation process; in fact it is a formative evaluation procedure.

Another suggestion, also just sketched for the moment, is the making of a final product, a joint project, relating the threads of thought developed during the course, or the classroom school year, to several forms of expression. In the process one and all can easily assess how far the children, or adults, progressed by the way they are willing to share with generosity their ideas, accept their improvement by the others and help each other to a common outcome with joy.

---

27 Detail from a photo taken by Isabel Gonçalves during a session of the annual introductory seminar on P4C - “The Art of Thinking”, held at the Portuguese Center of Philosophy for Children, Lisbon, 2005-2006. The use of postcards for this purpose was introduced in a previous seminar, by a teacher attending it, Susana Jorge.
A Line in the Horizon

Looking back at the cartoon that is a kind of epigraph for the subsequent reflections on the role of dialogue and one of the ways available to develop it, one can ask if there is not a kind of utopia lying behind a possible sustainable solution. After all, this is a real competitive, and in terms of distribution of richness, unbalanced world we live in.

Again, what can we do? Facing our responsibility not only with the present generations but as well as the future ones is a step forward.

Truly, the idea of a community of inquiry, “as an operative concept, displays a kind of inward movement, a theoretical dimension intimately linked to pedagogical practice which permanently reshapes and adds to its construction. Actually, if it is the case, it should be possible to assign a location, a topos to such community, and simultaneously, to discover something which rests outside the concept, whose boundaries expand and withdraw much in the same way as the line of the horizon fades away as we move” 28.

Experience encourages us to think that unconsciously the emotionally rewarding transformations that occur in ourselves by taking part in a live community of inquiry are already crossing the boundaries of classrooms and schools for other learning settings - even the net - but more meaningfully, maybe, to the realm of society in many places of this planet. Children grow-up... and their teachers likewise. Let's hope that in place of a philosopher king, as Plato wished, there are more and more critical, creative citizens able to think more reasonably and act in accordance, as much as the hazards of their situation allows them, in the scope of their lives and the roles they play, in order to contribute to the building of reality as a better world.

It is impossible to conceive of a free and creative life in the humanist sense as one lived without alertness, sensitivity and insight. This tells us what Socrates meant when he said that the best life is the considered life. To the question of ‘what is good?’, then, the answer can only be: ‘The considered life – free, creative, informed and chosen, a life of achievement and fulfilment, of pleasure and understanding, of love and friendship; in short, the best human life in a human world, humanely lived.’

An utopia? Then it has lasted for more than two thousand years - not very long in terms of our human species evolution, if we think how long man inhabits Earth. How much more time is needed to fulfil it is for future generations, if we don't endanger their survival, in the millennium to come, to turn into reality if it is their project too.

APPENDIX

Reality

Teacher: Please read out what you wrote, Patrik.
Patrik: Reality, oppression, illusion, mask.
Teacher: Did you write illusion as a reality?
Patrik: Yes.
Teacher: And what else did you write?
Patrik: Mask and interface
Dorka: What is interface?
Teacher: I have no idea.
Patrik: ...different systems/ structures can be connected
Zsófi: I have a question top of my head. But I am not sure how to write it down...

29 A.C. Grayling, What is Good? – The Search for the Best Way to Life, Phoenix, 2004
Teacher: What’s the question?
Zsófi: Does space really exist? Is it real or unreal?
Patrik: The Space, the Nothing? As a concept it is real.
Peti: The concept exists.
Krisztí: The space is real it isn’t concept.
Patrik: Space as an abstract?
Teacher: Please explain why is real or unreal? I’m very pleased that Zsófi asked this question. Explain to her, please.
Patrik: The modern science approach is that an enormous Space exists.
Kriszti: Ebből a szempontból valós, de mint elvont fogalom nem létezik.
Dorka: Úgy érted, hogy valaminek a hiány?
Teacher: Very good question Zsófi.
Choir: Zsófi!
Patrik: Are you thinking of The Space or space simply? Something or when something lack.
Zsófi: Space
Patrik: Oh, nothing?
Teacher: The space it’s arising in people? Lack/ absence /?
(noise and voices – students are getting to understand)
Kriszta: It can mean both.
Dorka: But what’s it shape like?
(noise, voices)
Teacher: Listen to me, please. Zsófi is frightened by the question and she ran away. She asked a very clever question so you should give her a normal answer...
Partik: Yes...
Teacher challenges him: Have you guessed how she meant Patrik?
Teacher: We should give her a sensible answer when she returns. It is very interesting, not only Zsófi disappeared but Gyuszi did.
Choir: It is normal/ typical
Teacher: Space has arised because no Zsófi, no Guszi. She asked a good question and left.
(Noise, the students are still working on their paper)
Teacher: She is frightened. Then let’s move on. Let’s go back, as Zsófi interrupted your speech.
Patrik: Fiction is falsehood, freedom, alternativity.
Teacher: Patrik is challenging, that is very good.
Patrik: I have alternative ideas.
Teacher: So you have alternative ideas and than
Teacher: Just one by one and where did you write illusion? Anyway the illusion is really good........
Patrik: The world that exists is a big system. It works in a clever way so it exists. It works according to its logical calculation. And what you see it is the reality. You sense as much as you come to terms from it. This is how the human system joins the system of reality.
Teacher: But this is only a part of the reality.
Patrik: But you can’t see everything. Ultraviolet, infrared and lots of other colours can’t be seen by people and lot of noise can’t be heard, and what is not perceived is not reality.
Dorka: No, it does exist, what you don’t see.
Patrik: That is the World.
Teacher: Please let her finish.
Dorka: It is not up to people that something exists. It is not you who decide if something you don’t see or hear exists or not.
Teacher: It is very good you have just said.
Patrik: And then the World and what people see it is the reality.
Teacher: In your opinion what you can see....
Patrik: It is also the World but not reality.
Peti: Listen Patrik, if you don’t see the Space, as far as you think it is not real?
Dorka: But what do you mean?
Peti: Do you mean it isn’t part of reality. Let’s say, you don’t see the other solar system, we say they don’t exist?
Patrik: I know they are there but I still can't see the different yellow colours, so they are not part of the reality and I can't esteem [regard]. I can't estimate, they are not part of my reality. Especially for myself.
Peti: Right, you not only esteem reality.
Patrik: I haven't said that.
Students: By your theory, look France is here, and you don't see, and then you can't esteem it.
Patrik: You don't understand, listen!
Kriszt: Yes.
Patrik: This is the World and as much as I can esteem.
Kriszt: Yes.
Patrik: I can see what is in it, but I don't see like...
Kriszt: Yes.
Patrik: Oh, my God
Several voices: The reality is also what you don't know.
Kriszt: Right and then....
Patrik: Can you be quite?
Teacher: Listen to him!
Patrik: You confuse reality and existence. There are frequencies I can see. It is called visible lightwave. I have never said the others are not existent, what I say I can't see them. Doesn't exist in my reality.
Kriszt: But Patrik, although you don't see them, they still are reality.
Teacher: Patrik says, he perceives lots of things though he doesn't see.
Patrik: You confuse reality and existence.
Kriszt: Ah, I see your reality?
Teacher: Let's stop here. What is not the same The reality and.....
Partik: The world
Patrik: The world is what perceiveble. The Reality what I see from it or anybody.
Patrik: My world is everything that exists and reality everything that can be seen from it.
Teacher: I heard a lecture about this about Hegel from a well-known (Hungarian) philosopher. Not nowadays, it was long ago.

Kriszti: What did he say?

Teacher: He said lots of things, like Hegel said this and that. I was totally confused because I read a lot from Hegel and I didn't remember any of that. Then Tamás Gáspár Miklós (another well-known Hungarian Philosopher) said: “Hold on please, Hegel didn't write that”. The lecturer than said “My Hegel did”.

(laughing)

Teacher: How it came up in my mind? Patrik said, “my reality”

Dorka: But then we cannot talk, because my reality is surely different from Patrik’s reality.

Teacher: Then Patrik says my reality it’s not what I see, what I perceive it’s a lot wider.

Teacher: Zsófi your behaviour was very original. You asked a clever question then you disappeared.

Dorka: As far as I’m concerned we shouldn’t say my reality, we should say his, I imagine, his reality.

Zsófi: Maria, (teacher’s name) I am frightened by my questions

Teacher: Zsófi are you? Haven’t got used to hearing you were very clever, but you were.

Zsófi: No, they don’t say it.

Teacher: Sorry but I want to leave it now and continue with Patrik’s writing. But now there is something more important. Please, you should be very honest with Zsófi: Before we leave. Was she clever or not?

Students: Now, yes

Teacher: What is the emphasis, now yes, or yes?

Students: Yes

Teacher: Zsófi you were very clever and please don’t be so frightened by your [questions] next time when you are clever again. You started something, two meanings of space and we stopped there didn’t we?

Choir: Yes we did.
CHAPTER 5

DEVELOPING DIALOGUE THROUGH PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Daniela G. Camhy

Austria
Introduction

We stand on a threshold of political, social, economical, and technological revolution that leads to far-reaching consequences for all social systems.

The rapid change of our present ways of life is related to the fast changes in the scientific and technological world and its frequent innovations. This leads to enormous disorientation especially with children and adolescents who have to cope with all new problems. Problems arise in the area of relationships between parting generations and in the field of complications resulting from national and transnational communication and socialization. Personal life, including school, learning, work and leisure time, is affected, too. This global change leaves no aspect of life unaltered.

How can we respond to these large transnational processes? We have barely started to consider how these accelerating dynamics are affecting our lives, our thinking and our educational systems. What skills do citizens need to develop? What kinds of attitudes do people need to have?

Educational Needs Have Changed

The rapid social and economic change requires considering conventional values, flexibility and global thinking. We know educational needs at all levels have changed. But what does that mean? Education’s challenge will be to shape the cognitive skills, interpersonal sensibilities, and cultural sophistication of children and youth – but these are not the kind of things that can simply be transmitted. There is a need first to analyse the changes that globalisation is bringing about in our daily experiences and also to become conscious of how the dynamics of globalisation are affecting our senses, our thinking, our values and our lifestyles. So many questions occur: How can we best prepare pupils and students to succeed in
the 21st century? What does a person need to survive and contribute to this world? Which skills, competencies, strategies, attitudes are essential for reflection, for better understanding, for good judgement and reasonable behaviour? What challenge should be made? What basics and skills are required for a worthwhile life?

**Philosophical Inquiry**

When we want to be clear about something, we ask questions, we look for something, we inquire. Charles Sanders Peirce defined inquiry as a process we engage in to move ourselves from a state of uncertainty and doubt to a state of “belief”, which we might call “knowledge” or “certainty”. For Peirce good inquiry is an important social activity, inquiry begins with "some surprising phenomenon, some experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some habit of expectation of the inquisiturus."  

According to C. S. Peirce, the characteristic feature of questioning lies in the fact that it aims at finding out one’s own creativeness and corrects what is faulty in one's own actions. Questioning is thus self-correcting. Philosophy deals with questions, especially the question of how to think better. John Dewey defines thinking as “a process of inquiry, of looking into things, of investigating”.

Philosophy is a discipline that considers alternative ways of acting, creating, speaking and thinking. To discover these alternatives philosophers persistently appraise and examine their own assumptions and presuppositions and questions. They speculate imaginatively concerning ever more comprehensive frames of reference. In short, philosophers engage in critical questioning and inventive reflection.

---

31 Dewey, John: Education and Democracy.
Philosophy is an activity

Since Socrates and Kant and certainly since Wittgenstein, philosophy has been understood not only as knowledge, but as an activity. It is an act of awareness and of reflection, an act of daring to go beyond safe concepts. Philosophy is a basic field of inquiry, it encompasses basic questions regarding language, meaning, freedom, justice, nature, culture, self, community, the nature of personhood, truth... Practising philosophy includes various kinds of inquiry – logical inquiry, ethical inquiry, social inquiry... Philosophical Inquiry is a form of thinking that finds its origins in what is uncertain in experience, it also includes inquiry into its own methods of inquiry, so there is a "metalevel inquiry".

According to Richard Bernstein philosophy is the discipline that keeps “... alive the spirit of restless questioning...” “The cliché is that it is easy to ask questions but hard to give answers. But the truth is that it is the art of questioning that is difficult and fragile. Serious questioning requires knowing what to question and how. That which has always distinguished the greatest philosophers is their ability to question what no one else had thought to question, and thereby to challenge the pre-judgements and prejudices of which most of us are unaware, even though we hold them”.

Zygmunt Bauman warns “Not asking certain questions is pregnant with more dangers than failing to answer the questions already on the official agenda; while asking the wrong kind of questions all too often helps avert eyes from the truly important issues. The price of silence is paid in the hard currency of human suffering.”

---

Philosophy is inquiry into the meaning of concepts that are central for our everyday life experience: “What does friendship mean?” “What is justice?” “What is real?”

Philosophers wonder about things that others take for granted. Young children do the same thing, they ask questions and investigate, they are curious and wonder. But very often we recognise that their curiosity and the sense of wonder diminish as they progress to school. Instead of stimulating a child’s curiosity schools seem to be discouraging inquiry. So what can be done? What should schools be teaching and how can teachers get involved in education for inquiry?

Every Student Should Become an Inquirer

In the late 1960’s Matthew Lipman, pioneer of Philosophy for Children, came to the conclusion that there is a need of a philosophical curriculum that would help young people to improve their thinking skills in a multidimensional way. He founded and developed a program including many philosophical stories for young people which explore themes selected from the history of philosophy and with his colleagues he developed accompanying instructional materials for teachers. After more than thirty years Philosophy for Children has already been established in over fifty nations worldwide.

According to Matthew Lipman: “...one cannot become educated oneself unless one relives and re-enacts the struggle that mankind went through to find the so-called answers that we accept today. The good teacher is one who recognises that the child is unable to take a statement for granted. Such a teacher knows that a reliving

---

35 Thinking in a multidimensional way means critical, creative and caring thinking.
or re-experiencing of the entire inquiry process to arrive at the truth of the statement is essential in coming to appreciate meaningful knowledge”\textsuperscript{36}.

Knowledge begins in doing, it is active. It is in the course of putting ideas to the test of experience that growth occurs. Dewey requires that pupils be given wide opportunities for purposive inquiry. Education therefore has to provide the learner with the knowledge of how to ask questions rather than just giving examples of how to solve problems or how to give answers.

This makes clear how important the role of philosophical questioning for other disciplines is, for philosophy is problem-creation and “compels us to reflect on what we are doing and how we live”\textsuperscript{37}.

Today there is so much ambiguity, confusion, anxiety and uncertainty, but also rapid changes in information technology, which make the philosophical task of questioning matter more than ever.

The relevance of philosophy is that one of its educational aims is that every student should become an inquirer. As Lipman writes: “We cannot educate for inquiry unless we have education as inquiry – unless, that is, the qualitative character we desire to have in the end is loaded into the means”.

The aim of philosophical dialogue is not to adjust emotional and affective behaviour, but to support thinking of the reflective kind. This kind of dialogue is based originally on the “Meiotic” of Socrates. Considering the different possibilities of every partner, one’s own ideas and thoughts are given birth with the help of clever questions.


Inquiry is stimulated by what Laurance Splitter and Ann Sharp call “open procedural” and “open substantive” questions.\textsuperscript{38} These are the kind of questions that do not have answers. Socrates was famous for generating dialogue by asking difficult questions. Richard Paul\textsuperscript{39} gives a central place to what he calls “Socratic questioning”\textsuperscript{40}.

Questions of clarification:

\begin{itemize}
  \item What do you mean by...?
  \item Are you saying that...?
  \item How are you using the word...?
  \item Could you give me an example of...?
  \item Does anyone have any questions for...?
\end{itemize}

Questions that probe assumptions:

\begin{itemize}
  \item What is she assuming?
  \item Do you think that assumption is warranted?
  \item Why would someone make that assumption?
  \item Are there any hidden assumptions in that question?
\end{itemize}

Questions that probe reasons and evidence:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Can you give an example/counter example to illustrate your point?
  \item What are your reasons for saying that?
  \item Do you agree with her reasons?
  \item But is that evidence good enough?
  \item By what criteria do you make that judgement?
\end{itemize}

Do you think that source is an appropriate authority?

Questions about viewpoints or perspectives:

What would be another way of putting that?
Are any other beliefs on this subject possible?
Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?
How are Cheng’s and Maria’s ideas alike / different?
Supposing someone wanted to disagree with you. What do you think they would say?
What if someone were to suggest that....?
Can you try to see the issue from their point of view?

Questions that probe implications and consequences:

What would follow from what you say?
If we say this is unethical, how about that?
What would be the likely consequences of behaving like that?
Are you prepared to accept those consequences?
Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case?

Questions about questions:

Do you think that is an appropriate question?
How is that question relevant?
What does that question assume?
Can you think of another question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue?
How is that question going to help us?
Have we come any closer to solving the problem or answering the question?
Dewey and Lipman emphasize the importance of inquiry. Dewey focused on scientific inquiry, while Lipman points out that scientific inquiry is not sufficient, philosophical inquiry is needed as well.

“When children are encouraged to think philosophically, the classroom is converted into a community of inquiry. Such a community is committed to the procedures of inquiry, to responsible search techniques that presuppose an openness to evidence and to reason. It is assumed that these procedures of the community, when internalised, become the reflective habits of the individual.”

Community of Inquiry

Doing philosophy means dialogical as well as communal inquiry. Community of Inquiry was originally a term coined by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914) to reference interaction among scientists. It is a group (social setting) of individuals who search out the problematic borders of a puzzling concept through the use of dialogue. To develop a structured dialogue it is important to create an environment in which all participants of the conversation are being treated equally.

John Dewey defines community as a group of like-minded but diverse individuals who come together around a common concern over time. Community implies, and a democratic society requires, education. Education is based on inquiry, that is, figuring things out, planning and solving problems that arise from the world around us. We solve these problems together in the places in which these problems arise, namely in communities. One form of these communities is schools.

Matthew Lipman sees philosophy within the community of inquiry as a Socratic process, entailing all aspects of philosophy. Philosophy not only gives children the opportunity to give meaning to their lives, but also stimulates thinking and encourages cooperative inquiry within a community of inquiry.

Participating in a community of inquiry engages children on the one hand in important cognitive moves, such as clarifying terms and concepts, creating hypotheses, asking and giving good reasons, offering examples and counter examples, drawing inferences and following the inquiry where it leads. On the other hand, children learn the inquiry also as a social practice. Lipman sees “the social dimension of democracy in practice, for it both paves the way for the implementation of such practice and is emblematic of what such practice has the potential to become.”

Philosophical inquiry includes the practice of critical, creative and caring thinking. The classroom community of inquiry enables children to experience what it is like to live in a context of mutual respect, and to practise and discover cognitive skills.

The idea is that doing philosophy, as distinct from learning about philosophy, helps us to understand better the ways in which we reason about the world, make decisions and live together. The classroom community of inquiry is characterized by dialogue and one of the goals for the participants is “to arrive at reasonable philosophical judgments regarding the questions or issues that occasioned the dialogue.”

Ideally, the relationship between teacher and students has the character of face to face dialogue. As a member of the community, the teacher is an equal. The teacher is not an authority of knowledge. He or she does not provide answers, but rather raises questions. The primary role of the teacher is to facilitate the philosophical inquiry.
discussion so that it might become a dialogue. The teacher has to create an environment of trust in which the verbal expressions of all children are respected. Each person has a special contribution to give to this community.

A community of inquiry is characterized by dialogue that is fashioned collaboratively out of the reasoned contribution of all participants. Pupils learn how to build on strong reasoning, accept the responsibility of making their contributions within the context of others, follow the inquiry where it leads, respect the perspective of others, collaboratively engage in self-correcting when necessary and take pride in the accomplishments of group as well as oneself. Further in the process, they practise the art of making good judgements within the context of dialogue and communal inquiry. Taking current questions and problems as a starting point, the philosophical dialogue starts with concrete experience, it moves from particular to general. On the other hand also the other way around can be demonstrated, the application of the general to the particular. “To do Philosophy” is to try to stimulate the curiosity about the linguistic representation of the idea and the concept, the pleasure of the language game, which makes new degrees of freedom in the perception of the world possible.

In philosophy for children it is not the rote learning of factual knowledge that is central, but rather the development of active thought. The aim is to make children aware of their capacity for discussion and to build upon this capacity. These abilities should help them to deal better with a new situation, to recognise connections, to discover contradictions within the information and to learn to think independently.

At various ages children occupy themselves with all sorts of philosophical questions. Very often they are left alone with their questions, as they are with other difficulties and needs. Their confusions, doubts, imaginations, perceptions, the questioning of principles, the perpetual question "Why?" and the search for meaning often lead them to an intellectual dissatisfaction which must be confronted.
Here philosophy can help: by clarifying thoughts and by pointing out possible solutions or at least by putting students on the trail of possible solutions. "Philosophy should be clear and define more sharply those thoughts which are obscure and blurred." It should also develop them further. This capability for reflection, for distancing oneself intellectually from a problem, can perhaps lead to liberation from intellectual dissatisfaction. Philosophy is not limited to reasoning and to the development of creativity, but can also be applied to everyday activity. (Handlungsorientierung)

Philosophizing with children seems to foster skills and abilities, which are indispensable for regaining our future according to “Sustainable Development”. These are cognitive as well as social skills: recognizing the future as a task of joint action, analysing our perception of reality and our own way of life critically, normative thinking and reasoning, recognizing paradigms and the capability to consider alternatives, holistic thinking and the capability to participate in a dialogue.

The community of inquiry is an example of democratic practice, it helps children and adults to develop tools to make decisions, to become more thoughtful and more reflective citizens. It is characterised by puzzlement and wonder, tolerance and respect, intellectual risk-taking and self-correction.

The aim is that pupils in a class will become a community of people who inquire cooperatively and think together in a self-reflective and critical manner. It is a cooperative activity and encourages individuals to speak up and talk about their ideas, think about their own thinking among others, make reasonable judgements, be caring and become autonomous thinkers.

Enquiry and Dialogue

Much current research and writing has focused on dialogue as well as on community. Very often the term conversation or discussion is used synonymously with dialogue. So it is important to make clear distinctions.

Often when we begin to talk to someone, we start a conversation; it is a part of everyday living. It comes very naturally, it might not have a deeper purpose, it might be a spontaneous mode of exchange: participants usually do not think reflectively. It means for example talking to each other for its own sake, to give information, to organize or just simply to talk and share ideas. The roots of the word mean “turn together”. So we listen and take turns in talking to each other. We often listen to conversation and we notice that most people find it very hard to recall what another person really had said. Focusing on one’s own feelings and thoughts we are only hearing what fits into our concept. Splitter and Sharp⁴⁷ suggest “that much of what passes as ordinary conversation reflects either not much thinking at all, or thinking which is ill-formed and inconsequential”.

Sometimes a conversation leads to a discussion⁴⁸ where we offer our own comments or opinions and we make the effort to make people understand us, usually defending our positions, looking for evidence to be right and to show that others are wrong. So people take positions and bring up arguments and try to defend them. As David Bohm says, it similar to a Ping-Pong match, where the aim of the game is to win and defend well. So discussions are conversations, where people defend their opinions and differences: it is a competition of participants and views. It involves stating a position, defending it with counterattacks and seeing who wins.

⁴⁸ The roots of the word discussion mean to shake apart.
A dialogue is different. It is a way, or better a conversation, of people thinking and reflecting together; it is a process, where one’s own position is not the only way and final answer. A dialogue opens up possibilities through our differences and has the intention to reach new understanding. Dialogue is not simply talking or sharing ideas, it is more. To engage in dialogue means thinking and reflecting together, to recognize perspectives put forward by others and to explore new possibilities. It is a complex activity primarily to think together in relationship. That means that you no longer take your own position and thoughts for granted; it implies openness to others’ ideas and to listen to the perspectives of others.

According to Buber genuine dialogue occurs only where each of the participants “has in mind the other or the others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relationship between himself and them.”

A philosophical dialogue is a specific attempt, that Lipman describes as “a dialogue that tries to conform to logic, it moves forward like a boat tacking into the wind, but in the process of its progress comes to resemble that of thinking itself.”

The classroom community of inquiry is characterized by dialogue. In order to follow the inquiry where it leads the participants must reason, they have to get engaged in logical moves. That means for example to explore what has being assumed or taken for granted. So students learn basic logic, argumentation skills, competency in dialogue and what Harvey Siegel calls “the disposition of concern for good reasons”. In addition, the practice of "community of inquiry" implements two features that Willingham observes in the scientific community: making one’s thinking accountable to one’s peers, and participation in a collaborative

---

49 Dialogue come from the Greek words *dia* and *logos*. *Dia* mean “through” and *logos* translates to “word” and “meaning”.
community." It often focuses on a specific question or problematic topic. As Splitter and Sharp point out it is self-correcting and self-regulating thinking.

“A philosophical dialogue is more than just talking, it is an activity, a shared inquiry, a way of critical thinking and reflecting together. It helps to develop tools to explore underlying causes, rules and assumptions and can be very creative in finding new ways of solving problems.”

“In philosophical dialogue, where all participants are equal partners, you learn to use thoughts and arguments in a well reflected way, to explain opinions, to construct suppositions, to develop concepts, to discover various possibilities and alternatives, to put questions, to make decisions, to recognise different points of view, to practise logical thinking. This leads to a better understanding of problems, to a better ability of judgement and articulation, and after all to more tolerance towards other opinions.”

This Figure shows some of the differences between:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Discussion</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Philosophical Dialogue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talking for its own sake - give information - organize, share ideas</td>
<td>Offering one’s own comments and opinions</td>
<td>Thinking and reflecting together</td>
<td>Thinking, reflecting and inquiring (inquiry dialogue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing on one's own feelings and thoughts</td>
<td>Effort to make people understand</td>
<td>One’s own position is not the only way</td>
<td>Thinking together implies relax your grip on certainty and listen to the possibilities that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

52 Interview with Maughn Gregory: Philosophy for Children by Michael F. Shauhnessy senior Columnist EdNewws. org published 08/14/2007
55 ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listening and exchange of ideas</th>
<th>Looking for evidence to be right and to show others are wrong</th>
<th>Building up a community and each person has a special contribution to give</th>
<th>Thinking together in relationship – “community of inquiry”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not much thinking or thinking which is ill-formed and inconsequential</td>
<td>Stating a position, defending it and seeing who wins</td>
<td>Intention to reach a new understanding</td>
<td>Intention to arrive at one or more reasonable judgements, regarding the questions or issues that occasioned the dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of feelings, thoughts, information</td>
<td>Criticizing the other side's position</td>
<td>Exploration, investigation, inquiry</td>
<td>Exploration, investigation, inquiry together to recognizing philosophically problematic aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>Combative</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Collaborative through philosophical inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing what fits in our concept</td>
<td>Listening to find flaws and make counterexamples</td>
<td>Listening to understand</td>
<td>Listening to understand and to build on each others ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking about your ideas</td>
<td>Seeking a conclusion that ratifies our position</td>
<td>Discovering new options and alternatives</td>
<td>Philosophical inquiry in form of a community of inquiry employs the following learning strategies: 1. emphasis on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

result simply from being in a relationship with others – possibilities that might not otherwise have occurred.
A specific form of a philosophical dialogue is the Socratic discussion which starts from philosophical questions. “A Socratic discussion according to the method practised in the school of the German philosopher Leonard Nelson is the collective effort to find the truth about the subject under discussion, that is the search for a satisfying answer to a question or solution to a problem which the participants in the discussion think important enough to pay careful attention to and investigate into The only tools the Socratic discussion makes use of are the exchange of ideas, arguments to support them, questions for explanation of what was said, scrutiny of arguments and analysis of concepts.”

Krohn (1998) proposes four “indispensable features of Socratic Dialogue”:

1. “Starting with the concrete and remaining in contact with concrete experience: Insight is gained only when in all phases of a Socratic Dialogue the link between any statement made and personal experience is explicit. This means that a Socratic Dialogue is a process which concerns the whole person.

2. Full understanding between participants: This involves much more than verbal agreement. Everyone has to be clear about the meaning of what has just been said by testing it against her or his own concrete experience. The limitations of individual personal experience which stand in the way of full understanding should be made conscious and thereby transcended.

---

56 van der Leeuw, Karel: The Socratic Discussion. An introduction to the method and some literature.
3. Adherence to a subsidiary question until it is answered: in order to achieve this, the group is required to bring great commitment to their work and to gain self-confidence in the power of reason. This means, on the one hand, not giving up when the work is difficult, but on the other, to be calm enough to accept, for a time, a different course in the dialogue in order then to return to the subsidiary question.

4. Striving for consensus: This requires an honest examination of the thoughts of others and being honest in one’s own statements. When such honesty and openness towards one’s own and other participants’ feelings and thinking are present, then the striving for consensus will emerge, not necessarily the consensus itself.”

According to Leonard Nelson’s educational ideas the Socratic method is the only method of teaching and learning philosophy. It was applied by Nelson in his school the Walkemühle near Kassel in Germany, and later in the exile school in Denmark. Gustav Heckmann, a pupil of Nelson, also used the method in teaching mathematics as well as in philosophical seminars. The Socratic method is however also of practical importance in political activity.

Hillary Putnam, the author of “Renewing Philosophy” wrote together with the co-author Ruth Anna Putnam, in their essay “Education for Democracy”, that they believe in a similar educational circumstance to the one Dewey found in 1938, when he felt compelled to write “Experience and Education”. They review Dewey’s philosophy of education, reminding us that education involves the reconstruction

59 On the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany the school was confiscated in March 1933, but re-opened in Denmark later that same year.
of experience both for the individual and society, that “the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education...” and “... that schools should teach the experience of applying intelligence to value questions.”

Implementing democracy in school involves dialogue and understanding, human action, empathy and trust. A philosophy for children community provides an ideal framework for working out inter-subjective perceptions and understanding of complex cultural differences. It is one way that the next generation will be prepared socially and cognitively to engage in the necessary dialogue, judging and questioning what is vital to existence for a democratic society.

Philosophy answers this new challenge of the ever-changing world by searching for intercultural understanding in a globalized world. There can be no doubt that philosophy can promote intercultural thinking, decision-making and action taking, but more effort is necessary to implement this philosophical capability in children's learning and living environment in the medium term.

This implementation in children's environment is more likely to succeed if one is aware of the network-like nature of philosophy with children: doing philosophy with children is a holistic dynamic approach, which promotes personal integration of human existence through cognitive, emotional and social communication.

---

CHAPTER 6

PROMOTING CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION BY MEANS OF DIALOGUE IN THE CLASSROOM

Lucianne Zammit
Introduction

Schooling is often focused on preparing students for adulthood. However, as White and Wyn (2004) argue, this is problematic because it does not take into account the current experiences and perspectives of students. The concept of “childhood” is often defined as “not adulthood”, which means that children are not assigned autonomy or citizenship until they become adults.

Teaching for Citizenship in Schools

Cassidy (2006) suggests that Citizenship Education in schools is based on the assumption that education is based on preparation for adulthood, and is often a cover for moral education – teaching the norms of society to students in order to teach them how to behave in an adult world. She believes that adults have enormous power over children, and this power is manifested in the way that they deny children the chance to practise citizenship skills. Children are shown that citizenship is a desirable thing, but it is only conferred upon adulthood, and in the mean time, they must be trained for it, without being treated as citizens in their own right.

She considers children to be a minority group whose rights are being suppressed, since their behaviour and living conditions are determined by the more powerful majority of adults. The adults, who are in control, limit the contributions that children can make to society, and decide which rights children are entitled to hold. Children are denied the chance to participate in the democratic process on the basis that they have no life experiences. She compares our current attitude towards children to that towards women in the past.

Cassidy suggests that the practice of the community of philosophical inquiry empowers children and helps them develop the necessary skills which they need
to think, inquire, reason and participate as citizens in their community. Children also learn how to listen to other people’s opinions, how to build on previous arguments and develop them in order to be more persuasive, and that although individuals can be very different from themselves, it is possible to work with these individuals for a common cause. She believes that the community of philosophical inquiry serves as a good model for our society, because children are involved in a more participatory manner, and it helps children to become more empowered in society (ibid.). Sharp adds that:

... the commitment to engage in a community of inquiry is a political commitment even in the elementary school level. In a real sense, it is a commitment to freedom, open debate, pluralism, self government and democracy ... It is only to the extent that individuals have had the experience of dialoguing with others as equals, participating in shared, public inquiry that they will be able to eventually take an active role in the shaping of a democratic society (Sharp, 1993, p. 343).

According to Lipman63, one of the responsibilities of education is to prepare children for an ideal democratic society which is a reflective, participatory community in which problems are solved through self-corrective inquiry. In this ideal society, people study and conclude together, work, participate in the decision-making process and administration, and make use of the service offered by the society. It is dynamic, and its members continually strive to question, criticize and improve its institutions, values and criteria. Thus, its citizens must be able to make independent and critical judgements (Juuso, 2007).

P4C and Democracy

A community of inquiry typically consists of a number of individuals with different values and perspectives, who must be open to the possibility of changing their

---

perspectives through listening and evaluating those of their peers. They continually examine their beliefs in an open and critical manner in order to learn more effectively through new experiences.

The ability to recognise perspective, both in oneself and in others, is becoming increasingly more important in our contemporary world of mass information, which provides us with an overwhelming amount of information and endless different opinions (Mitias, 2004). P4C provides a pluralistic environment because it places its emphasis on dialogue, the sharing of opinions, and the rational consideration of different beliefs and arguments. “Democracy involves the belief that mutual understanding across differences of opinion and diversity of interest can only be achieved through genuine dialogue and discussion” (Fisher, 1998, p. 81).

P4C also helps children to learn critical thinking, which is a “reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1985, p. 46). Boyum (2006) asserts that critical thinking is now widely acknowledged as an educational aim because of its reliance on accountability. This entails providing reasons for what you say and do, and being able to evaluate reasons. It places its emphasis on rational accountability, which is vital to the democratic process. It does this in three ways. First of all, it refers to the representative aspect of democracy – citizens must evaluate candidates in order to vote for the ones most likely to be capable of representing them. Secondly, it makes reference to the participatory aspect of a democratic way of life, which rests on the importance of being able to think critically when participating in public debate. Finally, it emphasizes the liberal aspect of modern democracy, where autonomy is closely correlated to freedom of thought (ibid.).
The What, the Why and the How

Philosophy for Children embraces the what, why and how in teaching Citizenship Education to children. Citizenship Education includes concepts that by their very nature are philosophical. The concept of rights (for example, human rights), solidarity, respect, value, dignity and inclusion are all examples of ideas that have been, and will continue to be concepts that philosophers write about.

Philosophy for Children encourages pupils to discuss such concepts. It promotes dialogue and understanding, encouraging dialogue on the interpersonal (dialogue even with oneself – thinking) as well as the socio-political. Last but not least, Philosophy for Children uses the community of inquiry as a methodology that promotes understanding, thinking and judgement.

The community of inquiry helps children realise the importance of dialogue, and to learn important skills like presenting arguments to support one’s opinion, listening to others’ positions, identifying illogical arguments, and so on. These skills put them in a better position to discuss issues that are essential for the good of society.

The examination of different perspectives requires learners to be flexible, as well as acquire skills of evaluating information and its sources, and to analyze and distinguish between opposing values and opinions. This produces tolerant citizens who are also critical of the often one-sided information they find in books, newspapers, television and the Internet.

How can this be done?

Lipman’s P4C programme is set in the “practical”, in the innovative way he drew philosophy back to the classroom – something that had been lost over the ages. He did this by taking ideas from “classical philosophy”, rewriting these very same ideas into novels in which the main actors are children, and supplying teachers
with manuals that complement these novels with information, knowledge, exercises and guidelines. Lipman’s philosophical novels are classified according to the age of the target students, and each novel corresponds to a particular subject area, as well as a philosophical issue. For example, *Kio and Gus* (1982), which is aimed at seven to eight year olds, can be used to teach Environmental Education, and it deals with reasoning about language. Lisa, aimed at fourteen to fifteen year olds, is used to teach Moral Education, and deals with ethical reasoning. *Mark* (1980), a novel aimed at students who are over sixteen, is the one which particularly deals with Citizenship Education. In *Mark*, the fictional characters that have been used throughout are older, they are high school students. Mark gets into trouble and is accused of vandalising school property, and all the evidence seems to point towards him. The class, with the help of a retired judge, tries to determine whether he is guilty. In the process they explore a number of social issues, such as the functions of crime, law and democracy in society, the concepts of society, freedom, justice and so on. The manual that accompanies it, *Social Inquiry* (Lipman & Sharp, 1980b), uses a variety of classroom activities and exercises in order to make students practise these concepts. These activities include discussions about various topics, selecting criteria, classifying concepts, finding arguments in favour or against a particular issue, and so on and so forth.

**An Alternative Approach**

An alternative approach would be to take contemporary narratives and base class discussions on them. The idea is to first use contemporary narratives found in the media (such as newsletters) and then to encourage pupils to start writing their own narratives as well. Later in the year, these same narratives, that are much closer to the daily life of the pupil, would be the text upon which discussions and dialogue are based. I would use texts on contemporary local issues, such as that of illegal immigration, which is a very topical issue in Malta at the moment. Instead of using philosophical novels, I would aim for something resembling Fisher’s (1998b)
approach, which uses many different kinds of texts such as personal narratives, photos, pictures, poems, traditional stories, and so on. However, it must be pointed out that some of these texts, such as fairy tales, often contain negative elements, such as gender stereotyping and sometimes even an in-built mode of oppression. Fisher mentions the fairy tales of Grimm and Anderson, in which children are often abused in one way or another, be it through neglect, kidnapping or persecution. However, Fisher does not dismiss their use in the classroom. Instead, he opts for a more critical approach to these stories in the classroom.

Fisher also advocates the use of pictures, which he finds lacking in Lipman's novels, because he believes that pictures can add different dimensions of meaning to a story, especially for younger children (ibid.). Murris and Haynes (2000) explore the concept of using picture story books to practise philosophical inquiry in their resource book *Storywise*. Rowe and Newton (1994) of the 'Citizenship Foundation' also published resource material called *You, Me, Us!* This consists of a number of stories combined with pictures in order to highlight different themes, such as Respecting Differences, Rules, Friendship and Community and Environment. It is based on a Philosophy for Children approach, and is used in Britain to teach Citizenship Education. Another text which is widely used is McKee's *Not Now Bernard* (1980), a pictorial story of a little boy desperately trying to attract his parent's attention. The story's simplicity and humour, as well as the pictures, have made it very popular for use with young children (Moon, 1985), but it can also be used as a starting point for more serious discussions about family relationships. Children's drawings can also be used in this way. Sometimes, drawing enables children to express themselves better than they do in words, and this technique could be used as a starting point for discussion.

Photos can be used in order to provoke thought and discussion. An example could be found in the photos of the philosopher Baudrillard who uses them as a 'philosophical text'. According to Coulter and Reid (2007) photography is Baudrillard's response to the unintelligible and enigmatic world around him. His photos, like his writing, do not offer the ultimate truth or meaning, but a sense of
unravelling or mystifying. They are thought provoking. They make us think. They present us with a vaguely recognisable world that does not look at all familiar, and unlike most photographers, he seeks to capture an absence, rather than a subject. “Baudrillard’s photographs may be portraits of a world that defies belief” (Coulter and Reid, 2007, p. 15). Thus, we see that photography, like pictures, can also act as a stimulus for exploring the world in a different way than we usually would.

If one takes the topic of immigration as an example, I would use different materials for discussion, such as photos, drawings, newspaper articles, immigrant children’s personal narratives, poetry and so on in order to bring out different philosophical values and themes. The issue of illegal immigration is a very hot topic in Malta at the moment. Since Malta is located in the middle of the Mediterranean, roughly half way in between Northern Africa and Europe, a good number of immigrants travelling to Europe on rickety boats end up on our shores after running out of fuel or provisions. When they are brought ashore, they usually have no means of identification and there is no way of telling where they are coming from, so they
are kept in detention centres until their paperwork is processed. They are usually kept there for eighteen months. Some of them manage to obtain refugee status or humanitarian protection, and in that case, they are moved to an open centre, which provides them with very basic accommodation. The detention centres in particular have been criticised harshly by humanitarian agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières (2009), which has revealed that they are providing appalling living conditions, with poor hygiene standards and inadequate shelter.

However, as one can see from the numerous letters in the newspapers and the conversations that one hears on the streets, it seems that a growing proportion of the Maltese are becoming worried about this influx of illegal immigrants. Some comments are downright racist, while others refer to economic issues, such as the fact that Maltese citizens are paying for the immigrants’ accommodation through their taxes and that some immigrants are working illegally.

Although this is the issue that is on everyone’s mind at the moment, immigration is a broader issue than this. There are a number of immigrants who have entered the country legally, and who have settled here. These immigrants cannot be ignored, because they might also feel alienated and insecure. As the world changes and becomes more and more globalised, such migration between countries will probably increase, and we must make sure that our students understand the issues involved so that they would be in a better position to handle any problems that might arise. They themselves might be migrants in the future, and if they are not, they will probably encounter immigrants in their daily lives. This is the reason why the topic of immigration is often dealt with in Citizenship Education. Using as an example a letter from *The Times of Malta*, one can develop various issues and values.
St Paul's shipwreck and the immigrants

Michael Grech, Għargħur

Henry Frendo recently censored President George Abela and Archbishop Paul Cremona for comparing the story of those migrants who, unfortunately for them, end up on our shores, to the shipwreck of the Apostle Paul. He maintained that the "analogy is historically inaccurate and strained". The reason he gave is that, unlike modern migrants, "St Paul...was not and had no intention of being a migrant... Here, you had a one-off accident at sea where a shipload of ordinary travellers were caught in a storm and made shore temporarily."

Apart from the fact that he is historically incorrect (St Paul was a prisoner; not an "ordinary traveller"), apparently the writer has no idea as to what analogies entail. An analogy does not involve things/situations that are exactly alike. "Analogy: Are WE migrants? –moving...

"Correct" and "incorrect" and the issue of interpretation, and of "truths".

The correct use of an analogy.

The difference between an analogy and a metaphor and their use.

(Analogy: Are WE migrants? –moving...
What the person making the analogy requires is that the two situations are similar in those aspects that are relevant to the analogy. This obviously holds in the case of Paul and modern migrants. From one situation to another, flow, liquidity, and so on? How can we be “migrants” (metaphorically)?

In both cases:

- The Maltese face an unexpected and uninvited "other".

- The "other" has his own culture and religion (though this may not be the case today, since a good number of immigrants are Christian).

- In today's Malta the other is considered as potentially a criminal and hence detained; in the case of Paul the Maltese faced a patented criminal who would eventually be condemned to death in Rome.

On the contrary, it is the contrast Prof. Frendo makes between Paul's "legality" and the "illegality" of these immigrants which seems to be somewhat fallacious. His reasoning implicitly

- The “other” – who is the other?
- Who is MY other?
- Are immigrants my other too?

- The rights of the other
- Human rights as that which binds us together.
- Empathy
- Stories (narratives) of despair, of suffering, of escape from oppression, from evil. What is the role and obligations (legal and moral) of the Maltese society?

- Culture and Religion: are these what makes us “us”? The unifying/divisive role of religion. God – the almighty – as a bonding (or dividing) factor of different religious.

- The difference between the “actual” and the 'potential'.

- The concept of human dignity.

- The legal, illegal, moral and immoral. Can something be illegal but morally right? Can something be legal but immoral at the same time?
assumes a common context in relation to which the situation of the two (Paul and the immigrants) is considered. As a historian, Prof. Frendo should know that Paul lived in a cosmopolitan empire that comprised the entire Mediterranean, not in a world of nation-states. Hence, any comparison between the law-abiding former and the border-trespassing and law-transgressing latter is rather tenuous.

Moreover, assuming the comparison holds, his argument seems to implicitly contain two further shortcomings:

1. The belief that the problem of immigration is merely legal; a widespread but simplistic belief which would entail a simple solution - the legalisation of African immigration.

2. The presupposition of the legitimacy of established international and political orders (Roman and actual); something that should not be taken for granted by any thinking person. On the contrary, I would expect an "intellectual" to highlight the contradictions of established political orders; the primary contemporary one arguably being the fact that we are living in a world where the powers that be impose on third world countries the commandment to pull down economic barriers (and those who refuse to do so to protect any nascent industry are punished if they fail to comply), while urging
them to erect walls to stop people (who after all may be considered an economic asset) from following the goods that are moving to the most affluent parts of the world.


Other points of discussion that come out of this letter:

- The self and identity
- Freedom (of movement, of expression, and their limitations)
- Fairness and Rights, including Human Rights
- Celebration of diversity
- Equality and equity
- Respect for others
- Truth and reason
- Empathy
- Democracy
- Community involvement and active citizenship
- Racism, racial discrimination, minority rights, and institutionalised racism
- Irreconcilable positions
- Shared experiences and the common good
- Concern for others
- Suffering
When discussing these issues, most of which are philosophical and deal with issues of citizenship, I would start from personal narratives, drawings, photos or poems provided by immigrant students themselves. I think that these would be a good starting point for discussion, because this would empower students and give them a way of voicing their thoughts, their fears and experiences. Furthermore, I believe that students often learn more from their peers than they do from adults, and hearing about other students’ experiences would be beneficial to everyone involved. Finally, it gives immigrant students a chance to explain their point of view, without the help of intermediaries, who often make incorrect assumptions when interpreting their narratives.

I would also provide material about the local situation from different media such as articles from newspapers, comments from blogs, reports by aid agencies, photos taken by reporters, and so on. Such material can provide a wealth of information, as well as debatable comments which can result in endless discussion. The students can analyze such information, discussing its validity, truthfulness, the agenda of the person or organisation which has provided it, and so on. Students will also be asked to bring to class material related to the topic, and possibly interview some members of their family on the subject. Most importantly, students will be encouraged to express their opinions verbally and in other modes as well, such as in drawings, writing, and so on.

**Conclusion**

The letter above is intended to be an example of what can be done in class. Other resources could include the experiences of immigrant students, report about detention centres in Malta commissioned by Médecins Sans Frontières, articles, letters from newspapers, drawings made by immigrant children and so on. These are just a few examples; there is a great deal of information that can be found
about the subject, and it is not my intention to list every resource that can be used in the classroom. My idea is to use a similar approach to other local situations, like the present change in the education system, the role of Malta in the EU and the elections of the Maltese representative in the EU parliament, the family (a topic very much under discussion at the time of writing) and other topics identified by the students themselves.

I have tried to show in a practical way how Citizenship Education can be taught in schools using the Philosophy for Children approach with the use of localised narratives as texts. Within this approach, critical reflective thinking becomes the hub of activity around which contemporary issues dealing with citizenship are discussed in class in a community of inquiry, which makes use of communication and dialogue as pedagogical tools.
Man tells blood bank to stop 'wasting' supplies on immigrants

Mark Micallef

The director of the blood bank thought someone was playing a joke when a letter landed on his desk from a potential donor asking for assurances that his blood would not be given to immigrants.

However, the man who wrote the letter was dead serious. In fact, he was so upset the bank did not take up his suggestion that he wrote a letter to The Sunday Times, saying he had a right not to donate blood unless he was given such a guarantee.

He said in the letter to the paper: "I, for one, am not willing to donate blood if this is going to be used on undesired illegal citizens. They are already benefitting from free healthcare, shelter, food, telephony and what not. Not my blood as well though!"

He goes on to describe illegal immigrants as a "parasite community" and argues that the authorities would be reneging on their duty towards the legal population (tourists included) if they "squander our supply on them (immigrants)".

The man bases his argument on the premise that the "uncontrollable influx" of immigrants is exacerbating periodic blood shortages.
But Alex Aquilina, head of the National Blood Transfusion Service who received the original letter, said this was incorrect.

Dr Aquilina said the amount of blood taken up by immigrants, in fact, represented a fraction of that given to the rest of the population. This is not surprising, given that they only represent around one per cent of the total population.

"The blood bank collects blood and distributes it to whoever needs it. Our mission is to save lives," Dr Aquilina said.

"One is free to donate or not to donate blood assuming one is eligible to do so. However, we strongly feel that we all have an obligation to donate blood to all who need it. So we consider this reasoning to be ethically, morally, and logically unacceptable. Not donating blood on the basis of the correspondent's reasoning would jeopardise the lives of many people."

When contacted yesterday, the man who wrote the letter proposed a new solution - creating a blood bank specifically for immigrants.

When it was put to him that his suggestion could endanger lives, he said: "Their own friends who had the same idea of entering illegally should be donors to immigrants in need, not us." He even said blood should be withheld "if need be".

When contacted, columnist and anthropologist Mark Anthony Falzon said not only was the man's approach xenophobic; it was not practical.

Donated blood is processed according to its shelf-life and is then used (or not) depending on demand in a very costly process.

"The last thing the blood bank needs is to further separate the blood products according to the prejudices of the donors. Just imagine: 'platelets for white Nationalists', 'whole blood for Somalis', and so on," Dr Falzon said.

"So, rather than Mr Spiteri worrying about 'wasting' his blood, pre-selection would be a clear case of the blood bank wasting its time and resources on people like him. Donating blood is a voluntary act of solidarity; those who do not 'have it in them', pardon the pun, need not apply."

The National Commission for the Promotion of Equality declined the opportunity to condemn the man's actions, but it pointed out that implementing any discriminatory policy of the sort would be illegal.

However, it praised the blood bank's response, which told the man that it was there to serve whoever needed its service.

When asked how many times he had donated blood so far, the man, who was otherwise forthcoming, said: "I cannot understand what this has got to do with the problem."
A total of 108 illegal immigrants landed in Malta in two groups this afternoon.

The first 31, landed at Delimara early in the afternoon. Seventeen men, two women, a boy and a girl were found on land and another 10 men were on a boat trying to escape. They were escorted to land by the Administrative Law Enforcement police.

The second group, of 77, including two women, were landed at Wied il-Buni at about 3 p.m. They were brought to shore by the Armed Forces of Malta on two AFM patrol boats after they were rescued from rough seas by the container vessel Stadt Goslar some 50 miles south west of Malta.

*The Times*: Sunday, 24th August 2008 - 12:42CE
References


CHAPTER 7

A WISER APPROACH TO PLTS, SEAL, PSHE, CITIZENSHIP AND CROSS-CURRICULAR DIMENSIONS

Roger Sutcliffe
The word ‘curriculum’ in Latin meant ‘a running (course)’. Extending this analogy, one might say that SMSC (Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural development) was an early runner in the (England and Wales) National Curriculum Stakes, but was overshadowed by PSHE (Personal, Social, Health and Education) and Citizenship.

Joining the race more recently have been SEAL (Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning), presented as a ‘framework’ for PSHE, and PLTS (Personal, Learning and Thinking Skills), not to mention the following Cross-curriculum Dimensions, launched in March 2009:

- Identity and cultural diversity
- Healthy lifestyles
- Community participation
- Enterprise
- Global Dimension and Sustainable Development
- Technology and the Media
- Creativity and Critical Thinking

Despite the sense of overkill that these lists evoke, it should be emphasized, at once, that in their various ways they draw attention to absolutely vital elements in good educational provision. An education system that did not place a high value on most, if not all, these elements would hardly be worthy of the name ‘education’; and the best teachers and schools still manage to value them alongside the pursuit of academic excellence.

The time has come, however, to simplify the task – and timetables – of schools, by combining the elements into a single ‘subject’ that provides not only more coherence, but also a much greater prospect of permanence amidst continual change. This, then, is the first manifesto on behalf of PSP – Personal and Social Philosophy.

To anyone who has a sense of what ‘Philosophy’ has meant to the human spirit and
species since the word was invented by the Greeks, it is perfectly obvious that this is the discipline that can, and should, bring together all the vital elements listed above. From the time that Socrates said he was concerned, above all, with the best possible state of people's 'psyche' (spirit/soul/mind) Philosophy was set on the journey to living a/the 'good' life; and, from the same time, it has always carried the notion that the good life for a person can scarcely be constructed without regard to the good life for society – and vice-versa.

One might argue, then, that the slot in the timetable for PSHE, etc., should be given the simple (but respectably old) title of Philosophy itself. But below are a few more detailed arguments for preferring the title, ‘Personal and Social Philosophy’.

**Personal Education.** The first argument is that this makes the bridge from Personal Education (as in PSE) clear for all to see and easy for them to step over. Personal education proper – that is, educating a ‘person’ – is effectively a journey towards the Greek ideal, ‘know thyself’, and is founded on the concept of a person as an autonomous being who makes up their own mind, particularly about their own self.

Thinking philosophically about oneself embraces all possible aspects of a human being/person. It thus relates not only to Personal Skills - P(LT)S - and Spiritual and Moral development - SM(SC) - but also to Emotional Health - (S)EAL and (P)S(H)C(E).

**Social Education.** Thinking about oneself, moreover, is not the same as thinking of oneself. The latter is limited by one’s own (self) interest, whilst the former is open to the interests of others, and to the relationship between one’s self and others. Philosophy pays due respect to this relationship, via its traditional sub-disciplines of Ethics and Politics. The second argument, then, is that the explicit reference to Social, as well as Personal, Philosophy in PSP makes clear the links with Social and Cultural development - S(MS)C - and Social Aspects of Learning - S(E)AL - and with the Social and Citizenship parts of (P)S(H)C(E).
Learning and Thinking Skills. Next, the headlining of Philosophy itself, of course, provides a perfect platform for addressing the Learning and Thinking Skills in (P)LTS. No other discipline focuses as much on thinking as does Philosophy – which is, indeed, sometimes characterised as ‘Thinking about Thinking’ – and no other discipline examines and evaluates knowledge and learning as does Philosophy. For sure, it is good to learn about learning, but it is even better to learn to think about learning, and to learn about thinking.

Philosophical enquiry, in fact, provides the perfect practice in the 7th of the Cross-curricular dimensions – Creativity and Critical thinking. It is increasingly acknowledged that the former, defined so often and tritely as ‘thinking out of the box’, is essentially about the ability to make new conceptual connections, whilst the latter is more than just the ability to reason: it is about the ability to make fine distinctions. But the complementary skills of synthesis and analysis, as well as questioning and reasoning, have always been practised in Philosophy. The subject matter and the discipline of philosophical enquiry draw young people into creative and critical dialogue, often of a quality to astonish their teachers.

Cross-curriculum Dimensions. It remains only to note that the first 5 of the 7 Cross-curriculum Dimensions, can, and should, be easy to address within a well-designed Personal and Social Philosophy course, whilst the remaining dimension to be addressed, Technology and the Media, is quite likely to feature within already timetabled subjects (D&T, Art, Drama, etc). Even then a good case can be made for them to be subject to a healthy dose of ‘independent’ scrutiny, if not scepticism. Given the influence that technology and the media have on both individuals and society in general, it would be fitting for this scrutiny to take place in PSP sessions.

Practicalities. The intellectual case, then, for adopting PSP into the timetable (instead of, not in addition to, the various headlines under which schools address PLTS) is comprehensive. But would such a move be practicable? Are enough teachers ready to teach PSP?
Actually, there are probably more teachers ready to teach PSP than there are teachers ready to teach PLTS, which has no base in a discipline. Not only is there a growing number of Philosophy specialists teaching the successful A/S level Philosophy course, but also there is a healthy group of RE teachers who already teach Ethics in the Sixth Form.

Add to these the quietly growing number of teachers who have trained in the equally successful Philosophy for Children (P4C) initiative, and the human resource base for PSP looks encouraging.

Pedagogy: P4C, indeed, provides more than just personnel: it provides the most suitable pedagogy for this vital part of education, namely, ‘communities of enquiry’ - which deliberately and precisely cultivate the disposition to ask questions that are socially as well as personally constructive. (Less coyly, and more concisely, they aim to cultivate practical wisdom.)

The community of enquiry approach, in fact, with its emphasis on thinking better together in order to think better for yourself, is perfectly suited to the practice and development of the six PLTS skills: independent enquirers, creative thinkers, reflective learners, team workers, self-managers and effective participants.

Transition. More and more children are already practising P4C (or one of its close cousins: Philosophy with Children, or Communities of Philosophical Inquiry) in UK primary schools, and many are disappointed to find that there is no opportunity to continue this practice in their transition year.

The development of PSP in the years between primary and sixth form education would bridge this gap, with considerable impact, but minimal disruption.

Not only would those already teaching Philosophy (and/or RE) at the top end welcome the chance to develop students’ philosophical skills earlier, but teachers of other disciplines, such as History or Science, can fairly easily be inducted into
the community of enquiry approach. The essential qualification is to want students to think ‘deeper and wider’ – more about themselves, and more about others.

**Resources.** There are also plenty of materials to resource such an initiative, and many more could be developed quickly and organically through a PSP network.

So, we have the people, the pedagogy and the primers. It would seem prudent, if not wise, to pull all these together into a programme in the timetable that has real credibility. Philosophy will always be around as a discipline, but how long a shelf-life have SEAL, PLTS and the rest of them?

HEADTEACHERS, curriculum designers and secondary teachers who are interested in taking this philosophical (‘pursuit of wisdom’) approach to dealing with acronym overload should contact roger@p4c.com.
CHAPTER 8

DIALOGUE, SELF AND EDUCATION

Hannu Juuso, Timo Laine & Ieva Rocena
In everyday discourse the concept of dialogue is used in many different senses. It is usually understood as a communicative experience of verbal interaction but maybe not so often characterised by equality, mutual respect, reciprocity, care and tolerance between its participants. However, it is just those attributes which should be assumed to catch the most essential features of this phenomenon. The exchange of messages by asking and questioning is not as such a condition for any situation to make it dialogical. Rather, dialogue seems to point to a particular kind of human relationship which allows for changing and being changed as a person. In this sense dialogue is not so much a specific communicative form but ‘...a river of meaning flowing around and through the participants’ - as described by David Bohm.64

In philosophy this special character of human relationship has been discussed in terms of encountering, among others. The starting-point for this thinking is always the relationship of anyone’s ‘I’ to other people. This "I"-centeredness gives rise to the concepts of the 'other' and 'otherness'. The phenomenon of encountering cannot be found if human relationships are viewed as if from the outside objectively and from the viewpoint of a third party. An encounter with another person always takes place in the lived perspective of an individual.

In modern educational philosophy the concepts of encounter and dialogicality have been used in different senses. In this article we will, firstly, discuss about those different angles as expressed by Martin Buber (1878 – 1965) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900 – 2002). This analysis is broadened by sketching the theory of self as developed by John Dewey (1859-1952) and Georg Herbert Mead (1863-1931). From these grounds we will discuss the significance, place and outcomes of dialogue in pedagogical relationship. Here the notion of pedagogical tact as a dialogical phenomenon in the heart of education is taken into the special lightning. In the article we are arguing that educating children towards dialogue – as

64 Bohm 1991, 2.
paradoxical as it might look like - is the very goal of education where genuine growth as self-creation with ‘others’ is encouraged.

**Dialogue as an Experience of Unity and Genuine Understanding:** Martin Buber and Hans-Georg Gadamer

Meeting other people is likely to be one of the most meaningful things in one’s life. We all have much experience of those occasions in our personal history as well as we also can recognize their many sentient nuances and differences. There are times with the feeling of relax and relief but also of confuse and excitement. What is this curious phenomenon all about?

According to Martin Buber all human relationships can be reduced to just two main forms, namely the monological and the dialogical. The space between two people exists according to the other one of those categories also giving different meaning to both parties of that relationship. The ‘I’ of monological ‘I-They’ relationship is the different ‘I’ compared to that ‘I’ of dialogical ‘I – You’ relationship. The next figure presenting these diverse aspects is derived just from the base of that distinction made by Buber.

**MONOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP**

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>one directional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trying to effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pursuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goal oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planning in advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>using of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

65 See Buber 1984.
DIALOGICAL RELATIONSHIP

reciprocal

I

‘OTHER’

- searching connection
- openness to ‘other’
- willingness to understand
- respecting
- responsibility

Seen
-as a unique individual
-as a subject
-as a person
-as a united whole

Figure 1: Monological and dialogical relationship based on Buber.

For Buber, ‘genuine encounters’ and dialogicality are more like exceptional events in a man’s life, and their value is added to through this exceptionality. According to this existentialist view, a dialogic encounter with another person means immediate experience of unity. The other person unpredictably makes a deep impression on me, touches me with his difference, and this experience changes me. Such an encounter with an experience of unity is not limited to verbal communication or, for instance, learning only. It is not a matter of ‘factual’ consciousness of another person’s speech as a goal-oriented expansion of one’s own previous knowledge, but of the special experience of a ‘touch’ that has a broad and deep influence on the development of our entire personality. Such existentially understood dialogical encounters with others – who can be our fathers and mothers, friends, dear ones or perhaps also children, among others – create our identity, our understanding of ourselves. We become ourselves while others ‘tell’ it to us in situations in which our persons are fully present. This very totality in situations of encounter is the core of this existential conception: reciprocity (You to Me and I to You), personal
presence, kindness, a desire to understand the other person, and confidentiality are required for it to be realized.\textsuperscript{66}

If compared to Buber’s view, a broader and less demanding way to understand dialogicality is to define it as a relation to another person which also aims at unity with the other person, but which is satisfied with internal dialogization of mutual discourse or ‘genuine understanding’. Mutual speech and understanding are also one of the most important levels of the dialogical relationship to Buber. The most fundamental question is: how can I attain an understanding of what is strange to me from my own starting-points? For Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘genuine understanding’ does not mean the adaptation of the other into one’s own horizon, i.e. into what in the other person’s expression is interpreted to me as something already known and obvious, or what pleases me because it goes well together with my previous thoughts and feelings.\textsuperscript{67} This kind of listening or reading that excludes otherness, the difference of the other meaning horizon, is not about understanding at all, as nothing new is understood in it. Genuine understanding is for Gadamer a dialogic process of encountering the other person, in which my own meaning horizon is merged with the other different horizon, in which an effort is made to find a new understanding of what was spoken or written as text in unity with the ‘other’. It is not about an attempt to understand the other person’s mental life, but the issue at hand as seen from the other person’s perspective. The next figure is an attempt to describe that birth of new understanding – or self-creation in connection with the ‘other’- from the base of those Gadamerian ideas.

\textsuperscript{66} See Taylor 1989.
\textsuperscript{67} See Gadamer 1982.
Pre-understanding

‘OTHER’

Expressions like
speech and
body language

lived experience

Dialogue:

understanding

New understanding of ”Love”

lived experience

Figure 2: The hermeneutic construction of knowledge as new understanding
Meeting the other and merging of horizons is possible only if there is principal disposition of willing to understand the other. In a situation of dialogue it is possible only through listening and by restricting oneself. As far as dialogue is both individual and communal activity, listening has two directions - listening to others and listening to oneself. This is why silence is as essential as speaking to dialogue. It is necessary for thinking and understanding in order to create new meanings.

*If we were supposed to talk more than we listen, we would have two mouths and one ear.*

Mark Twain

Deutsch distinguishes between listening to and listening for.\(^{68}\) Listening for takes place when one listens with attendance, looks for some specific or generally anticipated meaning or significance. When one listens to, she attends to someone and what he or she is saying for its own sake, with sensitivity and alertness, without anticipated meaning, with a total openness. According to Deutsch, in genuine conversation, listening for and listening to are combined, integrated and create intimacy.

Dialogue has certain intimacy among participants also in another sense. It can nourish in the environment of mutual responsibility, trust and collaboration. At the same time all these aspects are developed through dialogue. One learns to be responsible for one’s words and expressions, attitudes, one learns to trust others and to be reliable, one learns to collaborate in order to develop the thread of the common dialogue.

Participants find that they are involved in an ever changing and developing pool of common meaning. A shared content of consciousness emerges which allows a level of creativity and insight that is not generally available to individuals or to groups that interact in more familiar ways. This reveals an aspect of Dialogue that Patrick Deutsch 1992, 105.
de Mare has called *koinonia*, a word meaning "impersonal fellowship", which was originally used to describe the early form of Athenian democracy in which all the free men of the city gathered to govern themselves.

### The Social Origin of Self: John Dewey and George Herbert Mead

John Dewey and Georg Herbert Mead thought that the human being is an individual only in a relationship with others. According to them, meaning arises in human interaction and in the agreements required by common action in social contexts. Mental processes are part of the process formed by man and the environment, and language is only possible thanks to the communicative interaction on which the existence of meaning is based. Individuals need each other's perspectives in their own action, producing at the same time the common meaning content of the community of meaning. According to Dewey, consciousness of self thus inevitably requires consciousness of others. The self is, however, more than just a relationship to another self. It cannot be absolutely distinguished from the other, as we can experience our selves only as long as that other exists in our experience. Failure to recognize that the world of inner experience is dependent upon an extension of language, which is a social product and operation, leads to a subjectivistic and egoistic strain. By means of language, individuals can learn to see the perspective of the other. With the development of one's own unique conduct, a common community of meaning also develops. It is through this community of meaning that not only the self, but also a sense of self-consciousness emerges.\(^69\)

Mead maintains that we can only speak of ‘mind’ through the existence of significant symbols. The mind appears (or emerges) when an organism is able to point out meanings to others and to himself. “It is absurd to look at the mind simply from the standpoint of the individual organism; for, although it has its focus there, it is essentially a social phenomenon; even its biological functions are

---

\(^69\) Dewey 1908; See also Dewey 1934.
social.”\textsuperscript{70} If I do not act implicitly like the other one does in response to my gesture, I never develop my mind. But as I respond implicitly to my expression like the other also responds to it, I can place myself in the other’s position in relation to myself by becoming conscious of my gesture and the response it caused in the other. According to Mead, in so doing I develop my reflective consciousness. The condition of this arising is that things become symbolic having meanings that I can use in that ongoing, functional interaction. Then collaboration, for instance, is successful with others thanks to the fact that I am able to take my attitudes as the objects of my own attention. Thus my own attitudes are responsible for others’ conduct, as I can through them exert an influence on others’ action, with them becoming stimuli of others’ action.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, for Dewey and Mead, the origins of the self are social and intersubjective; it is through social interaction that self is both formed and brought to consciousness.

For both of these early pragmatists this basic theory of self had crucial pedagogical significance. Mead thinks that skipping the fundamental process described above of the natural generation of self-consciousness in the child and of the development taking place in its language and thinking has led to the problems in school education in his own times.\textsuperscript{72} In terms of teaching, the replication of the above theory on the natural generation and development of the child’s self-consciousness takes place in the relations that the child develops to his teacher and, on the other hand – through the teacher – to his classmates. This means for Mead – as it does for Dewey – the encountering of the experiences of the child and teacher.

To use Professor Dewey’s phrase, instruction should be an interchange of experience in which the child brings his experience to be interpreted by the

\textsuperscript{70} Mead 1934, 133; see also Mead 1913.

\textsuperscript{71} Mead 1910a.

\textsuperscript{72} Here Mead refers to, for instance, Herbart’s conception of the child as an \textit{Apperceptionsmasse} detached from his social self arising and developing among others, leading further to, among other things, the way in which the learning materials used in schools are presented.
experience of the parent or teacher. This recognizes that education is interchange of ideas, is conversation – belongs to the universe of discourse.\textsuperscript{73}

In this interchange of experience, the teacher becomes a natural part of the solution to the problem experienced by the child himself, and in fact “...that what the child has to learn is what he wants to acquire, to become the man.”\textsuperscript{74} For Mead, this would appear to be about the basic relationship in education, i.e. the pedagogical relationship. The teacher’s relation to his student is a condition of thought and meaning just because their ultimate social origin. Thus, the social relationship, which comes before meaning and thought, is actually ‘the material’ of education, and further the ‘problem of education’ is that “of introducing a method of thought” which comes back to “producing a social situation” in which the child itself is included.\textsuperscript{75}

For it to be practically possible for a child’s experience to be transformed in interpretation taking place through the teacher’s experience, it presupposes a problem genuinely experienced by the child as a subject-matter of instruction. This viewpoint also determines Mead’s teacherhood.

Just insofar as the subject-matter of instruction can be brought into the form of problems arising in the experience of the child – just as far will the relation of the child to the instructor become a part of the natural solution of the problem – actual success of a teacher depends in large measure upon his capacity to state the subject-matter of instruction in terms of the experience of the children.\textsuperscript{76}

Based on these starting-points, teaching should, according to Mead, take place as a mutual conversation between the child, his teacher and the other children – by the agency of the teacher. The conversation of concrete individuals, demands Mead, must be substituted for the pale abstractions of thought. In the conversation ‘I’

\textsuperscript{73} Mead 1910b.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Mead 1910-1911.
\textsuperscript{76} Mead 1910b.
internalize the world of meanings realized by the other members of the community in that communication by being able to place myself in their position in my own verbal expressions, i.e. to hear myself the way I assume them to hear me. Conversation must therefore be construed as the method of pedagogical practice recommended by Mead to concretize the development of self-consciousness taking place in thinking attached to language. According to Mead, the overwhelming problems of the school derive mostly from an inability to understand the radical meaning of this personal interaction and the related 'lack of a need' to transform the subject-matter into concrete experience of the children. So the material of the lesson is not identified with the impulses of the child but the attention of the child is that of a school self"... expressing subordination to school authority and identity of conduct with that of all the other children in the room."77 This way, what is social is the school discipline, not the life of learning.

So, the essential thing is what the child’s attention is targeted at in the classroom on the basis of his impulsiveness, because that is the way the process of the organization of consciousness, or the development of self-consciousness, takes place. In the intellectual phase of human action (following the emotional and aesthetical phase) “we train our children to choose the stimuli for their acts”.78 By this Mead means that in the phase of intelligent action, children should learn to control their immediate and blind tendency to respond that arises from the conflict caused by the variety of possibilities for response. In the phase of intelligent action, children should be trained to anticipate the consequences of their action and replace their primitive impulsiveness with the “full process of thought”.79 Similarly to Dewey, Mead states that this is one of the main tasks of education, i.e. to introduce “the method of thought” by which he refers to the process of thinking through the stages of problem, hypothesis and experimentation in a social situation. The child needs to be made at home in the new situation, which

---

77 Ibid.
78 Mead 1910-1911.
79 Ibid.
according to Mead, is above all dependent on social relations where the child’s own experience is crucial thus also changing the things to be acquired.\textsuperscript{80}

This inevitable social formation of self should furthermore give rise to not only the methods and learning materials of the school, but also the means to arouse and direct the pupils’ attention. According to Mead’s Philosophy of Education lectures the essential task of education is to formulate consciously “the traditions, ideas, and methods” that have been developed in the past, and to embody them in such a form “that they can be readily communicated”.\textsuperscript{81} So, in The psychology of Social Consciousness Implied in Instruction Mead thinks that textbooks, for instance, should be written in such a way that in addition to respecting the child’s intelligence, i.e. drawing on their own experience as a subject matter (or curriculum) of instruction, it implements the development of subject-matter as action and reaction of one mind upon another mind. “The dictum of the Platonic Socrates, that one must follow the argument where it leads in the dialogue, should be the motto of the writer of textbooks.”\textsuperscript{82}

**Dialogue and the Pedagogical Relationship**

What happens between educator and the child? What actually is ‘growth’ as the general aim of education? Is there any space for a dialogical encounter between ‘adult’ and ‘child’, and if it does, in what form? When discussing these fundamental questions of pedagogical interaction, we need to realize their extremely complicated nature as those ambivalent concepts involved – like adult and child - are intertwined to each others and naturally get their meaning in the totality of the socio-historical epoch in which they are being used. If the growth is used to refer to, as usually done in modernity, such forms of action and contents in the educational process that are thought to promote or support child’s

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Mead 1910b.
transformation towards self-determinate ‘autonomous adulthood’, the problem still remains about the meaning and genealogy of that often used notion. As discussed in his recent works by David Kennedy, there is not any unconditioned education of children an sich; it necessarily emerges us through our pre-understanding constructed from the social, cultural and philosophical lenses which, as categorical means, forms the condition to recognize it. From this base Kennedy argues that what has been the implicit determinant of modern education is basically the Western unconscious ‘adultist subjectivity’.

This problem can be viewed from the perspective of hermeneutic pedagogy where the so-called pedagogical relationship between educator and educate has been dealt with in particular. In a broad sense, the pedagogical relationship refers to the whole of relationships constituting pedagogical activity in which the essential basic element, in addition to the educator and child, is culture (or tradition). Hermeneutic pedagogy aims at understanding and conceptualizing how the individual’s process of Bildung, reproduction and on the other hand reforming of culture are ultimately possible within the framework of these basic elements. In this way the emphasis is on the educator’s responsible action as a condition for the (subjective) individual process of Bildung on the one hand and for the reproduction of (objective) culture on the other. As a condition of education, the not-yet-grownup child is not assumed to be capable of this alone. This might also be formulated in such a way that in a concrete educational situation something is paradoxically realized in the field of the encounter between educator and the child that is not only based on the educator’s intention but on the other hand also cannot be realized without it. The educator is empowered both by the child and by the culture which, he as an ‘adult’ directly represents. This thematics is also inherent in Dewey’s (and Mead’s) educational thinking – based on his philosophical distinctions - when he in his notion of intelligent growth as a consequence of scientific inquiry referees to a teacher as a necessary transformer between the child and the curriculum (read tradition) so that the child could gradually by his own behalf and by own means think for himself. For Dewey and Mead education is

---

83 See Kennedy 2006a; 2006b.
the adjustment of communication thus forming the intersubjective condition of democratic society. Also efforts have often been made to perceive this dialectical tension between subjective and objective and its outrun as a kind of synthesis (Aufhebung) from the viewpoint of dialogicality.

Buber presents the pedagogical relationship as a special form of the dialogical relationship. The "I-You" relationship between educator and child cannot be fully reciprocal in the same way as the "I-You" relationship based on equality between adults which also can be such only in principle. The inclusion (Umfassung) of ideal dialogue means to Buber the ability of both the parties to the dialogue to live through the situation of encounter in all of its aspects, i.e. not only from his or her own viewpoint but also from the partner's point of view. Buber thinks that this is also the fundamental element in the relationship between educator and pupil although it is bipolar by nature. The educator must inspire a dialogical "I-You" relationship in the pupil, who in turn "... should refer to and acknowledge his or educator as this certain person." The educational connection is, however, broken when the pupil as well is capable of reciprocally living through the common situation from the educator's point of view.

According to Buber, an educative connection as such cannot represent full reciprocity in accordance with ideal dialogue. Education, similarly to the way in which a psychotherapist's patient is healed, requires that a person lives in the encounter but is also withdrawn at the same time. The educator experiences a child's growth from the child's point of view, but the child cannot experience the educator's activity from the educator's point of view. However, this very capability means the breaking of the educational connection with the emergence of the "I-You" relationship and finally in the evaporation of the pedagogical relationship, which also for Buber would appear to be the raison d'etre of education.

---

84 Buber 1984, 130.
85 Ibid., 131.
[The teacher] experiences the pupil’s being educated, but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the educator. The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil at only one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relationship would burst asunder, or change into friendship.

Martin Buber

The analyses of the special character of the pedagogical relationship mentioned above are united by the idea of the child developing in a human way for the very reason that the educator initiates him into the form of common action within the framework of his own meaning space. However, putting an emphasis on the fact that it is not a result of natural development but a human achievement aiming at the growing person’s autonomy, the wish is to underline the well-known idea of hermeneutic pedagogy about education as a necessary condition of the process of Bildung. Education is neither asymmetrical, causal and reproductive social technology nor symmetrical reciprocity, that is, dialogue in the full sense of this concept. Education is pedagogical action towards dialogue still including complex dialogical phenomena as conditions for its objective. As Bildung is basically an open process as such, for which a condition is that the child necessarily remains for the educator as the ´other´, the question arises of what is the ultimate content of the educator’s mind guiding the concrete educational situations. How is it possible that the educator is able to overcome the distinction between ´child as difference of kind´ and ´child as difference of degree´, the question which is deeply involved here? The challenge to reject the ´deficit child´ but still preserve educative influence i.e. the ultimate perspective of adult is confronted in pedagogical interaction. We will confine ourselves next to discuss this complicated field of phenomena in the light of the concept of tact.
**Tact as Dialogical Phenomena**

Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) thinks that the critical question of an educator's skill is how s/he manifests tact in his/her action. Tact finds a place between theory and practice when a human being makes quick decisions and presents immediate judgments in his action, says Herbart. It is, above all, a situationally specific form of action based on sensitive feeling (Gefühl), and only remotely connected with ideas consciously derived from theory or beliefs. Herbart's tact senses the unique nature of situations, and is "...der unmittelbare Regent der Praxis." 

After Herbart, references to pedagogical tact have been mostly made in the German discussion. However, it seems to us that it was developed systematically not until Jacob Muth in his book Pädagogischer Takt (1962). He emphasizes the binding and planless nature (Nichtplanbarkeit) of pedagogical tact as it is essentially connected with the educator's unpredictable feeling (Gefühl) that s/he only experiences in each individual situation. Actually Muth is echoing here also Buber's educational thinking when stating that

\[ \textit{Takt ist nicht dem planenden Willen des Lehrers unterworfen, und darum kann taktvolles Handeln nicht in einem planvollen erzieherischen Vorgehen aktualisiert werden, sondern immer nur in der unvorhersehbaren Situation, die den Erzieher in Anspruch nimmt.} \]

The real teacher, he (Buber) believed, teaches most successfully when he is not consciously trying to teach at all, but when he acts spontaneously out of his own life. Then he can gain the pupil's confidence; he can convince the adolescent that there is human truth, that existence has a meaning. And when the pupil's confidence has been won, 'his resistance against being educated gives way to a

---

86 Herbart in Sämtliche Werke (1887) according to Muth 1962, 68, 125.
87 Direct quotation from Herbart by Muth, Muth 1962, 68.
88 Muth 1962, 12, 71-72.
singular happening: he accepts the educator as a person. He feels he may trust this man, that this man is taking part in his life, accepting him before desiring to influence him. And so he learns to ask....

Muth goes on by elaborating this notion especially from the didactic point of view. This means to him an attempt to perceive the meaning of tact by examining it in its functional contexts or in the concrete situations that manifest the above-mentioned characteristics associated with tact. According to Muth, tact manifests itself in education in general in many different ways. It is manifested in the engagement of speech, naturalness of action, avoidance of hurting the child and keeping the distance necessary for a pedagogical relationship.

In individual teaching situations, Muth says that tact is seen in situational confidence, dramaturgic skill and talent of improvisation. Muth specifically tries to show the opening of the realization of tact when the school ventures to follow free forms of action that were not planned beforehand. Lack of advance planning means openness to what happens in a unique pedagogical situation. It is about risk taking in a way, allowing room for tact for this very reason. For Muth, this most profound essence of teachership obviously derived from Herbart as well as from Buber, i.e. unselfish surrender to the child, the ability to love all people and especially learning to make quick assessments and decisions and acquiring situational confidence, does not follow any routine rules that can be learnt beforehand, although one can get prepared for them within certain limits.

*The educator cannot get oriented on the basis of the sciences.*
Max van Manen

In his book entitled *The Tact of Teaching* Max van Manen recapitulates and modifies the themes of Muth’s *Pädagigische Takt* from a phenomenological

---

89 Ibid., 26-62.
90 Ibid., 74-94.
91 Ibid., 74, 95-104.
viewpoint through a variety of practical examples. In this sense his working method in conceptualizing tact is similar to Muth's. Van Manen makes a distinction between general tactful action as symmetric interaction of adults and pedagogical tact which he considers asymmetric, although he attributes the same characteristics to both of them. Van Manen characterizes the former as a considerate way to act rather than as reflective knowing. Although general tact often involves withdrawal and waiting, it is still about a human being exerting an influence on another one. A tactful person needs to be sensitive but at the same time strong, as tact may require straightforwardness, determination and an open heart. Tact is about sincerity and truthfulness, it is never deceitful or misleading. Van Manen describes that a tactful person is able to 'read' another person's internal state, i.e. other people's thoughts and feelings from a variety indirect signs (gestures, behavior, expression, body). Furthermore, tact is connected with an ability to interpret the psychological and social meanings of this internal state. A tactful person understands the requirements, limitations and balance of a situation, which is why s/he knows almost automatically how far to go in them and how distant to stay. According to van Manen, tact would eventually also seem to be associated with a certain moral intuitiveness, as a tactful person is capable of realizing how to act well in a given situation. Tact in this general sense is for van Manen about deeply dialogical respect of human subjectivity and dignity, openness and sensitivity to another person's thoughts and feelings irrespective of the other person's age, for instance.

Van Manen considers the tact of the pedagogical relationship to be asymmetric in that the adult has no right to expect it from the child. Similarly to Muth, van Manen also emphasizes the responsibility connected with pedagogical tact, which means above all protecting the child and helping the child to grow. For van Manen, pedagogical tact is a complicated phenomenon that is not based to any major extent on habits or problem solving. It is not only intellectual or bodily, not purely reflective consideration, nor spontaneous or arbitrary. Tactful pedagogical action

---

92 van Manen 1993.
93 Ibid., 125-128.
means a kind of thoughtful alertness, says van Manen, in which the teacher is present, i.e. s/he does not try to reflectively draw away from a situation by, for instance, thinking about or experimenting with various alternatives or consequences to action. Van Manen interprets Herbart’s – and why not also James’s – idea of pedagogical tact between theory and practice to mean a conception through which the problematic separation of theory from practice can be surpassed. He does not conceive of tact so much as an ability to make quick decisions as a certain kind of mindfulness that enables considerate action. So when we, says van Manen, come to tactful action rather than say that it is ‘reflective’ we should say that tactful action is thoughtful in the sense of ‘mindful’. Ultimately, tact is also for van Manen at the core of the pedagogical relationship.

...the real life of teaching and of parenting happens in the thick life itself when one must know with a certain confidence just what to say or what to do (or what not to say or do) in situations with children. Therefore, pedagogical thoughtfulness and tact may be seen to constitute the essence and excellence of pedagogy. Pedagogy is structured like tact. The tact that adults are able to show with children is a function of the nature of pedagogy itself.

Max van Manen

Similarly to Muth and Buber, van Manen would also appear to think that educatorship is at least partly based on the ethical responsibility to offer oneself constantly to be available to the child as a kind of instrument or mechanism. Thereby the educator is assumed to act in such way that s/he produces the results that s/he immediately feels (believes) the child to intend in his/her own action. It is not about conscious calculation, but a task that opens up to the educator as an immediate requirement and responsibility. This relation between child and parent/teacher is symbolized by 'living with the child in loco parentis'. Van Manen means by this the normatively loaded interaction between adult and child which is permeated by the adult's responsibility to take care of the child's life and

---

94 Ibid., 128.
95 Ibid., 109.
96 Ibid., 5-7.
growth into a responsible person, "... the human charge of protecting and teaching the young to live in this world and to take the responsibility for themselves, for others, and for the continuance and welfare of the world." In this educational task 'oriented towards the good' van Manen demands priority of experience as it is entwined into the adult's pedagogical tact in the pedagogical moments of educational situations as a multifaceted and complex mindfulness toward children.

As new aspects of tact, van Manen points out the orientation towards the 'other' connected with it and the touchingness of tact. Tact is the practice of 'otherness', states van Manen. This means overcoming egocentrism by realizing what and how other people are to 'myself'. This double viewpoint of 'myself' means, above all, the experience of the other's vulnerability. According to van Manen, "... it is when I see that the other is a person who can be hurt, distressed, pained, suffering, anguished, weak, in grief or despair that I may be opened to the essential being of the other". Van Manen would appear to think here that even the requirement issued to the educator 'to be for the child' or to 'orient oneself to the child' is ultimately based on the 'other' realized in that double perspectiveness of 'myself'. Due to these double perspectives, I also experience myself as 'seen' by the child, which in turn places the immediate ethical requirement that concerns me. Based on this basic starting-point, pedagogical tact is manifested in many ways, plenty of which are itemized by van Manen, largely recapitulating the characterizations that were previously presented by Muth. It means, for instance, an ability of holding back, openness to the child's experience, preparation for subjectivity, delicate influence, situational confidence, and improvisatory ability. Pedagogical tact is further conveyed in speech, silence, eyes, gestures and the atmosphere.

---

97 Ibid., 7.
98 In fact, the word 'tact' is etymologically associated with touching. The Latin word *tactus* from which tact is derived means a touch, while the verb *tangere* means touching. Latin-based con-tact refers to intimate human relationship, intimacy and connectedness (see e.g. van Manen 1993, 126-127).
99 Ibid., 140.
The responsibility included in the tact of the pedagogical relationship referred to above as a kind of immediate ethical primate can be understood through the concept of responsibility proposed by Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995). Levinas understands responsibility

...as responsibility for the Other, thus as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me; or which precisely does matter to me, is met by me as face...The face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an order signified ... this order is the very signifyingness of the face.100

For Levinas, the 'face' means everything that is expressive in the 'other', thus actually the whole meaningful body. Adapted to the educational situation, Levinas' thinking means the experience of responsibility as 'being for the child'. It falls on me immediately without me in any way consciously taking responsibility for him or her. Therefore I feel affinity with the child. It does not, however, derive from intentionality or knowledge of the other, but is based on the above unselfish sense of responsibility. In this way the pedagogical relationship can turn into a Buberian 'genuine dialogical encounter', an exceptional experience of existential unity with the child.

The phenomenon of pedagogical tact reveals the many levels of the encounter between an adult and a child. An educative situation cannot be based on monologic unidirectionality, as it is shaped in tact, a dynamic manifestation brought forward by Bildung itself. The various concrete forms of pedagogical tact described above lead to the necessity of perceiving the educational situation also as a comprehensive field of bodily phenomena. The educational situation gives rise to 'space' and 'atmosphere' that search for dialogicality and are not derived from either party of the interaction before that situation.

100 Levinas 1996, 95-98.
Summary

In this essay we have tried to outline the pedagogical relationship as a field of phenomena searching for dialogue. Tact is raised here as essential phenomena. It is related to phenomenological hermeneutic understanding of the educational situation. This is about unpredictable and unique complicated phenomena of the pedagogical relationship beyond the reach of science, through which we think the educational situation in its “immediately pervasive quality” - as Dewey suggests - can be better understood. They are realized in the educator’s sensible ability to ‘read’ the educational situation, in the ability based on the educator’s experience to act educatively depending on the meaning perspectives arising in each unique situation and the children involved in it. This in turn presupposes a dialogical attitude towards the child, a desire to encounter him as the ‘other’, and it does not work only on the basis of goals and plans constructed in advance. In tact subjective encounters objective transformed by the teacher.

A genuinely professional teacher is capable of living through the unique educational situations that he faces in contact with the child. Along with double perspectives, intuitive realization of the child’s viewpoint means an immediately experienced responsibility. The vulnerable, small child touches the teacher as the ‘other’, i.e. the child within the teacher as demanding, obliging and ordering him to see and hear the child. At its deepest the touchingness of this state can mean an existential experience of unity with the child, in the pedagogical sense a quest for dialogue as tactful action as an ability to live in it in the forms of a variety of concrete activities implying restrictions on one's own ‘selfish’ perspective as representing only the reproduction of the Same. The essential content of the pedagogical sagacity of the teacher in the community of inquiry means this pedagogical sensitivity of action enabling the genuine growth still in unavoidable connection with the tradition.
References


CHAPTER 9

POSTMODERN INSIGHTS INTO DIALOGUE

Joseph Giordmaina
A World of Change

Teachers very often try to understand what kind of world their students come from. The generation gap is felt by all being relevant is always a challenge. In a world of iPods, internet and mobile phones, students seem to live in a world that is at a distance from that of their teachers. Pedagogically speaking, it makes sense to teach in a manner that is of interest to the pupils that relates to their everyday life.

One major characteristic in both students’ and teachers’ lives is change. Change is at times referred to as one of the main characteristics of what is called a postmodern world. It is a world in which space and time have changed their meaning: one can practically be anywhere anytime: mobile phones, e-mails, live coverage of weddings and wars, of disasters and achievements. Change and reality are discussed by the philosopher Baudrillard (1983) who speaks of ‘radical semiurgy’, that is, the constant accelerating proliferation of signs which produce simulations that create new forms of society, culture, and experience. For Baudrillard, what we have today is an implosion between the image and the real. Through this implosion, the real disappears and what we get is a hyperreality, where the real is no longer given, but is artificially reproduced as ‘real’. It becomes realer-than-real; a real retouched and refurbished in a hallucinatory resemblance to itself. In hyperreality, the model replaces the real, so family relations as seen on television become the model of how families should be, and the ideal home furnishings as illustrated in the soap operas how a home should be furnished.

Everything becomes an illusion. This description is very familiar to those who are in daily contact with students: their clothes/lifestyle, means of communication, etc.

The question that comes to mind after reading Baudrillard and the chapters of this book is: How real are the dialogues being promoted in class? How does one distinguish between a staged and a ‘real’ dialogue? Can one speak of ‘hyperdialogue’ in class, as opposed to ‘real’ dialogue?

Another useful term for us who are interested in using dialogue as a form of teaching by Baudrillard is the term ‘infotainment’, where information and
entertainment implode, and they become one and the same thing. We are thus continuously bombarded with infotainment, urged to buy, to consume, to vote, to participate. A related term often used in the same sense is ‘edutainment’ – an amalgamation of entertainment and education. Is this what we might be doing when it comes to the use of dialogue in class? Or do teachers have deeper objectives than simply trying to teach in an innovative and interesting – entertaining – manner?

For Baudrillard, the postmodern is

‘characteristic of a universe where there are no more definitions possible... It has all been done. The extreme limit of these possibilities has been reached. It has destroyed itself. It has deconstructed its entire universe. So all that are left are the pieces. All that remains to be done is to play with the pieces - that is postmodern’ (Baudrillard Jean ‘Game with Vestiges’ On the Beach 5 (Winter) p.24).

Can dialogue be the means by means of which the fragments, the pieces are brought together, in order to help our students make better sense of the world? And if yes, should we be doing this – basically going against the grain, against their way of being, their way of life? A traditional tool that is built around the idea of dialogue, both within the self and with others, is Philosophy. For generations, people have ‘philosophised’, have tried to make sense of the world, mainly by using ‘texts’ as their tool – dialoguing with the past ideas, creating newer ones. My main recommendation in this chapter is that dialogue should and could be developed within the ‘subject’ of philosophy – and that philosophy - as a subject and not only as a method - should play an important role in a school’s curriculum.

**Philosophy**

One of the traditional questions in philosophy, and one that is often asked by students is: But what is philosophy? Of course, different philosophers have tackled such a question differently – the main approach being either historical – that is, starting from the pre-Socratics and ending with contemporary philosophers, or topical – that is, taking examples form everyday life (abortion, euthanasia, the
existence of God, political/moral rights, etc.) as examples of topics that have been dealt with philosophically.

The main question that a teacher would probably ask is: What kind of Philosophy should we be doing with children coming from what has been described above as postmodern backgrounds? And how different should it be from the kind of traditional philosophy often encountered in schools?

Attempts have been made to introduce philosophy (mainly as an activity that promotes community and dialogue) for children. One well-known philosopher who promoted the idea of ‘philosophy for children’ is Mathew Lipman. Lipman published *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery* in 1974. This novel deals mainly with the teaching of logic. The traditional boundaries of philosophy are reflected in the rest of Lipman’s curriculum: *Lisa* deals with ethical issues, *Suki* with aesthetics etc. The style is consistent throughout his curriculum: a novel which is read in sections over a span of a year is discussed in a ‘community of inquiry’. Children are invited to think about the issues and to identify topics they would like to talk about. These are written on a board, one item is selected and an inquiry is facilitated either by the teacher or one of the students. Importance is given to the ‘doing’ of philosophy through a process of talk/dialogue rather than the teaching of philosophy as a subject. But in the design of the curricula, special focus is given to specific areas, for example logic or ethics, depending on the grade the children are in. Lipman believes that this approach improves the thinking of children, giving them important skills outlined in the manuals, such as the skill of making comparisons, making arguments, working with rules and classifying, making distinctions, etc.

Crucial for Lipman’s curriculum is continuity in the curriculum, through which reinforcement of particular skills takes place.

More recent writers in the field of philosophy for children have developed this basic idea further, some taking a different approach. Among these, one finds the works of Murris (1995) who introduced the idea of using picture books as a text...
for discussion, McCall (1990), Fisher (1996, 1997, 1997b), Fox (1996), Cam (1993) and Lake (1991), all of whom use different texts such as stories, fairy tales, poems or games to develop thinking in children. Within these approaches there is usually an identification of topics, some of which are labelled ‘philosophical’ and which children identify and discuss in class (e.g. bullying, fairness, rights etc), using a methodology similar to the one developed by Lipman. One notices the use of pictures, videos, and a number of activities which in general seem to be missing from Lipman’s curriculum. There is a wider choice of text, which in most cases, is not specifically written for philosophy for children. But the general aim of Philosophy for Children, whatever the approach, is to teach philosophy through ‘doing’ philosophy by means of organising the class in a community of inquiry setting (similar to ‘circle time’) and engaging in a process of dialogue about a topic identified by children.

**Fabricating Concepts**

It would be interesting and useful at this point to consider what Deleuze and Guattari and Rorty have to say about ‘philosophy’. For Deleuze and Guattari (1994) philosophy ‘is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts’. The goal of philosophy is to create concepts that are always new. They quote Nietzsche’s idea on the role of the philosopher and philosophy: “Philosophers must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing” (p.5). For Deleuze and Guattari and Nietzsche, the role of philosophers is to distrust the concepts they did not create. Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophy is not contemplation, reflection or communication. It is the creation of concepts, the creation of knowledge, by ‘friends of wisdom’, philosophers.

Deleuze is continuously emphasising the creative element in philosophy:

...concepts don’t first of all, turn up ready made, they don’t pre-exist: you have to invent, create concepts, and this involves just as much creation and invention as you would find in art and science. Philosophy’s job has always been to create new
concepts, with their own necessity. Because they're not just whatever generalities happen to be in fashion, either. They're singularities, rather, acting on the flows of everyday thought: it's perfectly easy to think without concepts, but as soon as there are concepts, there's genuine philosophy (Deleuze, 1995, p.32).

Deleuze and Guattari’s creativity can be demonstrated in two concepts they develop through the metaphors of ‘rhizomes’ (or the ‘body without organs’\(^{101}\)) and the ‘lines’ that constitute us. For Deleuze there are two modes of thinking, the vertical kind, where the metaphor used is the ‘tree’, and horizontal thinking, where the metaphor is the rhizome.\(^{102}\)

Deleuze and Guattari argue that all modern philosophy is based on the metaphor of the mirror\(^{103}\) and the metaphor of the tree. According to the first metaphor, reality is translucently reflected in consciousness. According to the second metaphor, the mind organises its knowledge of reality (provided by the mirror) in systematic and hierarchical principles (branches of knowledge) which are grounded in firm foundations (roots). This is

...representational thinking [which] is analogical; its concern is to establish a correspondence between the symmetrically structured domains of the subject, its concepts, and the object of the world to which the concepts are applied - the ‘arborescent model of thought’, fuelled by an abstract machine of language that is fixed, linear, and based on dualities. (Leach & Boler 1998 p.156).

Rhizomatics’ intention is to uproot philosophical trees with their first principles and deconstruct binary logic. Rhizomatics seek to spread their roots to make new connections: decentering information into divergent acentred systems, and language into multiple semiotic dimensions. Leach and Boler (1998 p.157) give the example of serious gossip as a practice close to rhizomatics: ‘We can never know quite where it [gossip] goes, whom it reaches, how it changes, or how and by whom it is understood’ (p.158). Possibly it is this kind of serious gossip that we need to promote in class.

\(^{101}\) Best and Kellen (1991) describe the ‘body -without-organs’ as a body without ‘organisation’, a body that breaks free from its socially articulated, disciplined, semioticized, and subjectified state (as an ‘organism’), to become disarticulated, dismantled, and deterritorialized, and hence able to be reconstituted in new ways (pp.90-91).

\(^{102}\) A rhizome is a continuously growing, usually horizontal underground stem, which puts out lateral shoots and adventitious roots at intervals.

\(^{103}\) This is the metaphor of philosophy that Rorty (1990) discusses in his book with the same name.
Conversations

Rorty (1980) describes traditional philosophy as that discipline which tries to solve ‘perennial, eternal problems - problems which arise as soon as one reflects’ (p.3). Such philosophy is one which tries to come up with a ‘foundations’ of knowledge, and, attaining the power of being the discipline that possesses the ‘foundations’, asserts itself to be in a position to judge the validity or otherwise of all other forms of knowledge in all fields. Hence traditional philosophy has this power of regulating all knowledge and culture: what can be known and also what cannot be known.

Rorty, drawing on Dewey, argues that knowledge is that which we are (socially) justified in believing, in other words, that knowledge is socially constructed (p.9). He points out that epistemological discourse rests on ‘a set of rules which tell us how rational agreement can be reached’, or ‘commensurability’. Having an epistemology means having a ‘maximum amount of common ground with others’ (p.316). This common ground has to be on the ‘outside’, beyond us or inside us, in our minds.

Abandoning commensuration does not mean that one becomes a relativist. Rational agreement and disagreement can still be reached, through a course of conversation. This is the hermeneutical approach to philosophy, where ‘as long as the conversation lasts’ (p.318) there is always hope for agreement. The community of inquiry in Lipman’s tradition tries to establish this ‘common ground’ with others, sometimes coming to an agreement, a conclusion; but not always. What is important is that the act of conversation, of dialogue keeps on taking place.
Normal and Abnormal Philosophy

Drawing on Kuhn’s distinction between normal science and abnormal science, Rorty makes a distinction between normal discourse and abnormal discourse. In normal discourse, just like in normal science, there are agreed upon rules, conventions, an agreed upon epistemology. Abnormal discourse happens when someone disregards these rules, and brings into the discourse a new creative stance which can be understood through hermeneutics. ‘Hermeneutics is what we get when we are no longer epistemological’ (Rorty 1980 p.324). And it is through such a hermeneutical exercise that a new epistemology is formed, that the unfamiliar is studied and made familiar. Hermeneutics, in Rorty’s sense, are necessary when the discourse is incommensurable. Abnormal discourse then becomes revolutionary or is simply disregarded. If epistemology is not possible, if no common ground can be found at all, then all one can do is show how the other side looks from our own point of view. That is, all we can do is be hermeneutic about the opposition - trying to show how the odd or paradoxical or offensive things they say hang together with the rest of what they want to say, and how what they say looks when put in our own alternative idiom (Rorty 1980 p.365).

Such discourse is what Rorty calls edifying discourse, discourse which is ‘supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings’ (Rorty 1980 p.360). For Rorty, abnormal discourse is always parasitic on normal discourse.

Discussing philosophy, Rorty distinguishes between two types of philosophy: systematic philosophy, which we might call ‘normal’ philosophy and edifying philosophy, which is the ‘abnormal’ philosophy parasitic on systematic philosophy. An example could be the way postmodern philosophy - taken as the abnormal discourse, the edifying philosophy, brought about by the ‘peripheral’ philosophers - is parasitic on ‘modern’ philosophy as developed throughout the last centuries by mainstream philosophers. Rorty describes the edifying philosophers as those who want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause - wonder that there is something new under the sun, something which is not an
accurate representation of what was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be explained and can barely be described (Rorty 1980 p.370).

Edifying philosophers are not interested at finding objective truths, they are interested in keeping the conversation going.

**Can Children be Edifying Philosophers?**

Probably not. Edifying philosophy is parasitic on systematic philosophy; it is not the antithesis to it. To become good edifying philosophers children have to be ‘initiated’ into the normal discourse of philosophy, into systematic philosophy. Without such a philosophy both children and adults will have problems in creating new discourse, or new concepts (Deleuze and Guattari). The works of the edifying philosophers, like Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, Rorty, Habermas are all parasitic on ‘traditional’ systematic philosophy. John Caputo expresses the call of the edifying philosophers as

... a recall, back to the human setting of our lives, back to a sense of finitude and morality, to the joy and the tragedy of the human condition, to an understanding of ourselves in which we recognise ourselves. In my view, everything in hermeneutics depends upon this recognition, upon our ability to find ourselves in the account (Caputo, 1985, p.266).

In this sense, children should be encouraged to ‘recognise’ themselves, to find themselves in the account. Foucault (1982) urges us to ask: ‘What’s going on just now? What’s happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living?’ (p.216). What the Philosophy for Children movement has been suggesting is that we should encourage children to ask such questions, and to subject normal discourse to ‘inquiry’, a term rejected by Rorty.
The Community of Inquiry and Diversity

The word ‘inquiry’ for Rorty suggests a search for truth, or for foundations. Conversation, like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomes, is more open, more free, where the diversity of voices is possible. This is what should, through Philosophy for Children be encouraged in schools: conversation about our social practices; how ‘these are generated, sustained and passed away’ (Bernstein, 1985, p.83). This is possible through phronesis, translated by Smith (1999) as practical judgement. Such judgement involves understanding (Lyotard, 1994, p.95).

In promoting diversity, a wide range of texts should be used in the classroom. By texts I understand all material that can be used to initiate a conversation among students and teacher. For example, if the focus is binarisms e.g. male/female, good/bad, science/art, written/oral, subjective/object truth, one can use photos, films, poetry, dialogue, magazines, and fairy tales to initiate the conversation. If the focus is on discourses, and how these, for example, create knowledge and meaning, the classroom itself and the school become the text. Diaries and students’ narratives, as well as biographies, are extremely useful. Writing about the self helps students to position themselves in multiple positions, and writing their ‘story’ helps them to see how they have been constituted. ‘To write is to “show oneself,” to project oneself into view, to make one’s face appear in the other’s presence’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1997 p.216). Writing the self is one way of engaging in dialogue with oneself, of constructing texts and creating oneself at the same time.\(^\text{104}\)

After encountering the text, students are asked to identify the issues that they want to converse about; this can be done either in small groups or one whole group, in what I shall be calling ‘communities of conversations’. The problem with

\(^{104}\) For a good example of biographical writing and its relation to the creation of the self, see Schaafisma D. (1998).
turning the class into one community is that by its very nature a community excludes those who do not fit in. Young (1990) argues that:

The ideal of community presumes subjects can understand one another as they understand themselves. It thus denies the difference between subjects. ...it denies difference in the form of temporal and spatial distancing... [it] totalises and detemporalises its conception of social life by setting up an opposition between authentic and inauthentic social relations. It also detemporalises its understanding of social change by positing the desired society as the complete negation of existing society. It thus provides no understanding of the move from here to there that would be rooted in an understanding of the contradictions and possibilities of existing society (p. 302).

Young offers the model of an unoppressive city as a model of understanding social relations. Such a city is made up of several communities and these should be reflected in the classroom. The teacher is encouraged to promote conversation between the diverse communities, and children are encouraged to move from one community to another, depending on their interests. One also has to recognise that at times communication between communities fails, and it is here, where there is no longer a common epistemology, that Rorty's hermeneutical approach paves the way to understanding among the different communities.

Within such conversations, children should be encouraged to reflect on who is speaking (male/female, black/white, teacher/student), from which position and context, and what the effects of what is being said are. In such conversations children are encouraged to listen and build on one another's ideas.

Following the conversation(s), children should be encouraged to express their ‘new’ position in a number of ways, including producing things (art, poetry, games, writing) and acting on their ideas. Conversations are transformative. They transfer both that which is spoken about as well as the subject. Through an activity of writing about their conversation and experience, students create knowledge, in an interactive way. In this sense the knowledge created is autobiographical; there is part of them in it; it becomes a personal narrative, a better understanding of the ‘sites’ they are in. One hopes that through such discussions children will be able to see how institutions and ideas are created by people and how these are made to suit particular groups’ interests. This does not mean that children should not be
taught about social conventions, about institutions or values; it only means that such teaching should be done in a manner which is open to evaluation, to critique. A few topics could include:

- a discussion of European ‘common’ values: human rights/human dignity, fundamental freedoms, democratic legitimacy, peace and the rejection of violence as a means to an end, respect for others, a spirit of solidarity, (within Europe and vis-a-vis the world as a whole), equitable development, equal opportunities, the ethics of rational thought: the ethics of evidence and proof, preservation of the ecosystem and personal responsibility

- a discussion of the school curriculum: focus on ‘structures’ rather than ‘subjects’, focus on ‘unity’ rather than ‘difference’, efficiency, effectiveness and the measurement of ‘performativity’, monitoring of students and teachers, the study of textbooks vis-a-vis issues of gender, race, the way knowledge is presented: as ready-made rather than created, as universal and ahistorical rather than partial, local and specific, the way education tries to ‘make’ subjects in one particular way and not in others...

- a discussion of television programmes and the media in general: information technology, the manipulation of the consumer, the world of signs, of images, of reality and hyperreality, of simulacra: the replacement and reproduction of reality, ...

The ‘Subject’

Deleuze and Guattari speak of the ‘subject’ which is like a hand, comprising multiple lines. For them there are three basic kinds of lines; the ‘rigid segmentary line’, which is a molar line that constructs fixed and normalised identities within...

---

105 See the report published by the study group on education and training of the European Commission: Accomplishing Europe through Education and Training (1997).
106 Most of these issues are discussed in Blake et al (1998).
various institutions by way of binary oppositions: bosses and workers, male or female, white or black; ‘the supple segmentary line’, a molecular movement away from molar rigidity: where the cracks start showing up; and finally, ‘the lines of flight’; the deterritorializing movements away from molar identity where the cracks become ruptures and the subject is shattered in the process of becoming multiple. This latter line is the plane of creativity and desire. But it can also be the plane of death and destruction. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987 p.204) there is no social system that does not leak in all directions. There are always multiple paths of escape and transformations are possible. The state always tries to control, to discipline ‘rhizomatic’ thoughts through theory, through totalising forms of philosophy, and in practice by means of the police and bureaucratic organisations.

Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari have shown that there are constraints on the way we act which are beyond us. Normalisation and control at all levels, including the school, restrain our capacity to decide and deliberate among alternatives (hyperdialogue). This is contrary to what existentialists like Sartre believed: that ‘a subject possesses three key characteristics that mutually imply one another: a consciousness transparent to itself, voluntary self-determination; and (to a greater or lesser degree) the constitution of its own experience’ (May, 1994 p.76). It is contrary to the impression some teachers give in philosophy for children lessons where discussion, dialogue and understanding are presented as emancipator tools by means of which we can free ourselves from various dominating factors.

Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari argue that we are socially constituted, that there are forces and powers that constitute us and our knowledge. Our deliberations, the way we think, are the results of such forces. For Deleuze and Guattari these forces are forces of desire, for Foucault they are the forces of power. In *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1* (pp.94-96) Foucault explains that power is not something that is ‘acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points’, that relations of power are not in ‘superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they come to play’,
that power comes ‘from below’, is not binary (ruler/ruled); power is both ‘intentional and nonsubjective’; there is no power ‘that is exercised without a series of aims and objections’; there is always a plurality of resistance to power, and there is no escaping it, there is no ‘outside’108.

Much of the time this power, which is not necessarily suppressive, is hidden and intertwined with knowledge. It is this power that makes the subject; a produced subject rather than a producing subject.

The constitution of the subject comes from outside its own realm of reflection and decision, thus undermining at a stroke the subject’s transparency, voluntarism, and self-constitution (May, 1994. p.77).

For Foucault the subject has no essence: human beings are made subjects, are constituted. But being constituted does not mean that we are totally determined by outside forces. One can be a ‘subject’ to someone else’s control, but one can be a subject in the sense of self-knowledge, conscious of his self as a subject. Philosophy for Children and the promotion of conversations or ‘serious gossip’ in schools help students be aware of themselves as subjects to their particular life histories, to the multiple discourses (often contradictory) in which they are caught, to practices that constitute us into what we are.

This can be done through conversations in the classroom by means of which students and teachers reflect on their life-history, are encouraged to think about the power relations in the classroom, the school and beyond, how they are positioned, for example, gender (male/female), race (black/white), intelligence (bright/dull), and how they can position themselves, creating and recreating themselves. The subject of the conversation is not necessarily a school subject, some story, some book, or some other stimulus. The children are the subject.

Conclusion

Throughout this last chapter I am trying to open, rather than close the discussion on dialogue. I have argued that one perception of philosophy that can be useful to people working in philosophy for children is that of philosophy as conversation and as concept creation. The emphasis here is on philosophy as a creative activity. On the other hand, one must not forget that to become edifying philosophers children need to be initiated into the ‘normal’ systematic discourse of philosophy. I have shown that this is possible through conversations among different communities in the classroom, highlighting the possible excluding effect of one community for those who do not ‘fit’. I have also pointed out that according to a number of writers, we and knowledge are socially constructed, that power plays an important part in our daily lives, and that children can be helped to create meaning, through a conversation on a number of topics suggested above, through an activity very much depended on dialogue, which we have labelled Philosophy for Children.

Bibliography


---


iii The IAPC (Institute for the Development of Philosophy for Children) has produced eight novels with their corresponding manuals. For details see bibliography.

iv Repreent as *Thinking In Community In Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across The Disciplines* (1997) Vol.xvi No.4 pp.6-21.


vii An ironist is defined by Rorty (1995 p.75) as spending her time ‘worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of socialisation which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned he into the wrong kind of human being.

viii We can proceed from the fact that functioning language games, in which speech acts are exchanged, are based on an underlying consensus. This underlying consensus is formed in the reciprocal recognition of at least four claims to validity which speakers announce to each other: the comprehensibility of the utterance,
the truth of its propositional component, the correctness and appropriateness of its performatory component, and the authenticity of the speaking subject.

Habermas (1971) p.17-18